Al Chaidar - Blake Respini - Herdi Sahrasad

from Shari'aism to Terrorism

Political Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia

FROM SHARI'AISM TO TERRORISM

Political Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia

AL CHAIDAR

BLAKE RESPINI

HERDI SAHRASAD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

THIS book is a collection of papers and articles that have been published early in various newspapers, journals, or presented in various seminars, conferences and academic discussions in Indonesia and abroad.

This book is originally a passion —or then be a coincidence in a historical inevitability— we can't help to ignore this extra-ordinary world phenomenon.

Here, we would like to emphasize that shariaism and terrorism in Indonesia refer to acts of sharia enforcement and terrorism that take place within Indonesia or attacks on Indonesian people or foreign interests. The acts of terrorism often target the government of the Republic of Indonesia or foreigners in Indonesia, most notably Western people, especially those from the United States and Australia. besides the news of holy war and holy need, this is just a little sorrowed talk. This is, at the beginning we start to research, not something about the ordinary world.

In Indonesia, actually, the debate over the passage of sharia-based legislation reflects that that Indonesia continues to map out the most central questions concerning the basic shape of its democracy.

The debate is less a debate about whether sharia is good or bad, but more about the proper meaning of sharia and its relationship to the state and thus its relationship to the national ideology of Pancasila.

Ultimately, it reflects a deep debate over the very meaning of the Indonesian nation and what it means to be Indonesian.

While political violence, labeled loosely as "terrorism," is a seemingly ubiquitous factor in twentieth-century world politics. Coping with it has become a major preoccupation of governments and is the object of considerable international cooperation among them (Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, 1990).

There is conclusion that recent terrorism in Indonesia in part be attributed to the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and al-Qaeda-affiliated Jamaah Islamiyah, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and Darul Islam or the ISIS-afiliated (Islamic State of Iraq and Syam), Jamaah Ansharu Tauhid Islamist terror group.

And thanks to the globalized state of the issue of terrorism, Indonesian get more and more helpings hands from all over the western world in combatting terrorism.

This book will not finished without assistance and supportive-pressure from many friends and fellows in Indonesia and the US, who can not be mentioned one by one here. Again, this book is a part of a long journey to find the truth and friendship among us. Nothing is perfect, because perfection is belongs only to God.

August, 2016

INDONESIA, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: A PERSPECTIVE[1]

THERE are currently hundreds moderate Muslim organizations in Indonesia, many of them set up following the fall of President Soeharto in May 1998. The nurturing of these civic organizations may be as important to the future of Indonesia's democracy as is the curtailment of extremists.

Furthermore, simple political maturity, such as developing true parties with accountability and that stand for something beyond personality as well the development of an educated and experienced electorate should protect and stabilize Indonesia's democracy.

However, a critical component of Indonesia's democratic future involves recognition of the special role of Islam in the state.

As most Indonesian Muslims want their government to respect Islamic customs even if they do not support the creation of an Islamic state, the line between support for and opposition to sharia is often blurred.

Many Indonesians, including those who are only nominally Muslims, hold conservative values and support strict moral laws without necessarily seeing them as purely religious- or sharia-based.

It is easy to mistake support for a conservative moral law as support for Islamism when it is more simply a reflection of basic conservative values.

---

[1]Published on *The Jakarta Post*, Friday, February 5, 2010.

By the same token, many Muslims in Indonesia reject some social arrangements and norms that are commonly associated with democracy in the West, including our pluralism and secularism. But this too neither makes them theocrats nor anti-democratic.

While the political debate is often framed by pitting Islamists against non-Islamists, the lines are really much more subtle than this and democratic negotiation will require all parties to recognize this so that they can find common ground.

In this regard, Ahmad Shboul (2005) reminds us that keeping religion out of politics is not the same as keeping it out of society in general and that aside from the communists, even the most secular governments of the Western world have not attempted to do this.

Shboul suggests that the US attempts to secularize Arab politics may have even resulted in a backlash that has contributed to the growth of political Islam. Westerners would do well to remember that there is not only one form democratic society can take.

In fact, we do well to remember that even in the West, notions over what accruements democracy must have remains in flux and have changed over time.

As Hefner points out, whereas family was once seen as the central base of Western culture, today individual freedom is often elevated above family unity.

Additionally, the very notion of family is being redefined as Americans consider a variety of arrangements including domestic partnerships, civil unions, and gay marriage.

Despite our consensus on many central values there is constant stress in Western societies over the proper balance of individual right and needs of the community, equality and freedom, and even the proper role of religion and morality in politics.

Just as various Western democratic societies define each of these somewhat differently, Muslim democracies are likely to have their own brand of pluralism.

The debate over the passage of sharia-based legislation reflects that that Indonesia continues to map out the most central questions concerning the basic shape of its democracy.

The debate is less a debate about whether sharia is good or bad, but more about the proper meaning of sharia and its relationship to the state and thus its relationship to the national ideology of Pancasila.

Ultimately, it reflects a deep debate over the very meaning of the Indonesian nation and what it means to be Indonesian.

All of us have multiple identities. We may define ourselves as students, scholars, husbands, wives, athletes, musicians from an array of images that form our composite selves.

However, for a nation state to succeed it is essential that one of the imbedded images that a country's inhabitants hold of themselves is that of their national identity.

But it is not enough to simply be an American, German, and Indonesian or Turk, for a nation to function it is necessary that one's national identity represent some share sense of community, and thus shared values.

Most nations form out of a long history that creates a shared past. In most of Western Europe these shared histories have been bound together by common languages, religions and cultural norms.

Thus, while the Italians and French were both Catholics, the growing awareness of their differences became an expression of nationalism.

Indonesians similarly may share Islam with others across the globe, but Islam can fulfill only part of the nationalist vision. Of course this is especially true in light of the tens of millions of Indonesians who are not Muslims.

The challenge for Indonesia is to find a place for sharia that neither subverts the uniqueness of Indonesia from rest of the Islam nor undermines non-Muslim Indonesians.

Indonesian Islamic scholarship has long and deep ties to the Middle East that form a strong bond with the rest of the Muslim world and recent decades have seen what is often called the Islamization or sometimes even the Arabization of Indonesia.

It would thus be a mistake to dismiss Indonesia as a worthy example of what the type of democratic society that Islam has produced even if it would be a mistake to assume that what can work in Indonesia could be exported to rest of the Islamic world.

The Rise of Sharia and Civil Society

There are hundreds moderate Muslim organizations in Indonesia today, many of them outgrowths of the democratically based *reformasi* movement in 1998.

The rising of these civic organizations may be as important to the future of Indonesia's democracy as is the curtailment of extremists. Furthermore, the political maturity, albeit simple, will help develop parties with accountability and those that stand for something beyond personality, as well as an educated and experienced electorate that protects and stabilizes Indonesia's democracy. [2]

However, a critical component for Indonesia's democratic future involves recognition of the special role of Islam in the state. As most Indonesian Muslims want their government to respect Islamic customs, but do not want to see the creation of an Islamic state, the line between support for and opposition to sharia is often blurred.

Many Indonesians, including those who are only nominally Muslim, hold conservative values and support strict moral laws without necessarily seeing them as purely religious or sharia-based. It is easy to mistakenly interpret support for a conservative moral law as support for Islamism, although it is more simply a reflection of basic conservative values.

By the same token, many Muslims in Indonesia reject some social arrangements and norms that are commonly associated with democracy in the West, including pluralism and secularism.

While the political debate is often framed by pitting Islamists against non-Islamists, the lines are really much more subtle than this and democratic negotiation will require all parties to recognize this so that they can find a common ground.

---

[2] Blake Respini and Herdi Sahrasad, "The rise of sharia seems not a Threat to Civil Society," *The Jakarta Post* (05/18/2007).

In this regard, Ahmad Shboul (2005) reminds us that keeping religion out of politics is not the same as keeping it out of society in general and that aside from the communists, even the most secular governments of the Western world have not attempted to do this. Shboul suggests that the U.S. attempts to secularize Arab politics may have even resulted in a backlash that has contributed to the growth of political Islam.

In fact, we do well to remember that even in the West, notions over what elements democracy must have remain in flux and have changed over time. Whereas family was once seen as the central base of Western culture, today individual freedom is often elevated above family unity. Additionally, the very notion of family is being redefined as Americans consider a variety of arrangements including domestic partnerships, civil unions and gay marriage.

Despite our consensus on many central values there is constant stress in Western societies over the proper balance of individual rights and the needs of the community, equality and freedom, and even the proper role of religion and morality in politics. Just as various Western democratic societies define each of these somewhat differently, Muslim democracies are likely to have their own brand of pluralism.

The debate over the passage of sharia-based legislation reflects that Indonesia continues to map out the most central questions concerning the basic shape of its democracy. The debate is less a debate about whether sharia is good or bad, but more about the proper meaning of sharia and its relationship to the state and thus its relationship to the national ideology of Pancasila.

Ultimately, it reflects a deep debate over the very meaning of the Indonesian nation and what it means to be Indonesian. All of us have multiple identities. We may define ourselves as students, scholars, husbands, wives, athletes, musicians from an array of images that form our composite selves.

However, for a nation state to succeed it is essential that one of the embedded images that a country's inhabitants hold of themselves is that of their national identity. However, it is not enough to simply be an American, German, Indonesian or Turk, for a nation to function it is necessary that national identity represents some share sense of community, and thus shared values.

Most nations form out of a long history the creates a shared past. In most of Western Europe these shared histories have been bound together by common languages, religions and cultural norms.

Benedict Anderson (1983) explains that a nation is an imagined community whereby people who have never even met one another come to see themselves as connected and separate from others. However, religion, because it usually does not correspond with national borders, usually can not be the core of the nationalist vision. Anderson wrote that nationalism as an idea came "to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such religions".

Thus, while the Italians and French were both Catholic, the growing awareness of their differences became an expression of nationalism. Indonesians similarly may share

Islam with others across the globe, but Islam can fulfill only part of the nationalist vision.

Of course this is especially true in light of the tens of millions of Indonesians who are not Muslim. The challenge for Indonesia is to find a place for sharia that neither subverts the uniqueness of Indonesia from the rest of Islam nor undermines Indonesia's non-Muslims.

Even if Indonesia becomes a model of a moderate and democratic Muslim society, it is not clear what this may imply for the rest of the Muslim world. Even though Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim nation, many write off Indonesia as not being truly Islamic and thus not worthy of comparison with other Muslim nations. It is also typical to see Indonesia as more tolerant, gentler, and softer, than the "real" Islam of the Arab world and to emphasize the syncretic nature of Indonesian Islam as a way to separate it from the wider Muslim world (Johns and Lahoud, 2005).

Indeed, many Indonesians are only nominally Muslim and there is no doubt that Indonesian Islam is often layered with strains of Hinduism, Buddhism and mysticism.

Furthermore, as has been shown here, Indonesian Islamic scholarship has long and deep ties to the Middle East that form a strong bond with the rest of the Muslim world and recent decades has seen what is often called the Islamization or sometimes even the Arabization of Indonesia. It would thus be a mistake to dismiss Indonesia as a worthy example of the type of democratic society that Islam produces and it would be a mistake to assume that what can work in Indonesia could be exported to rest of the Islamic world.

DEMOCRACY, SHARIA AND PANCASILA IN INDONESIA

Introduction

In the years following the Reformasi movement that brought down Suharto in 1998, the growth of an Islamist movement in support of the institution of *sharia* has perplexed scholars and ordinary Indonesians alike. While the vast majority of Indonesia's Muslims are moderate and do not support an Islamic state, conservative Muslim parties and civic organizations have grown in since 1998 and have gained considerable influence in some provinces and districts where they have passed local laws in over 55 districts inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of *sharia*. Among other things such laws have required women to wear veils (*jilbab*), commanded government employees to be fluent in the Koran, instituted a government collected *zakat*, and banned public consumption of alcohol.

On the national level, though in 2005 a bill to make *sharia* the official foundation of the state was quickly tabled without debate, a broad anti-pornography bill, which some see as a "backdoor" means of implementing *sharia*, remains under debate and if passed could forbid anything from pubic kissing to women exposing their belly buttons. The passage of these laws are also puzzling because they co-exist with continuing widespread support for the national ideology of *Pancasila*, which has historically has been associated with a rejection of Islamism. Both moderate Islamic and secular Indonesian activists fear the potential consequences of this

growth of the Islamic right on the still fragile democratization of Indonesia and worry that such laws pose a threat to the pluralism and diversity upon which democracy rests and which have been cornerstones of Indonesian nationalism since the nation's inception.

Understanding why these laws are gaining ground will help us understand their potential effect on Indonesia's democratization which in turn may shed light on the wider question of Islam's compatibility and democracy. The fact that so few Muslim nations have made the transition to democracy has led a number of scholars to question whether or not Islam is at root compatible with democracy and modernization. To add to this disquiet, a 2003 PEW survey revealed that only 65% of Indonesians think democracy can work. For these reasons, it may be logical to conclude that the rise of Islamic parties in Indonesia could pose a threat to both its democratization and modernization and usher in a new era of authoritarianism. As the world's largest Muslim nation, Indonesia is often seen as a test case for the compatibility of Islam and democracy. With the Middle East beset by authoritarian regimes and in light of America's apparent failure to bring democracy to Iraq, some U.S. policy makers hope to use Indonesia as a model for a pluralist, tolerant and democratic Islam in the Middle East (Sweet). Whether or not the Indonesian experience is translatable to the Middle East, the viability of liberal democracy the world's third largest nation where over 85% of the population in Muslim is significant unto itself.

The Islamic Roots of Indonesian Nationalism

Indonesia is one of the world's most diverse nations and its national slogan "Unity through Diversity" exemplifies the challenge the state faces. When the nation's founder, Sukarno, was once asked what all Indonesian peoples had in common, he simply replied, "Only that we were colonized by the Dutch" (Palmer 153). However, this may have been more of a political statement than one of fact for Islam had played a major unifying role and one that could potentially challenge his power. The nation, composed of 13,667 islands, and over 200 million people (50% which live on Java), is what Eka Darmaputera describes as the "most dispersed country in the world". The land and sea it controls encompasses nearly 4 million square miles across a 3,000 mile length. The archipelago is so vast that it would stretch from Hawaii all the way to the eastern seaboard if laid over the United States.

Culturally, there are over 300 ethnic groups with more than 50 spoken languages. Along with the indigenous Malay, there are significant numbers Chinese, Indian, and Arab minorities. While 87.5% of the population is Muslim, the Balinese are uniformly Hindu, and while Chinese Buddhists and both Catholic and Protestant Christians exist as regional majorities (Darmaputera 20). Additional cleavages were identified in by Clifford Geertz in his seminal work the *Religion of Java* where he outlined three primary cultural layers: the *abangan* of the villages who adhered to the tribal animism of indigenous peoples; the ruling *priyayi* of inland towns, who followed a hierarchical *Indic* tradition; and the *santri* who were mostly coastal traders and became converts to Islam. Reuven Kahane in *The Problem of Political Legitimacy*

in an Antagonistic Society, suggests that these three societies remained largely separate and provided no cultural unity to the archipelago. Today, the cultural divide between the *abangan*, who are nominally Muslim but follow a lose blend of Islam mixed with local tradition, and the more formally Islamic *santri* is still one of the most prominent social cleavages in Indonesia and shapes the debate over the proper place of Islam in politics.

Robert Hefner points out that many specialists tend to underestimate the role of Islam in Indonesian culture and are tempted to see what is admirable in Indonesia as the product of its Hindu-Buddhist axis or its Javanese roots rather than its Muslim heritage (2005, p xix). However, the truth is that Indonesia owes its formation largely to its Muslim heritage. While Benedict Anderson emphasizes the impact of the colonial experience on the formation of Indonesian national identity, Michael Laffan in his book *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia* points to the crucial role played by Islam in this formation. While Dutch colonialism cemented the idea of an Indonesia separate from the rest of Southeast Asia, it was Islam that originally gave a common identity to people from disparate cultures across a vast archipelago.

In emphasizing the colonial experience in the formation of Indonesian identity, Benedict Anderson points out how Indonesian students began to ″imagine″ an Indonesian community when they went to Dutch schools and saw maps which colored Indonesia as separate from the British Malay and the American Philippines (1983,132). Despite the fact of significant *commonalities* across the Malay culture from

Malaysia, to Indonesia, to the Philippines, and despite the vast cultural *differences* within what was to become Indonesia, these maps, he says, ingrained the idea that Indonesia was one singular thing and that it was something distinct from the other regions settled by ethnic Malays. Of course, similar occurrences were taking place in the British and American Malay holdings and thus we see that despite the fact that a region like Mindanao in the predominately Catholic Philippines had a Muslim majority and despite the fact that eastern part of Dutch Indonesia was predominately Christian, it was colonial heritage rather than religion that became the basis for national identity. Anderson paints a compelling picture of Malay Sumatrans who share neither language, ethnicity, nor religion with the Ambonese who live thousands of miles to the east of them but envision the Ambonese as part of them while viewing their neighboring Malays of Malaysians as foreigners (1983, 120).

Laffan on the other hand suggests that Indonesian nationalism "germinated" in the Middle East as much as in Leiden and suggests that Anderson may have under-estimated the role religion played in creating Indonesian nationhood. First of all, he explains that during the 19th century, Indonesians gradually adopted Islam, following the lead of local monarchs and starting with symbolic activities such as forsaking pork, circumcision, and the adoption of Arab-Islamic names. This, however, was followed by a slow adoption of religious orthodoxy which was accelerated by growth in the number of Indonesian elites who took *hajis* to Mecca which according to official figures jumped to 3,000 by 1858 (2003, 38). Darmaputera notes that these were up to 10,000 by 1880 and 50,000 by 1926 (1988, 50). *Hajis* who

returned home to the so-called 'lands below the winds' brought home more orthodox modes of faith and made Muslims aware of a common heritage that lay in Cairo, Bagdad, and Medina as much as Holland (2003,2).

However, Laffan notes that the experience in Mecca made Indonesians aware of their differences from other Muslims as well. Often their naiveté led them to be the victims of "tricksters and pickpockets" and they found themselves open to exploitation from the moment they arrived (2003, 51). These encouraged them to bond together and form a tight-nit Southeast Asian community that emerged in Mecca in the 1880's. Jawi friendships and intermarriage, pan-Islamic solidarity, Arab-Jawi opposition all contributed to a stronger Jawi identity despite cultural barriers such as regionalism and theological divergence which re-enforced one another as religious scholars tended to cater to students from specific parts of the archipelago.[1]

Laffan also points out Islam helped unite Indonesia not only through pilgrimages to Mecca but also by contributing to domestic pilgrimages as students flocked to study with leading scholars in Southeast Asia (2003, 19). While the Dutch may have built the railways, a significant portion of the domestic traffic on these lines were Muslims traveling between various *pesantrens* (Islamic schools). Laffan further adds that Javanese identity as separate from Muslim identity was also amplified by the presence of *Hadramis* (Arab traders) living in the archipelago which bred a level of contempt as Muslims often found themselves as an

[1] "Jawi" was a word coined by Arabs to indicate Easterners who neither Chinese nor Indian. Today, Java is Indonesia's most populous island and he seat of political and economic power.

underclass below an influx of Arabs (2003, 44). Even as late as the early 1920's when the group Sarekat Islam sponsored a series of conferences to discuss the idea of a pan-Islamic caliphate which was attended by most Islamic groups in the archipelago, numerous delegates expressed resentment towards the patronizing attitude of the Arabs. One member at the Surabaya meeting said that if they sent a delegation to the Cairo Congress, they would be "treated like flies" (2003, 212). Thus, we can see the concept of a pan-Islamic identity losing ground to a burgeoning nationalist, yet Islamic identity.

A key element in the development in national identify for Anderson is the development of a common language, but here too the Indonesians owe as much to Islam as to the Dutch. Anderson writes that Bahasa, the Indonesian language, was derived from "administrative Malay" (122). Laffan, however, shows that the development of Javanese Islamic literature predates the development colonial print-capitalism and was an expression of both Islamic and Jawi identity (2003, 25). He explains that starting in the 17thcentury; the written word of Islam was translated to reach a wider audience and provided another "thread of continuity between various regions". These books written in Javanese, known as the *kitab* represented what he described as "the unity of Islam as an expression of Jawi identity" (2003, 20-25).

Though at the beginning of the 20th century, indigenous peoples still largely identified themselves with the land of their particular rajas rather than as part of a united Indonesian land, what colonialism did was simply to bring

the religious identity to the fore. Both the locals and Dutch associated Islam as the central identity of the people the Dutch ruled. Orang Jawas or orangs Sunda were simply seen as sub-categories of *orang* Islam.[2] Laffan even describes a how Chinese countrymen who took up Javanese customs began to call themselves "*orang* Islam". However, Laffan admits the in the late 19thcentury, this identity still made no territorial claims and was seen as connected to a multiplicity of lands rather than a singular place or "homeland" (2003, 99). While some say that the journal Bintang Hindia, a pro-Dutch Malay language paper first printed in 1903 in Amsterdam, read widely by the growing priyayi (traditional ruling) class that was becoming educated in Malay was the first real propagator of an Indonesian national image, Laffan holds that it was rather the increasingly ecumenical discourses of Islam as that negated the positions of the rajas and moved the people's of the archipelago (2003, 100). Thus, while by the mid 19th century there was no real Indonesian nationalism per se, Islam had created a common faith and identity that becomes an integral facet of the development of the nation.

Islam additionally contributed deeply to the Indonesian nation in its leading role in the anti-colonial movement. Laffan describes how Mecca became a center for a growing opposition to colonial rule and shows how the roots of anti-colonialism can be found in 19th century works such as al-Falimbani's text, *The Virtues of Jihad,* which was banned by the Dutch as it promised eternal rewards for martyrdom and suffering for those who supported the Dutch (2003,27).

[2] The Bahasa term "orang" designates person.

Other texts helped forge identity in opposition to the Dutch by encouraging Islamic dress and proclaiming *fatwas* against brimmed hats and tight trousers that could interfere with *shalat* (Muslim prayer) (2003, 27). Ultimately, Laffan says, the subjugation of Indonesia by the Dutch was seen not as East vs. West, but as Islam vs. West as Muslims began to perceive a worldwide decline in Islamic political power (2003,28). From the 1900 on, Muslims, whether traditionalist or reformist, used Islam as a rallying point against colonial rule (2003, 31). This stands in contrast to Indonesian Christians who tended to feel loyalty to the Dutch and defend them against nationalists (von der Mehden, 2005). Additionally, because the Dutch often preferred to ally with traditional *adat* (animist) Javanese, colonialism began to be seen as a front against Islam. In fact, it was Dutch support of the Christian Minangkabau against the Muslims which led to the formation of Sarekat Islam, the first true mass-organization of Muslims in 1912. In modernist Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah schools students studied the same texts and gained a mutual identity of an Indonesian identity grounded against the Christian state that had established its borders and which now seemed determined to alter the faith of its inhabitants. (2003, 210).

While Laffan may have overemphasized the role of Islam by ignoring the degree to which it was limited by class, as it was mostly members of the new mercantilist class that could afford to send their sons to Mecca, and while he may have underemphasized the role of the Dutch, there is no doubt that the strength and unity of the Islamic world did, as he says "color the development of the independence movement" (2003, 76). In the end, Laffan takes issue with Geertz's

divisions of *abangan, priyayi* and *santri* for ignoring an over arching unity Islam provided. While political Islam failed to achieve leadership in the independence movement, which bowed to secular nationalists such as Sukarno and Hatta, it still created the foundations of Islamic nationhood that have not disappeared and continues to give Muslims credentials as nationalists. And despite their electoral failure following independence, they remained a strong voice in national politics, often from the outside, often voicing opposition to what many look back on as a history of corrupt authoritarian institutions, a position which has only served to strengthened the legitimacy of those who wish to use Islam as a political rallying force.

Islamisation and Islamism

Borrowing from Greg Fealy, we use the term Islamisation to refer to either the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam or the intensification of belief or practice both of which have clearly been taking place in Indonesia in recent years (2005,167). However, Islamisation should not be confused with Islamism which is the desire to create and live in an Islamic state. This paper will use the terms "radical" and "Islamist" inter-changeably to describe groups that wish to create an Islamic state or at least make *sharia* the basis of the state. While the most extreme of these groups may be willing to use violence to reach their objectives, the great majority of Islamists in Indonesia reject the use of violence and thus groups that utilize violence will not be the focus of this work. While some scholars use the expression "moderate Islamists" to describe those Islamists who are willing to

work through the system and reject violence, many Indonesian Muslims we spoke with who reject the implementation of sharia by any means, considered themselves moderates rather than liberals; thus, to avoid confusion, we will use the term ″moderate″ only to describe Muslims who oppose the new laws under discussion and ″Islamist″ to describe supporters.

While Islamism and fundamentalism are sometimes equated, fundamentalism specifically refers to belief in the authority of revealed texts and strict adherence to them. In this respect all Muslims who closely follow the Koran are fundamentalist whether they are Islamist or not. Indeed in Indonesia many deeply pious and morally conservative Muslims reject Islamism and wish to keep the state our of their religion. Thus, while the growth in Islamic piety in Indonesia provides a backdrop, we will see that it is not sufficient as an independent variable to explain the spate *sharia*laws that have recently gained ground.

While Islamisation is about religion, Islamism is concerned with politics. Anthony Johns and Nelly Lahound note that the difference between fundamentalism and Islamism that was put forth by Islamic scholar Mahmood Mamdani who held that ″fundamentalism is primarily a religious tendency that seeks salvation, whereas Islamism is more a political construct that seeks liberation (2005, 15). Islamists are often motivated by what they see as a grievous wrong which rests on a deep ignorance of God, known as *jahiliyya* (Johns and Lahoud 2005, 16). What is needed in their opinion is the Islamisation of all levels of society from government, to education, to moral law.

Sharia

In the Middle East, calls to apply *sharia* are often put forth by the popular slogan 'Islam is the Answer', which is often chanted during demonstrations (Shboul 2005, 174). Yet, upon closer examination it is seen that sharia is a contested term with multiple definitions. Some Muslim's see it as a very formalistic set of specific laws inherited from the Koran and Hadith, while others view it simply as a set of general and holistic principles that are not specific to Islam. When referring to "sharia bylaws" or "sharia inspired laws" in this paper, I am using the term in its more formalistic meaning as that is the common usage in the press and in the general debate over their passage. It is also important to note here that both the terms *sharia* and Islamism have deeply political connotations. Many Indonesian observers suggest that Indonesian support for *sharia*has more to do with people's desire for improved government and better lives than with a particular sense of religious piety. Islamism and the drive to put the state in the business of enforcing *sharia* is as much a political movement as it is a religious movement.

Democracy

Here, in examining sharia relationship with democracy it is important to be clear on how democracy is being defined. While democracy is often equated with majoritarian rule, most political theorists recognize that democracy must mean more than two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. Most western thinkers such as Robert Dahl and Samuel Huntington take a procedural view of democracy that sees it based on free, fair and open elections mixed with

basic minority rights such as protection of free speech and press and the right to assemble (Dahl 2002, Huntington1991). However, Huntington points out that democracy is sometimes also defined in terms of the sources of authority as well as the purposes served by government (2003,6). These ideas are more contested and raise the debate of whether or not democracy must entail the whole package of Western liberalism and promotion of individual rights. This paper takes a middle position. While recognizing that democracy must go beyond mere majority rule, it recognizes that there may be significant differences in the range of freedoms that particular democracies offer and that there could be an Islamic or and Indonesian version of democracy that draws the lines between individual freedoms and enforced conformity substantially different from Western norms.

Pancasila and the Non-secular State

With Muslims comprising over 80% of the population, many Islamic activists who had fought for independence expected that Muslims would unite under a single banner and that their contributions to independence would win them a large majority in popular elections allowing them to create an Islamic state. None of this came to be as in Indonesia's first national election in 1955 the Muslim movement split into two parties which together received only 43.9% of the vote. This failure to translate their contributions towards nationhood into political gain set the stage for the great schism that dominates Indonesian political life to this day. However, it was not a complete defeat for Muslims, for

though the official ideology of *Pancasila*, which became part of the national constitution, did not create an Islamic state, neither did it create a secular state, a fact that Muslims will use to their advantage down the line. Muslim parties and activists will find themselves in a position to depict themselves as outsiders who have neither failed at leadership nor been given their due. In the long run, and in a manner that Machiavelli might appreciate, their failure in the 1950'will be converted into opportunity.

On June 1st, 1945, when Sukarno gave the speech which has commonly become known as *LahirnyaPancasila* (the Birth of *Pancasila*), he outlined five principles that he hoped could form a unified national vision out of Indonesia's cultural milieu. This vision was intended to unite all Indonesians as well as separate them from the rest of the globe. While containing some elements borrowed from western liberalism, it was clearly indigenous in many aspects. In meeting both the need to separate Indonesia's Muslims from global notions of a caliphate and to include non-Muslims in the Indonesia vision, religion could not, as Benedict Anderson suggested, be at the root of the nationalist vision. However, the ideology Sukarno espoused that day, though not a religious vision per se, certainly was not secular. In fact, "*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*" (the one lordship), was the first of the five central principles that constitute *Pancasila*.[3]

[3] The other four pillars are. *Perikemanusiaan* (humanitariansim – which generally refers to recognition for human rights), *Kabangsaan* (nationalism), *Kerakyatan* (peoplehood and the Spirit of Wisdom in Deliberation and Representation which is usually simply seen as democracy), and *Keadilan Sosial* (social justice, which usually is seen as a defense for social welfare). Also in the final formulation of the constitution the word Allah in the was changed to more generic "Tuan" on request of Balinese.

Eka Darmaputera notes that this formulation was distinctively Indonesian in it's "neither nor" approach. Building on the Indonesian political traditions of deliberation and compromise, Sukarno formed a state that was neither Islamic nor secular (1988). No one would get what they entirely wanted and everyone would have to compromise. Thus, from the outset, *Pancasila* broke from the Western ideal of separation of church in state and forged a uniquely Indonesian path. Sukarno even claimed that he did not write *Pancasila*, but rather was only the formulator explaining, "I am no more than just a communicator of the desires and aspirations of the Indonesian people for generations. … *Pancasila* has been written in the heart of the Indonesian people for generations" (Darmaputera, 1988: 180). One scholar, Arnold Mononutu, claimed *Pancasila* "can be viewed as the emanation of the soul of the Indonesian people" due to its synthetic nature. Because it is based on compromise, is synthetically, and rejects "either-or" formulations. Darmaputera explains almost all groups can accept it (1988, 186).

However, the tension between a secular nationalist vision and a religious orientation remained. Mohammed Natsir, head of Indonesia's first and largest Islamic party, *Masyumi,* said during the 1956-59 *Konstituante* debate that his goal was to discard *Pancasila* proclaiming:

> *Because Pancasila is not wiling to abandon its neutrality, it is not willing to accept any positive substance; Pancasila remains a "pure concept" … without any form.*
>
> *For us, Moslems, to move from the ideology of Islam to Pancasila is like to leap from the real world to a vacuum space without air.* (Darmaputera 1988, 185)

While *Pancasila* was often presented as a comprise between secularists and those who wanted an Islamic state, many Muslim leaders felt betrayed and soon began to lobby for what was known as the Jakarta Charter. Often referred to as simply "the seven words", the Jakarta Charter stated that the *Pancasila's* first principle, belief in God, would be "*dengan kewajiban melaksanakan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya*" (with the obligation for Muslims to observe *sharia*). These seven words have ever since become a sort of dividing line in Indonesia, pitting the so-called nationalists against Islamists. For nearly two years the Constituent Assembly debated whether or not the Jakarta Charter should be part of the constitution until eventually Sukarno simply suspended debate, implemented the constitution without the seven words, and began Indonesia's experiment in "Guided Democracy". The resulting construct that pitted nationalists against Islamists has served as a framework for debate for over 60 years. In fact, the 2003 Pew global survey re-fashioned its question on political ideology in Indonesia in recognition of this basic tension. Whereas the generic question used in most countries asked respondents to rate themselves along a liberal/conservative continuum, the question was modified when asked in Indonesia by requiring respondents to place themselves on a scale ranging from Islamist to nationalist. As *Figure 10* shows, while the majority of Indonesians placed themselves somewhere in the middle, significant minorities ranged across the spectrum. A key for the Islamist parties, we will see, is to reframe this debate so that they are not pitted against nationalist sentiment.

Figure 10: Percentages Rating Islamic/Nationalist Sentiment on a 10 Point Scale.

Data compile from Pew 2002.

Throughout all the changes that Indonesia has gone through one thing that has stayed consistent is Islamic parties' ability to only gain only about 40% of the vote despite the country being about 85% Muslim. Even worse from the Islamist point of view, support for the Jakarta Charter has waned considerably over time. As shown in *Figure 11*, whereas in 1955 all six Islamic parties supported the charter and collectively received 39.3% of the vote, in 1999 the Islamic movement was split over the charter and those continuing to support the Jakarta Charter found their support drop by more than 50%. Despite a bit of a comeback in 2004 that some ascribe to the conservative parties downplaying their Islamist agendas, support for parties in favor the charter stayed just over half of what is in 1995.

Figure 11: Percentage of Islamic vote in Indonesia National Elections.

	1955	1999	2004
Total Islamic vote	43.9%	37.9%	38.3%
Conservative*	39.3%	15.9%	21.3%
Liberal/Moderate**		21.1%	17.0%

Data compiled from KPU.

* Conservative refers to parties supporting the Jakarta Charter, in1955 this was both the NU and Masyumi and in 2004 to the PPP, PKS, PBB, and PBR.

** Liberal/Moderate refers to *Pancasila* based parties including the PKB and PAN.

There have been numerous explanations for the Islamist movement's failure to fare better at the polls. One is simply increasing political fragmentation. In 1955 therewere six major Islamic parties while in 1999 there were over 20. Though changes in the election law whittled the number down to seven in 2008, it is still hardly a unified movement and the PKS, PBB, PBR, and PPP all compete for the conservative vote. This fragmentation is not surprising given Indonesia's ethnic, cultural, geographic and doctrinarian diversity.

Summary of the 5 April 2004 Indonesian People's Representative Council election results

Parties	Votes	%	Seats	%	+/–
Party of the Functional Groups (*Partai Golongan Karya*, Golkar)	24,480,757	21.58	128	23.27	+8
Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, PDI–P)	21,026,629	18.53	109	19.82	−44
National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, PKB)	11,989,564	10.57	52	9.45	+1

United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, PPP)	9,248,764	8.15	58	10.55	±0
Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat*, PD)	8,455,225	7.45	(55)	10.00	n/a
Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS)	8,325,020	7.34	45	8.18	+38
National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, PAN)	7,303,324	6.44	(53)	9.64	+19
Crescent Star Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang*, PBB)	2,970,487	2.62	11	2.00	−2
Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi*, PBR)	2,764,998	2.44	(14)	2.55	n/a
Prosperous Peace Party (*Partai Damai Sejahtera*, PDS)	2,414,254	2.13	(13)	2.36	n/a
Concern for the Nation Functional Party (*Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa*, PKPB)	2,399,290	2.11	2	0.36	n/a
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (*Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia*, PKPI)	1,424,240	1.26	1	0.18	−3
United Democratic Nationhood Party (*Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan*, PPDK)	1,313,654	1.16	(4)	0.73	n/a
Freedom Bull National Party (*Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan*, PNBK)	1,230,455	1.08	(0)	0.00	n/a
Pancasila Patriots' Party (*Partai Patriot Pancasila*)	1,073,139	0.95	0	0.00	n/a
Indonesian National Party Marhaenism (*Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme*, PNI Marhaenisme)	923,159	0.81	1	0.18	+1
Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (*Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia*, PPNUI)	895,610	0.79	0	0.00	−5
Pioneers' Party (*Partai Pelopor*, PP)	878,932	0.77	(3)	0.55	n/a
Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (*Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia*, PPDI)	855,811	0.75	1	0.18	−1
Freedom Party (*Partai Merdeka*)	842,541	0.74	0	0.00	n/a

Indonesian Unity Party (*Partai Sarikat Indonesia*, PSI)	679,296	0.60	0	0.00	n/a
New Indonesia Alliance Party (*Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru*, PPIB)	672,952	0.59	0	0.00	n/a
Regional Unity Party (*Partai Persatuan Daerah*, PPD)	657,916	0.58	0	0.00	n/a
Social Democrat Labor Party (*Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat*, PBSD)	636,397	0.56	0	0.00	n/a
Total	**113,462,414**	**100.00**	**550**	**100.00**	**+88**

Source: Ananta, Arifin & Suryadinata 2005, p. 22
Notes: Seat totals in parentheses indicate those changed after the Constitutional Court settled disputes related to election results. Final seating allocation is displayed.
Seat change totals are displayed only for parties which stood in the previous election, including those which changed party names

e•d **Summary of the 9 April 2009 Indonesian People's Representative Council election results**

Parties	**Votes**	**%**	**Seats**	**%**	**+/-**
Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat*, PD)	21,655,295	20.85	148	26.43	+93
Party of the Functional Groups (*Partai Golongan Karya*, Golkar)	15,031,497	14.45	106	18.93	-22
Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, PDI–P)	14,576,388	14.03	94	16.79	-15
Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS)	8,204,946	7.88	57	10.18	+12
National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, PAN)	6,273,462	6.01	46	8.21	-7
United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, PPP)	5,544,332	5.32	38	6.79	-20
National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, PKB)	5,146,302	4.94	28	5.00	-24
Great Indonesia Movement Party (*Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya*,	4,642,795	4.46	26	4.64	n/a

Gerindra)					
People’s Conscience Party (*Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat*, Hanura)	3,925,620	3.77	17	3.03	n/a
Crescent Star Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang*, PBB)	1,864,642	1.79	0	0.00	-11
Ulema National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama*, PKNU)	1,527,509	1.47	0	0.00	n/a
Prosperous Peace Party (*Partai Damai Sejahtera*, PDS)	1,522,032	1.48	0	0.00	-13
Concern for the Nation Functional Party (*Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa*, PKPB)	1,461,375	1.40	0	0.00	–2
Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi*, PBR)	1,264,150	1.21	0	0.00	–14
National People’s Concern Party (*Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional*, PPRN)	1,260,950	1.21	0	0.00	n/a
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (*Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia*, PKPI)	936,133	0.90	0	0.00	–1
Democratic Renewal Party (*Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan*, PDP)	896,959	0.86	0	0.00	n/a
National Front Party (*Partai Barisan Nasional*, Barnas)	760,712	0.73	0	0.00	n/a
Indonesian Workers and Employers Party (*Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia*, PPPI)	745,965	0.72	0	0.00	n/a
Democratic Nationhood Party (*Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan*, PDK)	671,356	0.64	0	0.00	–4
Archipelago Republic Party (*Partai Republik Nusantara*, PRN)	631,814	0.61	0	0.00	n/a
Regional Unity Party (*Partai Persatuan Daerah*, PPD)	553,299	0.53	0	0.00	±0
Patriot Party (*Partai Patriot*)	547,798	0.53	0	0.00	±0
Indonesian National Populist Fortress Party (*Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia*, PNBKI)	468,856	0.45	0	0.00	±0
Sovereignty Party (*Partai Kedaulatan*)	438,030	0.42	0	0.00	n/a

Indonesian Youth Party (*Partai Pemuda Indonesia*, PPI)	415,563	0.40	0	0.00	n/a
National Sun Party (*Partai Matahari Bangsa*, PMB)	415,294	0.40	0	0.00	n/a
Functional Party of Struggle (*Partai Karya Perjuangan*, PKP)	351,571	0.34	0	0.00	n/a
Pioneers' Party (*Partai Pelopor*)	345,092	0.33	0	0.00	–3
Indonesian Democratic Party of Devotion (*Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia*, PKDI)	325,771	0.31	0	0.00	n/a
Prosperous Indonesia Party (*Partai Indonesia Sejahtera*, PIS)	321,019	0.31	0	0.00	n/a
Indonesian National Party Marhaenism (*Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme*, PNI Marhaenisme)	317,443	0.30	0	0.00	–1
Labor Party (*Partai Buruh*)	265,369	0.25	0	0.00	±0
New Indonesia Party of Struggle (*Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru*, PPIB)	198,803	0.19	0	0.00	±0
Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (*Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia*, PPNUI)	146,831	0.14	0	0.00	±0
Indonesian Unity Party (*Partai Sarikat Indonesia*, PSI)	141,558	0.14	0	0.00	±0
Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (*Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia*, PPDI)	139,988	0.13	0	0.00	–1
Freedom Party (*Partai Merdeka*)	111,609	0.11	0	0.00	±0
Total	**104,048,118**	**100.00**	**560**	**100.00**	**+10**

Source: *General Election Commission* and *People's Representative Council website*

Summary of the 9 April 2014 **Indonesian People's Representative Council election results**						
Parties	**Votes**	**%**	**Swing**	**Seats**	**%**	**+/-**
Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*	23,681,471	18.95	▲4.92	109	19.46	▲15

Perjuangan, PDI–P)						
Party of the Functional Groups (*Partai Golongan Karya*, Golkar)	18,432,312	14.75	▲0.30	91	16.25	▼15
Great Indonesia Movement Party (*Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya*, Gerindra)	14,760,371	11.81	▲7.35	73	13.04	▲47
Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat*, PD)	12,728,913	10.19	▼10.66	61	10.89	▼87
National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, PAN)	9,481,621	7.59	▲1.58	49	8.75	▲3
National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, PKB)	11,298,957	9.04	▲4.10	47	8.39	▲19
Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS)	8,480,204	6.79	▼1.09	40	7.14	▼17
United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, PPP)	8,157,488	6.53	▲1.21	39	6.96	▲1
Nasdem Party (*Partai Nasdem*, Nasdem)	8,402,812	6.72	*New*	35	6.25	*New*
People's Conscience Party (*Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat*, Hanura)	6,579,498	5.26	▲1.49	16	2.86	▼1
Crescent Star Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang*, PBB)	1,825,750	1.46	▼0.33	0	0.00	—
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (*Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia*, PKPI)	1,143,094	0.91	▲0.01	0	0.00	—
Total	**124,972,491**	**100.00**	—	**560**	**100.00**	—
Spoilt and null votes	14,601,436	7.86	▼6.57			
Voter turnout	**139,573,927**	**75.11**	▲**4.12**			
Electorate	**185,826,024**					

The Islamic parties such as PBR and PBB in 2009 elections were thrown out of parliament because it is unable to meet the parliamentary threshold. This is an political indication that the Muslims tend to choose secular parties than Islamic ones. Election results of 2009 elections also showed a drop in votes for Islamic parties compared to 2004, when they collected a total of 38 percent of votes. Although 87 percent of Indonesia's population are followers of Islam, the four Islamic parties in this election (the United Development Party, the National Mandate Party, the Prosperous Justice Party, and the National Awakening Party) only collected 24 percent of votes. The Prosperous Justice Party gained 12 seats but fell short of its goal of garnering 15-percent of total votes cast.[4]

Many muslims disappointed with the Islamic parties because their politicians are not trustworthy, they are also dishonest and not credible. They also do not courage to be a strong opposition In addition to growing concerns for the economy, analysts believed that many voters shied away from Islamism after several local elections resulted in victories for Islamic parties. Once elected, these officials began experimenting with sharia, or Islamic law, prompting resistance among the local population. Most notably, legislators had proposed an anti-pornography bill in 2006 to gain the favor of religious groups. However, the bill's vagueness meant that practicing yoga could be construed as a pornographic action. Additionally, several corruption charges were brought against officials representing Islamic

[4] Febriamy Hutapea,"Voters Consider Credentials Over Religion: Survey". *Jakarta Globe* (15/05/2009). Onishi Norimitsu, "Indonesia's Voters Retreat From Radical Islam," *New York Times* (24/04-2009).

parties, which had previously been considered clean compared to other political parties The trend of voting for secular parties was not limited to Islam-based parties. The Christianity-based Prosperous Peace Party received only 1.48 percent of votes, and Catholicism-based Indonesian Democratic Party of Devotion received 0.31 percent.[5]

Furthermore, political cleavages make it difficult to bring together one vision as Islamic parties are just as likely to work with non-Islamic parties as with each other. (LaMoshi 2004). However one explains the lack of electoral success, one should be careful not to overstate the failure of Islamists in terms of shaping government policy. To understand what is happening today, one must keep in mind that *sharia* has long been a part of the Indonesian public policy.

About *Sharia* in Indonesia

Despite the failure of the Jakarta Charter *sharia* was not eliminated from government policy; indeed, the passage of *sharia* bylaws today is best understood as an extension of what been done in the past rather than something as categorically new. Salim and Azra explain that certain aspects of *sharia*, such as family law, banking, and zakat, have long had an accepted place in government policy and have been seen as appropriate under the first principle of *Pancasila*.In fact, Islamic law has been part of Indonesian politics since before the colonial period when local rajas based their laws on *sharia*. During the colonial period, the

[5] Simon Montlake, "In Indonesian Election, Secular Parties Confirm Appeal," *Christian* (09/04/2009). Robin Shulman, "Indonesia Holds Fast To Secular Politics," *Washington Post* (09/04/2009).

Dutch maintained the status quo by creating a colonial religious court system that affected parts of the colony beginning in 1882. (Hooker, 2003). A few years after independence, in 1957, this system was extended to cover all of Indonesia. According to scholar M.B. Hooker, these courts were structured much like the secular courts and were narrowly limited to hearing laws regarding dowries, marriage, and divorce. In 1970, the Law on Judicial Authority brought these courts under the authority of the Supreme Court (the MA or *Mahkamah Agung*) which could hear appeals from the cases involving the religious courts. Despite these restrictions and lack of independence, what is clear is that *sharia* has never been completely or formally excluded from Indonesian law. Furthermore, the state ideology of *Pancasila* never promised a separation of church and state and indeed in 1946 the Republic created a Ministry of Religion to oversee religious affairs which Hooker says gave *sharia* a bureaucratic presence and extended uniform regulations regarding marriage, inheritance and divorce (2003, 36). In 1974, after heavy lobbying by Muslim groups the Marriage Law of 1974, allowed for polygamy, prevented inter-religious marriages, and basically institutionalized *sharia* in regards to marriage (Azra 1992). From this time on it has been the case in Indonesia that all citizens must declare themselves to be an adherent of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or Hinduism which is then indicated on their national ID card.

Rather than focusing on the substance of *sharia*, these early regulations simply set out procedures and rules; likewise, none of these regulations seemed to germinate much controversy. Hooker points out that the political dimensions

regarding *sharia* have less to do with the formal prescriptions than with the various ideologies which surround an overall view of Islam (2003, 39). This debate began perhaps with the *Kompilasi* (Compilation) of Islamic Law which was adopted in 1991 in an attempt to form a single code for the interpretation of Islamic law by the religious courts. Article 1 of the *Kompilasi* states that:

> *For the people and nation of Indonesia which founded upon the Pancasila and Constitution of 1945 there is a right to the existence of a single national law which will guarantee the continuation of religious life based upon the principle of Belief in One Almighty God.*
>
> (Hooker 43)

What we have here is a tricky blending of state and religious authority. The compilation was approved by the *ulama*, but ultimately gained its authority from the president and *Pancasila*. And while attempting to unify the notion of Islamic law within the state, in setting forth the sources for *sharia*, according to Hooker it refers to the standard texts of the Shafi'i *mazhab*, additional texts from other *mazhab*, existing *yurisprudensi*, the *fatwa* of the ulama, and the "situation in other countries", while omitting the yellow books (*Kitab Kuning*) which were the basis for instruction in the pesantren (2003, 43). Thus, from its very foundation in Indonesian law, we see the eclecticism of *sharia* that will lead to so many debates over its meaning and implementation.

Up through the 1980's, *sharia* was restricted to marriage and divorce, *wakaf* (charitable giving), inheritance, and divorce; however, this began to expand in the last years of Sukarno's tenure as in 1991 laws regarding Islamic banking, *haj*

facilitation, and zakat were also adopted. In 1991, a ministerial decree on zakat institutionalized supervised zakat collection though still leaving its actual collection in the hands of religious leaders. Another law the same year allowed for the creation of an Islamic bank which operates on a profit sharing system that avoids the charging of interest. Additionally, between 1989 and 1991 an overhaul of the justice system made the judgments of the religious courts binding whereas previously they had been treated like *fatwa*, as advisory. Finally, though appellate jurisdiction remained with the secular MA, there is a fight led by the MUI (Indonesian Council of Ulama) to keep the courts under the less secular jurisdiction of MORA (the Ministry of Religious Affairs) (Salim 2003, 216). However, it should be remembered that none of the legislation passed or adopted on the national level involved making religious obligations compulsory; rather they have only served to encourage and facilitate. What is in part so controversial about the new local rules, such a zakat in East Lombok, is the attempt to compel religious norms.

The long standing conflict over the role of the government in the enforcement of *sharia* can be seen in the debate over zakat collection and administration. Due to fear of corruption, the Dutch prohibited government officials from participating in the management of zakat, which instead went directly to religious teachers (Salim 1999). After independence when MORA was established, it was the government's policy to not interfere with zakat collection and to simply encourage people to fulfill their obligation and perhaps prevent the misuse of funds. However, some Muslims argued for the government take a greater role. The

head of MORA, K.H. Mohammad Dachlan, argued, for example, that despite formal rejection of the Jakarta Charter, the seven words still should inform Indonesia as to the correct meaning and spirit of *Pancasila* which he believed inherently included a government responsibility for enforcing commandments of God, including zakat collection (Salim 1999, 187). It is in the context of this debate that Suharto in 1968 gave a major speech where he announced his intention to take over zakat agency, but only as a "private citizen". Salim argues that this was a political maneuver by Soeharto to deflate and reject the idea that *Pancasila* allowed for the government to veer into this domain (1999). The debate over zakat and government policy is further complicated by liberal Muslims arguing for the government to replace zakat with a modern tax system, rationalizing that that if Muslim paid taxes and taxes were used responsibly by the government to promote social welfare then religious duty is fulfilled (Barton 2002, 161). This could be seen as a sort of secularizing of zakat.

Ultimately Indonesia's great political and ideological struggles emerge from a lack of consensus regarding both the nature of *sharia* and *Pancasila*, and thus by necessity the relationship of the two. *Pancasila* neither denies nor accepts *sharia*, and *sharia* is neither accepted nor denied by *Pancasila* except by narrow ideological interpretations of each term. It is thus left to the politics to determine how these ideas will be formulated. The current debates over *sharia* are less about whether it has a place in government, but more about what is means and how it should be implemented. However, the debate goes even deeper than this, for *sharia* has become sort of a code word in political debate for what Islam is and

ultimately what Indonesia itself should be.

Concluding Remark

In our opinion, the passage of *sharia* based laws in Indonesia is an expression of Indonesia's newfound democracy. While the laws themselves may offend the sensibilities of liberal thinkers and may even threaten certain fundamentals of democratic principle, the Islamists who support the laws are implementing them through democratic means skillfully applied. Furthermore, while these laws may seem to be opposed to some of the values associated with Western democracy, such as pluralism and the separation of church and state, in the Indonesian context they are not far out of the mainstream despite the intense controversy they have generated. The success of the Islamists in passing *sharia* inspired laws has come from their seizing the opportunity provided by the political reforms and ideological vacuum created in the aftermath of the Suharto regime. Islamists have been able to capitalize on uncertainty Indonesians have felt about their future in a time of economic instability, rampant political corruption, and what seems to some to be a global attack on both Islam and indigenous culture.

As it now stands, Islamist parties are in a somewhat enviable position as while they are large enough, especially in some regions, to have a strong sway on local policies, they are small enough nationally position themselves as outsiders to political system that most Indonesians view with deep skepticism. While this status allows them to push at the edges, they hope to gain majority status; they most likely will be compelled to move towards the center. One must

remember that the PKS, Indonesia's largest Islamist party, has gained its success largely by adopting a more pragmatic and moderate tone. Much like India's BJP, which starting off as a radical fundamentalist Hindu party, but moved towards the center to become India's current ruling party, the PKS is going to have to find a balance between ideological purity and pragmatism. Of course, this is a tricky proposition for if the party continues to moderate its positions and language too much, it will begin to look like all the other opportunistic parties and frustrate the loyal base it commands. However, if it can continue to successfully negotiate a path that keeps its base loyal and yet appeals to the mainstream, it has a good chance of leading a movement to transform the Indonesian cultural landscape under the banner of *sharia*.

On the other hand, others such as Michael Vatikiotis of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore argues that Indonesia is not on the verge of being taken over by Islamic radicals, and points out that the vast majority of Indonesia's Muslims live in harmony with non-Muslims and set what he calls a "shining example for he rest of the Muslim world" (2007). He suggests that Indonesia could provide a blueprint for Islamic democracy as it has emerged from its troubled history as "stable democracy and moderate Muslim nation in a world that sees these qualities as incompatible" (2007). Many who share this opinion seem to see the current trend of "*shari'a*-ization" of the country as only a temporary hiccup. For example, a former chairman of Muhammadiyah and Muslim scholar Ahmad Syafii Maarif of Yogyakarta State University, said the emergence of Islamic extremists was only a short term phenomenon which would disappear once everyone was prosperous holding that, "Once

Indonesia overcomes its acute, domestic, socio-economic problems, religious uncivilized radicalism will have no corner in this country to survive" (Syofiardi, 2006). Others, seeing Islamism as a reaction to government corruption, feel that once groups like the PKS have been around for a while, they will begin look less pure and clean and people will become less enamored with them.

While the Islamist movement is not inherently undemocratic, there is reason to not be too sanguine about the country's future. Some serious observers fear the instability the *sharia* movement could produce. Greg Barton, for example, holds that while political Islamists may support the introduction of *sharia* by democratic means, these groups are converging with *jihadi* Islamists who advocate a more radical theocracy and are willing to use violence to get it. While the Islamist movement itself does not endanger democracy, its growth could embolden the more radical elements. Indeed, Indonesia has a history of Muslim orthodoxy being used to justify violence. Hefner remembers that the NU had been a willing participant in the mass killings of suspected communists that took place in 19655-66, pointing out that Muslims had been exploited by those who had less than democratic goals suggesting that Muslims who had used religious symbols to promote the killings were often wealthy landlords whose main interest was in protecting their property (2000, xv). Furthermore, apart from issues of violence, recent events in Thailand should remind us of how fragile democracy is in the region just as trouble in Pakistan reminds us what a volatile effect poverty and religion can have on democratic stability. If Islamists push their agenda too far they could very well incite a backlash from moderate

forces and provoke the type of social strife seen in Pakistan. In sum, Islamists may have no desire to overturn Indonesia's democracy but they are certainly in a position to wreak havoc on it by creating a society that is less inclusive, less open, and less tolerant.

To the extent Islamic parties seem to stand against democratic principles, one might ask what, if anything should be done to limit this threat. Banning them is probably not a solution as it is likely to simply drive them underground and in itself is contrary to freedom of expression and religion. Charles Honoris, in an editorial in the Jakarta Post, suggests that the best way to counter Islamic radicalism it through "pubic discourse and debate" led by NGO's and moderate Muslim groups that emphasize justice, tolerance, rationalism and humanism (2006), which if we believe Thomas Paine will ultimately win the battle of pubic opinion. Those that promote violence need to be simply be dealt with by the criminal justice system. Of course this reiterates the notion that the state has a crucial role to play in the maintenance of civil society. Hefner himself reminds us that "not all organizations in society are civil, and the state must act as a guardian of pubic civility" (215). Today, in Indonesia there are hundreds moderate Muslim organizations, many of the outgrowth of the democratically based Reformasi movement on 1987. The nurturing of these civic organizations may be as important to the future of Indonesia's democracy as is the curtailment of extremists. Furthermore, simple political maturity, such as developing true parties with accountability and that stand for something beyond personality as well a the development of an educated and experienced electorate should protect

and stabilize Indonesia's democracy.

However, a critical component for Indonesia's democratic future involves recognition of the special role of Islam in the state. As most Indonesian Muslims want their government to respect Islamic customs even if they do not the creation of an Islamic state, the line between support for and opposition to *sharia* is often blurred. Many Indonesian, including those who are only nominally Muslim, hold conservative values and support strict moral laws without necessarily seeing them as purely religious or *sharia* based. It is easy to mistakenly interpret support for a conservative moral law as support for Islamism when it is more simply a reflection of basic conservative values. By the same token, many Muslims in Indonesia reject some social arrangements and norms that are commonly associated with democracy in the West, including our pluralism and secularism; however this too neither makes them theocrats nor anti-democratic. While the political debate is often framed by pitting Islamists against non-Islamists, the lines are really much more subtle than this and democratic negotiation will require all parties to recognize this so that they can find common ground. Ahmad Shboul reminds us that keeping religion out of politics is not the same as keeping it out of society in general and that aside from the communists, even the most secular governments of the Western world have not attempted to do this. Shboul suggests that U.S. attempts to secularize Arab politics may have even resulted in a backlash that has contributed to the growth of political Islam (177). Westerners would do well to remember that there is not only one from a democratic society can have.

In fact, we do well to remember that even in the West, notions over what accruements democracy must have remains in flux and have changed over time. As Hefner points out, whereas family was once seen as the central base of Western culture, today individual freedom is often elevated above family unity (216). Additionally, the very notion of family is being redefined as Americans consider a variety of arrangements including domestic partnerships, civil unions, and gay marriage. Despite our consensus on many central values there is constant stress in Western societies over the proper balance of individual right and needs of the community, equality and freedom, and even the proper role of religion and morality in politics. Just as various Western democratic societies define each of these somewhat differently, Muslim democracies are likely to have their own brand of pluralism.

The debate over the passage of *sharia* based legislation reflects that that Indonesia continues to map out the most central questions concerning the basic shape of its democracy. The debate is less a debate about whether *sharia* is good or bad, but more about the proper meaning of *sharia*and its relationship to the state and thus its relationship to the national ideology of Pancasila. Ultimately, it reflects a deep debate over the very meaning of the Indonesian nation and what it means to be Indonesian. All of us have multiple identities. We may define ourselves as students, scholars, husbands, wives, athletes, musicians from an array of images that form our composite selves. However, for a nation state to succeed it is essential that one of the imbedded images that a country’s inhabitants hold of themselves is that of their national identity. However, it is

not enough to simply *be* an American, German, Indonesian or Turk, for a nation to function it is necessary that one's national identity represent some share sense of community, and thus shared values. Most nations form out of a long history the creation of a shared past. In most of Western Europe these shared histories have bound together by common languages, religions, and cultural norms. Benedict Anderson explains that a nation is an imagined community whereby people who have never even met one anther come to see themselves as connected and separate from others. However, religion, because it usually does not correspond with national borders tends usually can not be the core of the nationalist vision. Anderson wrote that nationalism as an idea came "to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such religions" (p6). Thus, while the Italians and French were both Catholic, the growing awareness of their differences became an expression of nationalism. Indonesians similarly may share Islam with others across the globe, but Islam can fulfill only part of the nationalist vision. Of course this is especially true in light of the tens of millions of Indonesians who are not Muslim. The challenge for Indonesia is to find a place for *sharia* that neither subverts the uniqueness of Indonesia from rest of the Islam nor undermines Indonesia's non-Muslims.

Even if Indonesia becomes a model of a moderate and democratic Muslim society, it is not clear what this may imply for the rest of the Muslim world. Even though Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim nation, many write off Indonesia as not being truly Islamic and thus not worthy

of comparison with other Muslim nations. It is also typical to see Indonesia as more tolerant, gentler, and softer, than the ″real″ Islam of the Arab world and to emphasize the syncretic nature of Indonesian Islam as a way to separate it from the wider Muslim world (Johns and Lahoud 2005). Indeed, many Indonesians are only nominally Muslim and there is not doubt that Indonesian Islam is often layered with strains of Hinduism, Buddhism and mysticism. The Buddhist overtones on the tombstone inscription of the Malaccan sultan Mansur Shah who died in 1477 reads, ″The world is but transitory; the world has no permanence, the world is like a house made by a spider″ (Warshaw, 1990). These Buddhist notions concerning the nature of the universe are testament to the region's long history of blending religious thought. Yet, other scholars point out that Islam has blended with earlier belief systems wherever it has spread and the syncretism found in Indonesia is not unique. Furthermore, as has been shown here, Indonesian Islamic scholarship has long and deep ties to the Middle East that form a strong bond with the rest of the Muslim world and recent decades has seen what is often called the Islamisation or sometimes even the Arabization of Indonesia. It would thus be a mistake to dismiss Indonesia as a worthy example of what the type of democratic society that Islam produce even if it would be a mistake to assume that what can work in Indonesia could be exported to rest of the Islamic world.

***

REFERENCES:

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined Communities*. Verso: London

Azra, Azyumardi. 1992. "The Indonesian Marriage Law of 1974." in *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia.* 2003. ed. Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi, Azra. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Aspinall, Edward and Fealy, Greg. 2003. "Decentralization and the Rise of the Local." in *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia*. ed. Fealy, Greg and Aspinall, Edward. Institute for Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore.

Geetz, Clfford. 1960. The Religion of Java. Glencoe: Free Press

Barton, Greg. 2002. *Abdurrahman Wahid: Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President.* Honalulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Barton, Greg. 2004. *Indonesia's Struggle Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam.* Sydney: UNSW Press

Dahl Robert and Stinebreickner, Bruce. 2002. *Modern Political Analysis 6th ed*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Darmaputera, Eka. 1988. *Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society*. New York: E.J. Brill

Hooker, M.B. 1999. "The State and Shari'a in Indonesia." in *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia.* 2003. ed. Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi, Azra. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Hefner W. Robert. 2000. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

Hefner, Robert. 2006. "Asian and Middle Eastern Islam." Essay presented at a FPRI Conference on May 6-7.

2006. Available at *www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idarticle=6766*

Johns, Anthony H. and Lahoud, Nelly 2005. "The World of Islam and the challenge of Islamism." In *Islam in World Politics*. ed. Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns. Routledge: London and New York

Kamrava, Mehran. 2005. "Development and Democracy: The Muslim World in a Comparitive Perspective." In *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*. Ed. Hunter, Shireen and Malk Huma. Praeger: London.

LaMoshi, Gary. 2004. "SBY's Aura of Election." *Slate*. Posted on 6/29/2004. Accessed on 312007. www.slate.com/id/2103021/

Laffan, Michael Francis. 2003. *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*. New York: Routledge Curzon

Lewis, Bernard. 1988. *The Political Language of Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Palmer, Leslie. 2006 . "Indonesia: Corruption, Ethnicity, and the "Pax Americana." *Asian Affairs*. Vol. XXXVII No. II July 2006.

Pew. 2002. "What the World thinks in 2002." Raw Data Set. *PEW Global Attitudes Project*. Posted 12/04/2002. Accessed 11/20/2006. *http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=809*

Pew. 2005. "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics." Raw Data Set. *PEW Global Attitudes Project*. Posted 7/14/2005.

Salim, Arskal. 1999. "Zakat Administration in Politics of Indonesian New Order." in *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia* 2003. ed. Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi, Azra. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Syofiardi, Bachyul. 2005. "Moderates, Conservatives Dispute Freedom of Thought." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. September 14, 2005.

Shboul, Ahmad 2005. "Between Rhetoric and Reality: Islam and Politics in the Arab World." In *Islam in World Politics*. ed. Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns. Routledge: London and New York.

Voll, John. 2005. "Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a Barrier?" In *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*. Ed. Hunter, Shireen and Malk Huma. Praeger: London.

Warshaw, Steven. 1990. *Southeast Asia Emerges*. Berkeley: Diablo Press.

Zenzie, Charles U. 1999. "Indonesia's New Political Spectrum." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 39, No. 2. (Mar. - Apr., 1999).

Newspaper Reports

Ali, Muhamad. 2006 "Bureaucratization of Islamic law and faith-based Power Politics." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. May 05, 2006.

Ali, Muhamad. 2006. "Exclusive bylaws at Odds with State ideology of Pancasila." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 19, 2006

Ali, Muhamad. 2006."Promoting Tolerant Nationalism, Beyond Religious versus Secular." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. September 1, 2006.

Bachyul, Syiardi. 2006. "Sudarto: Fighting for Pluralism, Against the Trend." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. August 28, 2006.

Banget, Angel. 2006. "Structural and Cultural Conflict Within NU." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. May 24, 2006.

Djiwandono, J. Soedjati. 2006. "SBY on Pancasila like an

Ostrich on the Sand." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 19, 2006

Donnan, Shawn. 2006. "Suharto's Principles Revive in Combat with Radical Islam." *Financial Times.* London: Financial Times Limited. August 7, 2006.

Extensive Relief Work in Aceh Wins Sympathy -- and Votes." Washington Post Foreign Service. January 14, 2005.

Hera, Diani. 2005. "Moderates, Conservatives Dispute Freedom of Thought." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. September 14, 2005.

Hera, Diani. 2005. "MUI issues 11 Fatwa." *The Jakarta Post*: Jakarta. July 29, 2005.

Hermawan, Ary. 2006 "Gloomy Outlook for Islamist Parties." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. October 16, 2006.

Hermawan, Ary. 2006. "NU reaffirms Pancasila Commitment." *The Jakarta Post*: Jakarta. November 11, 2006.

Honoris, Charles. 2006. "Taming the radicals Taming the radicals." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 6, 2006.

Honoris, Charles. 2006. "Democracy at the crossroads in Indonesia after 61 Years." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. September 15, 2006.

Hummel, Daniel. 2006. "Implications of Pornography Bill and Islamic Law." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. March 25, 2006.

Khalik, Abdul. 2005. 'Protesters Persist with Rallies Despite Police Ban." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. April 24, 2005

Magnis-Suseno, Franz. 2005. "Defining pluralism, liberalism, secularism." 2005 *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. August 16, 2005.

Nakashima Ellen. 2005. "Indonesian Islamic Party Reaps

Rewards of Goodwill

Perliz, Jane. 2006. "Spread of Islamic Law in Indonesia Takes Toll on Women." *The New York Times*: New York. June 27, 2006.

Rukmantara, Arie. 2006. "Joint Democracy Program targets Islamic schools." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. March 03, 2006.

Sachs, Peter. 2006. "Former Indonesian Leader Calls for Cleansing of Islam." *Religion News Service.* June 27, 2006.

Sahrasad, Herdi. 2006. "Is NU shifting Toward Intolerance?" *The Jakarta Post.* Jakarta. August 5, 2006.

Sembiring, Tifatul. 2005. "PKS Clarifies." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. December 7, 2005

Sijabat, Ridwan Max. 2006. "Survey Shows Prevalent Conservatism." *The Jakarta Post*: Jakarta. March 17, 2006.

Suwarni, Yuli and Khalik, Abdul. 2005. "Court Overturns PKS Depok Win." *The Jakarta Post*: Jakarta. Aug. 5, 2005.

Syofiardi, Bachyul. 2005. "Moderates, Conservatives Dispute Freedom of Thought." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. September 14, 2005.

Taufiqurrahman, M. 2006. "Legislators Take Stand Against Sharia Laws." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 14, 2006.

Tempo. 2006. "Hidayat Nurwahid: Those who oppose Syariah hide behind Pancasila." *AsiaViews*, Edition: 23/III/Jun/2006.

The Jakarta Post. 2005. "MUI does not Fully Understand our Political and Social Map." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. August 06, 2005.

The Jakarta Post. 2006. "Group says Pancasila Way to Halt Assault on Pluralism." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June

01, 2006.

The Jakarta Post. 2006. "NU Criticizes Controversial MUI Edicts." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. August 6, 2006.

The Jakarta Post. 2006. "Government Told to Act Fast Against Bylaws." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 16, 2006.

The Jakarta Post. 2006. "Political Experts Say Don't Put Pancasila on a Pedestal." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 03, 2006

The Jakarta Post. 2006. "Sharia a Reality and Asset of National Law."

The Jakarta Post. 2007. "10 Killed in Poso Battle." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. January 23, 2007.

Vatikiotis, Michael. 2007. "The Direction of Indonesia in 2007." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. January 10, 2007.

Vatikiotis, Michael. 2007. "The Direction of Indonesia in 2007." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. January 10, 2007.

Yazid, Mohammad. 2006. "Sharia Bylaws a Panacea for Legal System?" *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 23, 2006.

Zulkieflimansyah. 2006. "Islam, Muslims and Democracy in Indonesia." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. Sept. 12, 2006.

ISLAMISM, THE STATE, AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA: AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

THIS articles to explain why this recent wave of *sharia*based legislation has occurred. For those who deny Islam's compatibility with liberal democracy, the growth of *sharia* seems to be a natural and inevitable effect of what many note as the relatively recent Islamisation of Indonesia which is sometimes seen as the result of a global trend or international movement. It is this article's contention, however, that while some global influence is apparent, the thrust of the movement is largely indigenous and connected to Indonesia's own history which has long allowed Islam a political role. Furthermore, while the country does indeed seem to have become more Islamic, there is no direct connection between Islamisation and Islamism as many of those who are the most religiously pious reject bringing Islam into politics. Thus, as shown in *Diagram 1*, while Islamisation may be an antecedent variable that sets the stage for Islamism, we must reach beyond Islamisation to understand the success of the *sharia* movement. In the end, the most central explanation for the passage of *sharia* inspired laws is simply the exploitation of political opportunity. *Created in part by decentralization.*The passage of *sharia* based laws is more the product of politics than of religion and are more a reflection of changes in politics than of changes in religious outlook. While exogenous factors

play a role, the independent variable is endogenous to the Islamists themselves. Islam's historical role in politics, the new opening provided by Indonesia's recent decentralization, and recent wave of Islamisation are all exogenous factors contributing to the movement. However, the *sharia* movement would not have achieved much ground were it not for the effective political mobilizing of Islamist groups themselves which took advantage of decentralization by building a grass roots movement working through the pesantrens and crafting a clear and sellable message. Borrowing from social movement theory, this investigation will reveal how Islamist groups though not in the center of the ideological spectrum, have effectively framed the debate and mobilized consensus in ways that give them political advantage, at least in the short run.

Diagram 1: Variables Affecting the Passage of shariaby laws.

Diagram 1 shows that the passage of sharia bylaws is the product of both endogenous and exogenous factors
As political and religious factors; however, the independent variable is both endogenous and political.

While it will be the conclusion of this article that Islam itself is not inimical to democracy and that the *sharia* based laws are more of a product of Indonesia's democracy than a

rejection of it, it will also conclude that the passage of *sharia* based laws may do represent a threat to both the stability and shape of that democracy. While many scholars praise and rejoice in Indonesia's progress towards democracy, Thailand's recent backslide, should remind us to not be too complacent about democracy's hold on the region. Furthermore, supporters of *sharia* often speak of democracy in terms of numerical majorities while seeming oblivious to minority rights. Indeed, a somewhat illiberal democracy may be what is in store for Indonesia; yet it may also be that this is what fits for Indonesia and it would be presumptuous for Westerns to expect Indonesians to draw their form of democracy simply along Western lines.

Before moving forward it is important make clear on the distinctions between Islamism, radicalism and fundamentalism, words that often contain a number of subtexts as to differentiate the political ideology of Islamism from simple Islamisation. Likewise, it is necessary to be clear on what is being referred to as I speak of the Islamist movement in Indonesia. As sharia itself is a contested concept, it to needs some explanation as to how it is being used in this thesis as is the case with democracy itself.

Islamisation and Islamism

Borrowing from Greg Fealy, we use the term Islamisation to refer to either the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam or the intensification of belief or practice both of which have clearly been taking place in Indonesia in recent years (2005,167). However, Islamisation should not be confused with Islamism which is the desire to create and live in an Islamic

state. This article will use the terms ″radical″ and ″Islamist″ inter-changeably to describe groups that wish to create an Islamic state or at least make *sharia* the basis of the state. While the most extreme of these groups may be willing to use violence to reach their objectives, the great majority of Islamists in Indonesia reject the use of violence and thus groups that utilize violence will not be the focus of this work. While some scholars use the expression ″moderate Islamists″ to describe those Islamists who are willing to work through the system and reject violence, many Indonesian Muslims we spoke with who reject the implementation of sharia by any means, considered themselves moderates rather than liberals; thus, to avoid confusion, we will use the term ″moderate″ only to describe Muslims who oppose the new laws under discussion and ″Islamist″ to describe supporters.

While Islamism and fundamentalism are sometimes equated, fundamentalism specifically refers to belief in the authority of revealed texts and strict adherence to them. In this respect all Muslims who closely follow the Koran are fundamentalist whether they are Islamist or not. Indeed in Indonesia many deeply pious and morally conservative Muslims reject Islamism and wish to keep the state out of their religion. Thus, while the growth in Islamic piety in Indonesia provides a backdrop, we will see that it is not sufficient as an independent variable to explain the spate *sharia*laws that have recently gained ground.

While Islamisation is about religion, Islamism is concerned with politics. Anthony Johns and Nelly Lahound note that the difference between fundamentalism and Islamism that

was put forth by Islamic scholar Mahmood Mamdani who held that ″fundamentalism is primarily a religious tendency that seeks salvation, whereas Islamism is more a political construct that seeks liberation (2005, 15). Islamists are often motivated by what they see as a grievous wrong which rests on a deep ignorance of God, known as *jahiliyya* (Johns and Lahoud 2005, 16). What is needed in their opinion is the Islamisation of all levels of society from government, to education, to moral law.

Sharia

In the Middle East, calls to apply *sharia* are often put forth by the popular slogan ′Islam is the Answer′, which is often chanted during demonstrations (Shboul 2005, 174). Yet, upon closer examination it is seen that sharia is a contested term with multiple definitions. Some Muslim′s see it as a very formalistic set of specific laws inherited from the Koran and Hadith, while others view it simply as a set of general and holistic principles that are not specific to Islam. When referring to ″sharia bylaws″ or ″sharia inspired laws″ in this paper, I am using the term in its more formalistic meaning as that is the common usage in the press and in the general debate over their passage. It is also important to note here that both the terms *sharia* and Islamism have deeply political connotations. Many Indonesian observers suggest that Indonesian support for *sharia* has more to do with people′s desire for improved government and better lives than with a particular sense of religious piety. Islamism and the drive to put the state in the business of enforcing *sharia* is as much a political movement as it is a religious movement.

Democracy

In examining sharia relationship with democracy it is important to be clear on how democracy is being defined. While democracy is often equated with majoritarian rule, most political theorists recognize that democracy must mean more than two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. Most western thinkers such as Robert Dahl and Samuel Huntington take a procedural view of democracy that sees it based on free, fair and open elections mixed with basic minority rights such as protection of free speech and press and the right to assemble (Dahl 2002, Huntington1991). However, Huntington points out that democracy is sometimes also defined in terms of the sources of authority as well as the purposes served by government (2003,6). These ideas are more contested and raise the debate of whether or not democracy must entail the whole package of Western liberalism and promotion of individual rights. This thesis takes a middle position. While recognizing that democracy must go beyond mere majority rule, it recognizes that there may be significant differences in the range of freedoms that particular democracies offer and that there could be an Islamic or and Indonesian version of democracy that draws the lines between individual freedoms and enforced conformity substantially different from Western norms.

The Question of Islam's Relation to the State

However, the question we face today in regards to Indonesia is not only whether a country that is predominately Muslim can make a successful transition to democracy, but whether

the growing support for Islamic law and the increasing political activity of Islamic parties there threaten democratic development. To fully assess the Islamist movement in Indonesia today as well as what is driving it, it is important to understand the general debate within Islam over the proper relationship of church and state and ultimately whether democracy can accommodate *sharia* and whether *sharia* can accommodate democracy.

Though the prophet Mohammed was both a spiritual and temporal leader, he left no designated successor and ever since his death Muslims have debated the proper relationship between Islam and the state. Today an ongoing tug-o-war exists between Islamists, those who support the ideal of an Islamic state, and others who argue for varying degrees of separation. Some schools of thought believe that Islam ought to be kept out of politics and embrace multi-cultural societies while extremists on the other side claim that Allah's commandments can only be fulfilled by eliminating non-believers from society and creating a monolithic Islamic state. While both sides look to the Koran and Hadith for guidance on this issue, there is no consensus on what the revelation or Mohammed intended. Selective adaptation of Koranic verses is still used by various groups to support different political and ideological objectives as claim that it is as easy to find verses promoting relentless combat against unbelievers as it is finding ones that call for peace, harmony and pluralism. (John and Lahoud, 2005, 24) For example, Surah 47:4 states, "when ye meet the Unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks; At length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly on them" while Surah 5:33 exclaims that "Those who make war

with Allah and his messenger will be killed or crucified, or have their hands and feet on alternate sides cut off." Yet the Koran also states what others maintain is the ''essence" of Islam in the words of the of Surah 109:6 which says, ''For you, your religion; for me, my religion." and Surah 2:256 which holds that "there is no compulsion in religion". Those who look to these more embracing lines may still support some aspects of *sharia*, but not to the point where the rights and beliefs of others are negated or infringed upon.

Islamism, the movement to subordinate the state to Islam, gains credibility from a general, but disputed notion that Islam is a total system that covers all aspects of life from spirituality to social arrangements to governance. While this is to some degree true of all major religions, Ahmad Shboul succinctly observed that because of its breadth Islam "is perhaps harder to fillet out of politics" than other religions (2005, 171). While the founder of the Islamic Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna, described Islam as "religion and state" to emphasize the political dimension of Islam, Shboul notes that the conjunctive 'and' between religion and the world (*din wa dunya*) and between religion and state (*din wa dawla*) is as often seen by Muslims as a disconnected as much as a connective. (2005, 179) One of the early supporters of this view was Ali Abd al-Raziq who in 1925 claimed that "Muhammad's governance of the Muslim community at Medan was not part of his Prophetic mission, and his successors, the caliphs, succeeded only to temporal power" (Eickelman, 1996: 52). Taking this division further, M. B. Hooker points out that many Muslim thinkers see the idea of an Islamic state as a basic contradiction of terms as authority can have only one locus and Islamic fundamentalists see

Islamic authority as revelation emerging from the Koran, whereas secular nationalists see the state and its guiding constitution of the ultimate source of authority (1999, 33). Thus, the debate over how the Indonesian state should go in implementing the tenets of sharia cuts to the heart of how Muslim's interpret Islam and pits two contrasting ideologies against one another, political Islam on one side and the neo-modernists on the other.

Islam and Democracy

One of the central questions of comparative politics is whether pluralist democracy can take hold in nations that do not embrace the whole package of liberalism, secularism, and individualism. In recent years, this debate has become intensely focused on the compatibility of Islam and democracy as indeed the majority of world's Muslim countries are ruled by authoritarian regimes. Scholars such as Fareed Zakaria and David Landis have suggested that the lack of democracy in the Middle East is at least in part due to the presence of Islam (1999/2003). Since Suharto's fall in 1998, Indonesia has emerged as one of a handful of Muslim countries that can be rightfully called democratic.[1] However, the shape and stability of the this democracy has yet to be determined and as Indonesians debate place of *sharia* in their country, some are likely to see this as a test of whether or not liberal democracy and Islam can mesh. If Indonesia, often seen along with Turkey as a beacon of liberal Islam, were to move towards a more Islamist and less tolerant state, it

[1] In 2005, Freedom House, which rates nations worldwide on a politial freedom index gave Indonesia a respectable rating of 3 (on its inverted 7 point scale).

could provide fodder to those who see Islam as inherently incompatible with the liberal ideals of pluralism and diversity upon which western democracies are built.

A mainstream comparative politics text by Michael Todaro used in introductory college classes reveals a common perception among many scholars when it points out that ″Islamic countries have not taken well to democracy″ (2004, 289). Sodaro suggests that an inherent cultural flaw in Islam makes it unamendable to democracy. While there is no doubt that the Muslim world is plagued by authoritarian regimes, the connection between authoritarianism and Islam is less clear. However, Sodaro points to three factors that he says typically lead Islamic countries to authoritarian government: religious intolerance, ill treatment of woman, and Islamic law. He tells us that while Christianity and other religions went through reformations that made them more tolerant, the Muslim world fails to exhibit ″genuine tolerance″ for both non-Muslims and divisions within Islam. Women, he notes lack political equality with men as he cites Steven Fish's study which holds that ″the status of women in traditional Muslim counties is the single most significant variable associated with authoritarianism in the Muslim world – more significant than levels of political violence or state secularism″ (2002, 289). Finally, he points out that countries that practice *sharia* condone and ″routinely carry out″ decapitation, stoning, amputation and flogging, all which are of course antithetical to Western notions of democratic principle (2002, 289).

Such analysis echoes those by more notable theorists such as, David Landes, Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and

Martin Seymour Lipset. Landes in his monumental work the *Wealth and Poverty of Nations* acknowledges the diversity of thought and culture within Islam, but in the end says that certain "generalities" simply can not be ignored including Islam's tendency towards orthodoxy and fundamentalism as well as its propensity to take quick recourse in violence, all of which hinder the growth of democracy and modernization (1999, 214). Huntington in his classic *The Third Wave* simply asserts that Islam is "incompatible with democracy" and that "to the extent that governmental legitimacy and policy flow from religious doctrine and religious expertise, Islamic concepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of democratic politics" (1991, 307). His pessimism led him to note that even where reformist movements have emerged; there has been little true democratization. He points out that the liberalization that occurred in many Middle Eastern countries in the late 1980's and early 1990's, simply enhanced the power of "social and political movements whose commitment to democracy was questionable" (1991, 309). This is in fact exactly what some fear is occurring in post-Suharto Indonesia with the rise of Islamic parties which support the institution of *sharia*. Ultimately, Huntington goes on the suggest in 1993 that Islam's anti-democratic nature was unlikely to change and would thus set the stage for a great "clash of civilizations". Bernard Lewis simply stresses that Islamic concept of *din wa dawla* (religion and state)has historically acknowledged no distinction between church and state and that authority resides solely in God and not in the people (1998, 15).

However, this pessimism of Islam's compatibility with democracy is not confined to Western scholars.[2] Srif Mardin, a Turkish scholar, suggests the Muslim world suffers from being disconnected from the cultural history of ancient Greece that served as bedrock for democracy in the West (Hefner 2000, 214). Mardin asserts that despite the growth of civic organizations in some parts of the Muslim world, Islamic societies lack the "collective memory" of a culture that supports individual autonomy and self-determination. Other Muslim scholars have argued that democracy is incompatible with the Islamic concept of the of the absolute sovereignty of God which ultimately denies the possibility of sovereignty of the people. The idea that parliaments could alter the God's law, *sharia*, was seen as blasphemous (Vole, 2005: 84).

Another line of thought is that Islam is simply like all religions in being tied to backwardness, both politically and economically. In this view Islam like any religion must give way for modernization to take place. Dating back to the work of Max Weber, this so-called modernization theory holds that as societies modernize religion necessarily and naturally recedes from public life. It is therefore Muslim's reluctance to reform and secularize that prevents both democracy and economic development. Weber noted that Protestantism, especially Calvinism, with its emphasis on individual initiative, the work ethic, and personal responsibility was more conducive to modernization than

[2] This dichotomy of the West versus Islam is as misleading as it is helpful for after all Islam is one of the world's three major Western religions derived form the God of Abraham. Yet as the Muslim world fell behind during the industrial era and came to be colonized by Western nations, scholars from both sides of this spectrum use the term.

the exceedingly monotheistic and authoritarian worlds of either traditional Catholicism or Islam (Weber: Sociology of Religion, 265.) More recently, David Landes links modernization to cultures that have freed themselves from the stifling effects of religious orthodoxy and that have shifted religion to the private realm (1999). To these thinkers, Islam has held back Muslim societies both politically and economically, which themselves are linked.

It has been suggested that what Islam needs is its own Protestant type reformation to free it from the shackles unity and conformity that keep it from progressing. Renowned Islamic scholar Bernard Lewis emphasizes that the deeply rooted Islamic notion of *din wa dawla* (religion and state) signifies a unity between secular and non-secular affairs in the Islamic world that differentiates it from the reformed Christian world and negates the viability of carving out separate spheres for religious and political matters (1988). However, as we shall see, this view is flawed in three ways. First, it buys into a false conception of the Islamic history that has been propagated by Islamists themselves and suggests a golden age of political and religious unity that never actually existed. Secondly, it ignores both that fact that Islam has no central authority such as that of the Catholic Church and thus cannot imitate the reformation that occurred within Christianity. Finally, it ignores reformist movements that have indeed reshaped Islamic thinking in the last hundred years. One of the most important of these reform movements began in the second half of the 19th century with a group of scholars at the University of Al Azhar in Cairo who developed what became known as known as Islamic modernism. Leading this group was the

scholar Muhammad Abduh who, echoing the thought process of Weber, held that the principle reason Muslim countries had come to be dominated by the West was because they had stagnated in the their thinking and had become too dependent on religious authority and submission to *taqlid*, (Islamic jurisprudence) and to one of its the four *mazhabs* (schools). Abduh rejected the orthodoxy and dogma that dominated Islam and called for the 'gates of *ijtihad*' (personal interpretation) to be reopened and encouraged Muslims to study Western science and open up their systems of education in order to make their religion more suitable to the modern world and escape their poverty and backwardness (Barton 2002, 68-69). Likewise, numerous twentieth century rulers of Islamic nations such as Ataturk, the Shah of Iran, and even Saddam Hussein saw the need to keep religion separate from politics in order for their nations to modernize. Dale Eickelman notes that leaders such as these rejected a role for Islam in politics by identifying it with the past and backwardness and saw the choice as either "Mecca or mechanization". For normative modernization theorists who see economic development as a prerequisite for democracy, the Muslim world's lack of success in establishing democracy is due at least in part to Islam's stifling effect on socio economic modernization. Indonesia becomes an important test case for this theory as some see the democratization that began in 1998 as significant in part due to its economic development. If Islamic forces now rise to challenge and limit democratization, the independent variable preventing democratization could be argued to be Islam itself rather than simply Islam's effect on economic modernization.

Despite the modernization theory's suggestion that as nations modernize the gap between political and religious authority becomes progressively greater, the rise of Islamism and calls to institute *sharia*, suggest that much of the Muslim world is going in the exact opposite direction. Of course, as witnessed by the Evangelicals in American and Hindu nationalists in India, Muslims are not alone in this quest to unite state and religion. To explain this growth in religious activity, Robert Hefner and others such as Benjamin Barber in *Jihad vs. McWorld* note that modernization can lead to religious fundamentalism as much as secularism in that fundamentalism is often a response to the sense of displacement modernization causes. John Voll suggests that we need to recognize a multitude of modernity, some of which will be highly religious and some of which will highly authoritarian (just note Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia) (2005, 89). Voll also notes that modernization in the context of colonial rule can set forth traditions of authoritarianism that are hard to break. This, he says, explains the lack of democracy Middle East more than that region's Islamic roots.

Hefner poses that perhaps the biggest challenge for religious groups today is how to hold a defining world view that provides meaning while recognizing the pluralism that surrounds them (2000, 219). While some groups try to isolate themselves from the world and others will try to wipe out their opponents, a third option, and the one picked by the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, is to acknow-ledge and accept the diversity that surrounds them but then protect themselves from the secularism this implies by choosing to stand outside the state apparatus serving as a

counterbalance to the state. This way they avoid being subordinated by the state yet do not face the losing battle of trying to create a monolithic world. In this manner, Hefner shows that religion, including Islam, can serve a democratic purpose.

Islamist Parties and the Indonesian Islamist Movement

In contrast to those who view religion as inherently in opposition to political and economic modernization, others point to the positive role religion, and specifically Islam, can play in bringing a nation out of the shackles of the past and in promoting both democracy and economic modernization. Numerous Muslim thinkers including many from Indonesia stress Islam's democratic principles. One notable Egyptian writer, Ahmad Shawqi al-Fanjari, put together a list of all the democratic rights and liberties he could find in the major Islamic scriptures and concluded that "what is called freedom in Europe is exactly what is defined in our religion as justice" (Voll 2005. 85). Robert Hefner's classic work *Civil Islam* more specifically traces the roots and development of Islamic civic organizations in Indonesia that have served as a foundation for Indonesia's democratization and highlights the thought of Indonesian Islamic scholars who, like al-Fanjari, see in the Koran deep democratic values.

While Indonesia was led by the authoritarian Suharto, leading Islamic scholars of what is sometimes referred to as the neo-modernist school developed strong Islamic institutions which were able to check the government's authority and power and thus prepare Indonesia for a more democratic era. Though today many of these groups may not

support what might be seen as the rampant individualism of the West, their respect for diversity, free speech, and non-coercion make them fundamentally democratic (Hefner, 2002, 13). Just as Alexis de Tocqueville observed how American democracy gained force and vitality from religious institutions which brought people out of their individualistic shells and allowed for collective action, Hefner notes that Islam has provided Indonesians with a collective orientation that has promoted a voice of the people over state institutions. Robert Putman taught us that for democracy to work, societies need to provide forums where people can exercise their voice and practices the habits of deliberation. In America, churches, along with other civic organizations provided that; Hefner traces how Islamic organizations have done much the same for Indonesia. Hefner echoes Putman in claiming that "Democracy ultimately requires a public culture that (promotes) universal habits of participation and tolerance" (2003, 215). However, building on Putman, he acknowledges that culture must be also buttressed by civic institutions and shows that in Indonesia organizations like the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah did just that. Just as the European example shows, a region with a common cultural heritage can produce both democratic and authoritarian regimes; thus, it may not be Islam, but rather, the lack of strong civic institutions in many Muslim countries that stifles the growth of democracy.

In Indonesia post Suharto's New Order, there is some debate over who qualifies as an Islamist party or organization in Indonesia today. Perhaps the clearest litmus test is support for the so-called Jakarta Charter, which if passed would

oblige the government to enforce sharia on all its Muslims. However, even this picture is somewhat clouded. While a number of parties supporting the Jakarta Charter have sprung up in the post Soeharto Era, the three largest being the PKS, the PBB, and the PBR, attention is often focused on the PKS as it is the largest of the three and its growth spurt between 1999 and 2004 give it the most promise for the future. However, many argue that the PKS is not truly an Islamist party. While the PKS seems to have clearly started out with Islamist principles, current party leaders claim that it has moved to a more moderate position saying the PKS does not support an Islamic state. While they have abandoned the fight to adopt the Jakarta Charter on the national level, their stance on the passage of local *sharia* laws is less clear, as they basically say it is up to the local areas to decide (Hidayat, 2006). Assessing the true goals of the PKS is difficult; first of all, it is impossible to get into the minds of its leaders and secondly it is a broad party with various factions. However, given their roots in Egypt's Islamic Brotherhood, its recent support for the Jakarta Charter, and its general support for laws imbued with the spirit of *sharia*, including the national anti-pornography bill, this thesis will continue to treat it as an Islamist party recognizing that pragmatism also fits into its politics.

Sadanand Dhumein an article published in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* certainly takes this view and describes the PKS as the greatest "threat to Indonesia's tradition of pluralism, its stability and its prospects for economic growth" in Indonesia. He contends that PKS "leaders tend to couch their statements in ambiguity designed to calm Western and secular Indonesian fears while at the same time

reassuring the party's base about its goal, the Islamisation of Indonesian society culminating in the imposition of a state based on *sharia*" (2005). Indeed upon interviewing a representative of the bupati of East Lombok, I was told that their goal was to implement *sharia* "step by step". Dhume's article traces how the PKS drew its ideology and organizational structure from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Brotherhood's ideas, he explained reached Indonesia in the late 1970s when they organized in secret cells, each with a leader and between five and fifteen members. It became popular on college campuses and the early 1990s controlled student movements in virtually all of Indonesia's largest and most prestigious public universities. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, they formed as a political party with a founding manifesto that called for the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Current MPR Speaker and former PKS head, Hidayat Nurwahid, himself studied in Medina, Saudi Arabia where he was active in the overseas Indonesian Students Association (PPI). According to Tempo Magazine, when students and activists rejected *Pancasila* as the sole national philosophy, he concurred (2005). Since then, Dhume contends, the PKS has shied away from showing its true Islamist heritage and leanings to the general public. While leaders of the PKS have vehemently attacked Dhume's article, they have not disputed the heart of his assertions and instead have attacked Dhume's "*non-academic background and methodology*". In a letter to the Jakarta Post, PKS President Tifatul Sembiring goes on to fault the Post for publishing a "*relatively old article*", without noting that the article had been published by YaleGlobal, an on-line site under Yale University, and the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in May of

2005 before the Jakarta Post picked up an abridged version of the article in December, just two month's later. He criticized Dhume for attempting to associate the PKS with the Islamic Brotherhood and accused him of *"bigotry and hatred"* and without disputing his specific claims about their origins or their charter. Indeed, I experienced some of this defensiveness from the PKS myself when interviewing Sureyadi Jayapurnama a PKS representative to the Mataram DPRD. While my first question simply first asked what knowledge he had on *sharia* bylaws passed in the region, the first words out of his mouth was to proclaim the PKS did not support an Islamic state.

Despite its Islamist origins, in recent times the party has indeed adopted a softer message. A local news journal recently reported that at a local Islamic book fair, Hidayat iterated that there are many understandings about *sharia* and sounding much like a neo-modernist he proposed that people should not confine their understanding of *sharia* to legalistic restrictions and punishments, but rather should think of the fullness of God's law which includes cleanliness and good hygiene, professionalism, honesty and transparency in the economic sphere, as well as the eradication of corruption and bribery among officials (Putang 3/11/07). In June of 2006, Hidayat told Tempo Magazine that he lectured officials who were ready to enforce laws against gambling and the *jilbab* (headscarves) telling the magazine that he "told them, wearing headscarves and not gambling were indeed part of the Sharia … but not the essence of the Sharia." He said that the most important part of implementing *sharia* was to "improve the human resources, to be excellent and extraordinary

human beings" and to "produce noble and responsible people who will not commit corruption" (6/07). This moderate tone has also been reflected in some policy changes. In 2000, the PKS voted against adopting the Jakarta Charter, though in 2002 it simply abstained on the vote (Collins and Fauzi, 2005). In the 2004 presidential election, it chose not to run its own candidate and instead supported the moderate Amien Rais of PAN in the first round and the secularist and ultimate winner, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in the second round. However, the party was deeply slit over these endorsements and a hard line faction led by the Secretary General of PKS Anis Matta has vehemently opposed these moves and argued for the party to remain truer to its roots (Collins and Fauzi 2005).

There arefewer disputes, however, about the positions of a number of other Islamist groups. For example, three political parties, PPP, PBB, and PBR, all proudly proclaim support for the Jakarta Charter and the promotion traditional Islamic values. The PBB in fact claims itself as the heir to the now defunct Masyumi, Indonesia's original force behind the Jakarta Charter. A number of civil organizations also promote the passage of *sharia* including most notably Indonesia's top clerical body, the MUI, which is composed of ulama form both the NU and Muhammadiyah and has given vocal support to Islamist policies. While the MUI does not represent the opinion of all the regional ulama, individual clerics have called on their flocks to take certain political positions (Kappuswami, 2005). Finally, there are some small militant groups that have taken to the street in support of Islamist policies. These include the FPI (Islamic Defenders Front), the MMI (Indonesian Mujahidin Council), Hizbut

Tahrir (the Liberation Party), Laskar Jihad, and JI (Jemaah Islamiyah - which planned the Bali attacks). However, it is unclear whether these groups have aided or diminished the work by the vast majority of Islamists who do not resort to violence and intimidation. Collectively, while these groups may not quite add up to what could properly be called a general social movement; they do constitute a powerful political movement. It is to these militant groups collectively that Islamists or Islamist organizations have acted radically in Indonesia post Soeharto's New Order.

In our opinion, the passage of *sharia* based laws in Indonesia is an expression of Indonesia's newfound democracy. While the laws themselves may offend the sensibilities of liberal thinkers and may even threaten certain fundamentals of democratic principle, the Islamists who support the laws are implementing them through democratic means skillfully applied. Furthermore, while these laws may seem to be opposed to some of the values associated with Western democracy, such as pluralism and the separation of church and state, in the Indonesian context they are not far out of the mainstream despite the intense controversy they have generated. The success of the Islamists in passing *sharia* inspired laws has come from their seizing the opportunity provided by the political reforms and ideological vacuum created in the aftermath of the Suharto regime. Islamists have been able to capitalize on uncertainty Indonesians have felt about their future in a time of economic instability, rampant political corruption, and what seems to some to be a global attack on both Islam and indigenous culture.

As it now stands, Islamist parties are in a somewhat enviable

position as while they are large enough, especially in some regions, to have a strong sway on local policies, they are small enough nationally position themselves as outsiders to political system that most Indonesians view with deep skepticism. While this status allows them to push at the edges, they hope to gain majority status; they most likely will be compelled to move towards the center. One must remember that the PKS, Indonesia's largest Islamist party, has gained its success largely by adopting a more pragmatic and moderate tone. Much like India's BJP, which starting off as a radical fundamentalist Hindu party, but moved towards the center to become India's current ruling party, the PKS is going to have to find a balance between ideological purity and pragmatism. Of course, this is a tricky proposition for if the party continues to moderate its positions and language too much, it will begin to look like all the other opportunistic parties and frustrate the loyal base it commands. However, if it can continue to successfully negotiate a path that keeps its base loyal and yet appeals to the mainstream, it has a good chance of leading a movement to transform the Indonesian cultural landscape under the banner of *sharia*.

On the other hand, others such as Michael Vatikiotis of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore argues that Indonesia is not on the verge of being taken over by Islamic radicals, and points out that the vast majority of Indonesia's Muslims live in harmony with non-Muslims and set what he calls a "shining example for he rest of the Muslim world" (2007). He suggests that Indonesia could provide a blueprint for Islamic democracy as it has emerged from its troubled history as "stable democracy and moderate Muslim nation in a world that sees these qualities as incompatible" (2007).

Many who share this opinion seem to see the current trend of "*shari'a*-ization" of the country as only a temporary hiccup. For example, a former chairman of Muhammadiyah and Muslim scholar Ahmad Syafii Maarif of Yogyakarta State University, said the emergence of Islamic extremists was only a short term phenomenon which would disappear once everyone was prosperous holding that, "Once Indonesia overcomes its acute, domestic, socio-economic problems, religious uncivilized radicalism will have no corner in this country to survive" (Syofiardi, 2006). Others, seeing Islamism as a reaction to government corruption, feel that once groups like the PKS have been around for a while, they will begin look less pure and clean and people will become less enamored with them.

While the Islamist movement is not inherently undemocratic, there is reason to not be too sanguine about the country's future. Some serious observers fear the instability the *sharia* movement could produce. Greg Barton, for example, holds that while political Islamists may support the introduction of *sharia* by democratic means, these groups are converging with *jihadi* Islamists who advocate a more radical theocracy and are willing to use violence to get it. While the Islamist movement itself does not endanger democracy, its growth could embolden the more radical elements. Indeed, Indonesia has a history of Muslim orthodoxy being used to justify violence. Hefner remembers that the NU had been a willing participant in the mass killings of suspected communists that took place in 19655-66, pointing out that Muslims had been exploited by those who had less than democratic goals suggesting that Muslims who had used religious symbols to promote the killings were often wealthy

landlords whose main interest was in protecting their property (2000, xv). Furthermore, apart from issues of violence, recent events in Thailand should remind us of how fragile democracy is in the region just as trouble in Pakistan reminds us what a volatile effect poverty and religion can have on democratic stability. If Islamists push their agenda too far they could very well incite a backlash from moderate forces and provoke the type of social strife seen in Pakistan. In sum, Islamists may have no desire to overturn Indonesia's democracy but they are certainly in a position to wreak havoc on it by creating a society that is less inclusive, less open, and less tolerant.

To the extent Islamic parties seem to stand against democratic principles, one might ask what, if anything should be done to limit this threat. Banning them is probably not a solution as it is likely to simply drive them underground and in itself is contrary to freedom of expression and religion. Charles Honoris, in an editorial in the Jakarta Post, suggests that the best way to counter Islamic radicalism it through "pubic discourse and debate" led by NGO's and moderate Muslim groups that emphasize justice, tolerance, rationalism and humanism (2006), which if we believe Thomas Paine will ultimately win the battle of pubic opinion. Those that promote violence need to be simply be dealt with by the criminal justice system. Of course this reiterates the notion that the state has a crucial role to play in the maintenance of civil society. Hefner himself reminds us that "not all organizations in society are civil, and the state must act as a guardian of pubic civility" (215). Today, in Indonesia there are hundreds moderate Muslim organizations, many of the outgrowth of the

democratically based Reformasi movement on 1987. The nurturing of these civic organizations may be as important to the future of Indonesia's democracy as is the curtailment of extremists. Furthermore, simple political maturity, such as developing true parties with accountability and that stand for something beyond personality as well a the development of an educated and experienced electorate should protect and stabilize Indonesia's democracy.

***

REFERENCES

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined Communities*. Verso: London

Barton Greg. 2002. *Abdurrahman Wahid: Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President.* Honalulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Barton, Greg. 2004. *Indonesia's Struggle Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam.* Sydney: UNSW Press

Dahl Robert and Stinebreickner, Bruce. 2002. *Modern Political Analysis 6th ed*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Darmaputera, Eka. 1988. *Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society*. New York: E.J. Brill

Efendy, Bahtiar. 2003. *Islam and the State in Indonesia.* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Eickelman, Dale F. and Picsatori, James. 1996. *Muslim Politics* Princeton: Princeton Universtiy Press.

Geetz, Clfford. 1960. *The Religion of Java*. Glencoe: Free Press

Hefner W. Robert. 2000. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave.* Norman:

University of Oklahoma Press.

Intan, Benyamin Fleming. 2006. *"Public Religion" and the Pancasila-Based State of Indonesia.* New York; Peter Lang.

Laffan, Michael Francis. 2003. *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*. New York: Routledge Curzon

Landis, David S. 1999. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations.* New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Lewis, Bernard. 1988. *The Political Language of Islam.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ramage, Douglas E. 1995. *Politics in Indonesia*: London and New York: Routledge

Sodaro, Michael J. 2004. *Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction*. New York: McGraw Hill.

Uhlin, Anders. 1997. *Indonesia and the "Third Wave" of Democratization".* New York: St. Martins's Press.

Warshaw, Steven. 1990. *Southeast Asia Emerges*. Berkeley: Diablo Press.

Zakaria, Fareed. 2003. *The Future of Freedom.* London: W.W. Norton.

Academic Articles

Antlov, Hans. 2003. "Not Enough Politics! Power, Participation and the New Democratic Polity in Indonesia." in *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia*. ed. Fealy, Greg and Aspinall, Edward. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies.

Aspinall, Edward and Fealy, Greg. 2003. "Decentralization and the Rise of the Local." in *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia*. ed. Fealy, Greg and Aspinall, Edward. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies.

Azra, Azyumardi. 1992. "The Indonesian Marriage Law of

1974." in *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia.* 2003. ed. Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi, Azra. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Bedford, Robert and Snow, David. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization.: in *International Social Movement Research*. ed. Klandermans, Bert. London: Jai Press Inc.

Dhume, Sadanand. 2005. "Radical March on Indonesia's Future." *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Hong Kong, May 2005, Vol. 168 No. 5.

Fealy, Greg. 2005. "Islamisation and Politics in Southeast Asia: The Contrasting Cases of Malaysia and Indonesia." In *Islam in World Politics*. ed. Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns. Routledge: London and New York.

Federspiel, Howard. 1998. "Islamic Values, Law and Expectations in Contemporay Indonesia" in *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia.* 2003. ed. Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi, Azra. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Fish, Stephen. 2002. "Islam and Authoritarianism". *World Politics.* Vol. 55, No.1 (October 2002)..

Hefner, Robert. 2006. "Asian and Middle Eastern Islam." Essay presented at a FPRI

Hillman, Ben. 2006. "New Elections, Old Politics." *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Vol. 169 No. 1 (Jan/Feb 2006).

Hooker, M.B. 1999. "The State and Shari'a in Indonesia." in *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia.* 2003. ed. Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi, Azra. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Hosen, Nadirsyah. 2003. "*Fatwa* and Politics in Indonesia" in *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia.* 2003. ed. Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi, Azra. Singapore: Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies

Huntington P. Samuel. 1993 "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs,* Vol.72 No. 3 (summer 1993)

Johns, Anthony H. and Lahoud, Nelly 2005. "The World of Islam and the challenge of Islamism." In *Islam in World Politics*. ed. Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns. London and New York: Routledge.

Kamrava, Mehran. 2005. "Development and Democracy: The Muslim World in a Comparitive Perspective." In *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*. Ed. Hunter, Shireen and Malk Huma. London: Praeger.

Klandermans, Bert. 1988. "The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus." In *International Social Movement Research*. ed by Klandermans, Bert. London: Jai Press Inc.

Palmer, Leslie. 2006 . "Indonesia: Corruption, Ethnicity, and the "Pax Americana." *Asian Affairs,* Vol. XXXVII, No. II, July 2006.

Salim, Arskal. 1999. "Zakat Administration in Politics of Indonesian New Order." in *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia* 2003. ed. Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi, Azra. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Satriyo, Hana A. 2003. "Decentralisation and Women in Indonesia: One Step back, Two Steps Forward?" in *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia*. ed. Fealy, Greg and Aspinall, Edward. Institute for Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore.

Shboul, Ahmad 2005. "Between Rhetoric and Reality: Islam and Politics in the Arab World." In *Islam in World Politics*. ed. Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns. Routledge: London and New York.

Voll, John. 2005. "Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a

Barrier?" In *Modernization, Democracy and Islam*. Ed. Hunter, Shireen and Malk Huma. London: Praeger.

Zenzie, Charles U. 1999. "Indonesia's New Political Spectrum." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 39, No. 2. (Mar. - Apr., 1999).

Newspaper Reports

Ali, Muhamad. 2006 "Bureaucratization of Islamic law and faith-based Power Politics." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. May 05, 2006.

Ali, Muhamad. 2006. "Exclusive bylaws at Odds with State ideology of Pancasila." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 19, 2006

Ali, Muhamad. 2006."Promoting Tolerant Nationalism, Beyond Religious versus Secular." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. September 1, 2006.

Banget, Angel. 2006. "Structural and Cultural Conflict Within NU." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. May 24, 2006

Djiwandono, J. Soedjati. 2006. "SBY on Pancasila like an Ostrich on the Sand." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 19, 2006

Bachyul, Syiardi. 2006. "Sudarto: Fighting for Pluralism, Against the Trend." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. August 28, 2006.

Donnan, Shawn. 2006. "Suharto's Principles Revive in Combat with Radical Islam." *Financial Times.* London: Financial Times Limited. August 7, 2006.

Hera, Diani. 2005. "MUI issues 11 Fatwa." *The Jakarta Post*: Jakarta. July 29, 2005.

Hera, Diani. 2005. "Moderates, Conservatives Dispute Freedom of Thought." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. September 14, 2005.

Hermawan, Ary. 2006 "Gloomy Outlook for Islamist Parties." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. October 16, 2006.

Hermawan, Ary. 2006. "NU reaffirms Pancasila Commitment." *The Jakarta Post*: Jakarta. November 11, 2006.

Honoris, Charles. 2006. "Taming the radicals Taming the radicals." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 6, 2006.

Honoris, Charles. 2006. "Democracy at the crossroads in Indonesia after 61 Years." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. September 15, 2006

Hummel, Daniel. 2006. "Implications of Pornography Bill and Islamic Law." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. March 25, 2006.

Khalik, Abdul. 2005. 'Protesters Persist with Rallies Despite Police Ban." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. April 24, 2005

Magnis-Suseno, Franz. 2005. "Defining pluralism, liberalism, secularism." 2005 *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. August 16, 2005.

Nakashima Ellen. 2005. "Indonesian Islamic Party Reaps Rewards of Goodwill

"Extensive Relief Work in Aceh Wins Sympathy -- and Votes." *Washington Post Foreign Service*. January 14, 2005.

Perliz, Jane. 2006. "Spread of Islamic Law in Indonesia Takes Toll on Women." *The New York Times*: New York. June 27, 2006.

Rukmantara, Arie. 2006. "Joint Democracy Program targets Islamic schools." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. March 03, 2006.

Sachs, Peter. 2006. "Former Indonesian Leader Calls for Cleansing of Islam." *Religion News Service.* June 27, 2006.

Sahrasad, Herdi. 2006. "Is NU shifting Toward Intolerance?" *The Jakarta Post.* Jakarta. August 5, 2006.

Sembiring, Tifatul. 2005. "PKS Clarifies." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. December 7, 2005

Sijabat, Ridwan Max. 2006. "Survey Shows Prevalent Conservatism." *The Jakarta Post*: Jakarta. March 17, 2006.

Suwarni, Yuli and Khalik, Abdul. 2005. "Court Overturns PKS Depok Win." *The Jakarta Post*: Jakarta. Aug. 5, 2005.

Syofiardi, Bachyul. 2005. "Moderates, Conservatives Dispute Freedom of Thought." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. September 14, 2005.

Taufiqurrahman, M. 2006. "Legislators Take Stand Against Sharia Laws." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 14, 2006.

Vatikiotis, Michael. 2007. "The Direction of Indonesia in 2007." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. January 10, 2007.

Yazid, Mohammad. 2006. "Sharia Bylaws a Panacea for Legal System?" *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 23, 2006.

Zulkieflimansyah. 2006. "Islam, Muslims and Democracy in Indonesia." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. Sept. 12, 2006.

The Jakarta Post. 2005. "MUI does not Fully Understand our Political and Social Map." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. August 06, 2005.

The Jakarta Post. 2006. "Sharia a Reality and Asset of National Law." *The Jakarta Post*: Jakarta: Feb 4, 2006.

The Jakarta Post. 2006. "Group says Pancasila Way to Halt Assault on Pluralism." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 01, 2006.

The Jakarta Post. 2006. "Political Experts Say Don't Put Pancasila on a Pedestal." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 03, 2006

The Jakarta Post. 2006. "Government Told to Act Fast Against Bylaws." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 16, 2006.

The Jakarta Post. 2006. "NU Criticizes Controversial MUI Edicts." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. August 6, 2006.

The Jakarta Post. 2007. "10 Killed in Poso Battle." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. January 23, 2007.

Tempo. 2006. "Hidayat Nurwahid: Those who oppose Syariah hide behind Pancasila."

FROM SARIKAT ISLAM TO DARUL ISLAM/NEGARA ISLAM INDONESIA (DI/NII), ISLAMIC POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA : A PERSPECTIVE

"Dan oleh karena Repoeblik Indonesia berdasarkan koedaoelatan Ra'iat, maka seoara ra'iat jang terbanjak itoelah jang akan memegang kekoeasaan negara. Djika kommoenisme jang diikuti oleh sebagian besar daripada ra'iat, maka pemerintah Negara akan mengikoeti haloean politik, sepandjang adjaran kommoenis. Dan bila sosialisme atau nasionalismelah jang "menang soeara", maka sosialisme atau nasionalismelah yang menentoekan haloean politik negara. Demikian poela, djika Islam jang mendapat koernia Toehan "menang dalam perdjoeangan politik" itoe, maka Islam poelalah jang akan memegang tampoek Pemerintah Negara. Sehingga pada waktoe itoe terbangoenlah doenia Islam atau Daroel-Islam, jang tidak menjimpang seramboet dibelah toejoeh sekalipoen daripada adjaran-adjaran Kitabuoellah dan Soennahtoen-Nabi Moehammad Çlm.[1]

TO UNDERSTAND Islamic political movements of Darul Islam in Indonesia, we must firstly understood how the

[1]Translation: "*And therefore Indonesian republic based on the sovereignty of the people, the voice of the people is the most that will hold state power. if communism is followed by most of the people, then the state government will follow the political direction along communism. And if socialism or nationalism "winning sound", then socialism or nationalism that determines the political direction of the country. Similarly, if Islam who received gifts of God "won in the political struggle" that, then Islam will also hold the reins of the State Government. So at that time Islamic world or Darul Islam will arise, which does not even deviate as tiny as a hair sliced seven from the teachings of the Book of Allah and the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)*." S.M. Kartosoewirjo, *Haloean Politik Islam*, (Malangbong: Penerbit Poestaka Daroel-Islam, 1946), p. 16.

socio-cultural environment and the communities in which it originated, which formed personalities and influences thinking. The influences of Islamism in the Netherland Indies from the Middle East like the thinking Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1837–97), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935) had preached Islamic alternatives to the political, economic, and cultural decline of the Western states. As personae who were born of Java coastal communities, Kartosoewirjo, HOS Tjokroaminoto and Hadji Samanhoedi strongly influenced by socio-cultural environment and traditions of Java, which then form the values for movement and thought, as he understands and interprets the teachings of Islam into movement, for it to be seen the social situation and the political situation at the time he was born and grew into a figure-forming Islamic State of Indonesia.[2]

It has long been the island of Java is the island's most densely populated place compared to other islands in the Indonesian archipelago. In addition, Java is very strategically located as a traffic lane and inter-island trade in the archipelago. So it is not surprising that in the 6th century and 7th, has stood Hindu kingdoms which brought the people of India that marked the beginning of the development of the history of Hindu kingdom in the archipelago. In addition, Java has very good soil fertility for agricultural

[2] See, Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia SM Kartosoewirjo: Fakta dan SejarahDarul Islam* (Jakarta: Darul Falah,1999); Al Chaidar, "Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Darul Islam's Response Towards Indonesian Democracy, 1949–1982," *paper,* in a conference on regional workshop on "Contemporary Islamic Movements in Southeast Asia: Militancy, Separatism, Terrorism and Democratisation Process,"organized by The RIDEP Institute/FES, Bogor, Indonesia, 2002.

development. Fertile soil also affects the proliferation of movements of thought. Although Hinduism has contributed a lot to the development of Indonesian society, coupled with the Islamic culture and the inculturation of the Indo-European, has resulted in a "affinities and extreme" for the future development of modern Indonesia, but the most dynamic Islam give a rounded shape to the history of Indonesia-lonjongnya now. Round-lonjongnya Indonesia especially strongly influenced the dynamics of the movement of people in Java.

With its natural wealth, Java island evokes the spirit of the imperialist West to make the Dutch East Indies in particular Java as garden continuum to support the country's economy. The Dutch traders came to the Indies with the intention of going to dominate the lucrative trade of this region, especially the spice trade. It has in its power to encourage the desire to compete among European countries, such as the Portuguese in the territorial waters of eastern Indonesia; The Netherlands, which is generally carried Trade Guild East Indies (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC abbreviated); and the United Kingdom in the western region. Since the founding of the VOC in 1602, the Netherlands became powerful trade empire. 1619 Netherlands strengthen its foothold place for trading in West Java, and continued in the 1620s with its competitors expel -Portugis and English - out of the Maluku Islands, to get his power base in the region.

With such great allure of Java or this archipelago, then we saw during the first half of the 18th century, the Netherlands has intervened in the power of the kings of Java with a series

of wars in succession in the collapse of the kingdom of Mataram. Thus, competition among Javanese rulers have been evocative of the Netherlands to engage much in political affairs in Java, is no exception in the body's internal problems kingdoms of Java. Dutch efforts made in this regard is to protect one of the claimants to the throne of power among competing. Similarly, in its efforts to develop trade, the Dutch through VOC involved in efforts to "pacify" the beach area, which continues into the interior of Java. Pacify (Penentraman) is intended to regulate public and Javanese rulers with their political patterns. For many years the Netherlands run an influence on the rulers in Java and trade mastered. Until then the Dutch government took over the debts VOC went bankrupt in the late 18th century, the Netherlands has run a vast political power over Java. Everyone who lives, birth and death in Java slightest feel the influence of Dutch rule. And, Kartosoewirjo is one among them.

Three decades before the end of the 19th century, has became a common liberal political and economic influence in Indonesia. In the middle of the traditional economic system, the Dutch economic conditions began to show a striking difference. The existence of "economic development" Western-style Netherlands has not raised the lives of indigenous people in Java. The pursuit of profit, European entrepreneurs are very bad impact and devastated the economy in ruins joints. Plantations and factories emerged everywhere and everything is maintained Netherlands. On the other hand, economic growth efforts to improve the welfare of the community is very far behind the accelerated development of the Javanese population.

Seeing the reality of Dutch private entrepreneurs who do not want to give benefit and prosperity for the indigenous population, have been aware of the politicians who influenced thinking liberal humanism and Marxism that was sweeping Europe at the time, that the indigenous poverty should be addressed first, before growing the colonies into a market that is more encouragingthe Dutch colonial policy that no mercy toward the natives of the Netherland Indies, several prominent humanists give a very harsh reaction, even from the Dutch people themselves. Stories of the fate of the colony, in 1899, about the inhumanity and arbitrariness committed by the Dutch entrepreneurs have changed the course of history.

This criticism, no matter how small has been very influential decisive for colonial political change. This makes the insistence of Queen Wilhelmina change Dutch policy in dealing with the problems of the colonies and the indigenous people. In 1901 Queen Wilhelmina called political policy changes colony, which is the beginning of a new era in the politics of the colonial Dutch, who then referred to as ″Ethical Policy″ Dutch. This is the speech uttered from the throne of the Kingdom of the Netherlands: ″As a Christian country, the Netherlands shall improve the legal position of indigenous Christians in the Indian archipelago, providing strong support to the Christian mission, and instill in the entire system of government with the awareness that the Netherlands has a moral obligation to the people of this region. Although at first , the expected goals of the Queen's speech is more emphasis on the welfare of the indigenous Christian, but attention was then expanded covering also the entire indigenous population,

without a religious point of view. But it is important to note, that the ethical stance is based on a deep conviction about the advantages of culture West. In other words, reform must be carried out from above; modernization equated with estab-Western-ness, or more pointedly Dutchification's. "

So, with all the "regretness," although superficial in the eyes of the native colony, built of modern educational institutions in the archipelago. Java gets priority because the island has a pacifist community in large numbers. Hardware devices came from Europe, entering the traditional agrarian society and the simple-minded. Ideological device also participate in it simultaneously. Seen then is a portrait of a changing of faces and other native Java. Even if listened further, the ethical stance that it has a dual nature, including: (1) want to improve the welfare of the indigenous population; and (2) gradually wants to foster political autonomy and decentralization in the Dutch East Indies. In this case the Dutch colonial government was well aware that these two goals are not separated, and that the first goal can only be realized if local governments really want to be responsible for the indigenous population. Hence, although the welfare of the more important issues, but the first step taken by the government is the problem of decentralization. As for the reason for this is that: the power of government to be transferred (1) of the Netherlands to the Indies, (2) from Batavia to other areas, and (3) of the Europeans to the natives. Colonial politics this time turn to the growing autonomy of government, but the Netherlands does not intend to give political independence to the Indies.

But in reality, the transition of power from the Netherlands to the East Indies can never be implemented. They just ”move” their traditions and ideology in the West to be able to live on land that had been dominated by the East. Dutch government held a decentralization and expansion of colonial bureaucracy into new fields, creating demands a large number of educated Javanese to devote themselves in the government. Father B.C. Kartosoewirjo is one of hundreds of thousands of colonial bureaucrats who breathe this atmosphere, breathe new hopes are growing in this land. With the hope that the colonial government was unable to fill positions in cooperation with the authorities of the natives and their subordinates who are still working, their reason is because they are the only people in Java who really can run jobs bureaucracy. Animism minded peasants generally not educated technically, as well as psychologically not ready for such work. Traders and farmers minded Islam seemed reluctant to assume office for the sake of ”something” with foreign governments and secular. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that the development of Indonesian society seen many of the early arrival of Islam in Indonesia. Christian Snouck Hurgronje, one most influential scholar Ethical Policy, concluded that estab-West’s Dutch East Indies could only be done with the support of the Javanese aristocracy because of the sophistication of their culture, their relationship with Western influences, and the estrangement of their traditional attitudes towards Islam , So what happens then is the emergence of arrogance among Indonesian intellectuals at that time who have followed their education abroad. Teradopsi Western cultural influences in their minds so that there are no longer in their brains to fight

for Islam.

Despite the Ethical Policy was officially started in 1901, but politics is still not fully able to replace the laissez-faire liberalism with state intervention in economic matters and an ambitious program of welfare legislation. Private, which is represented by the indigenous traders and Islam, is part of a laissez-faire movement that began to writhe in the heart of the archipelago: Java. Muslim merchant class function is to create social conditions and political lasting colony so that it can offset the effects of the disintegration of Western influence on Indonesia. Prosperity must replace the exploitation, and renewal must replace the regimentation that is the key word of Dutch colonization of the twentieth century. Due to the political exploitation by running the Dutch colonists had drained the natural resources owned by the people of Indonesia, so that not only the economy that is turned off until the single political abolished. Thus, Java is the region's economic growth is very fertile, as well as soil and raising many dissidents breakthrough times brilliant and opponents establishment and arrogance of power.

Ethical Policy is also a political reform in order to strengthen the status-quo by way of managing change in a regular cycle of conjuncture and as far as possible be set. Administratively, The Time of Ethical bring measures of autonomy from the mother country, handover of responsibility most of the central government in Batavia to local officials, from administrative corps of indigenous and strict vigil by the Dutch authorities. Political reform is focused on the formation of representative councils for the Javanese population.

From Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI) to Sarekat Islam (SI)

The history of NII, as perceived by the members of NII, started from from a seed planted by Sarekat Dagang Islam and for them, its become an symbolic imagery and then the expectation of an imminent cosmic cataclysm in which God destroys the ruling power of evil and raises the righteous to life in a messianic state somehow in the future. They believe that this something viewed as a prophetic revelation. Hadji Samanhudi (1868 – 28 December 1956) was founder of Sarekat Dagang Islam, a mass organization in Indonesia that was previously an association for *batik* traders in Surakarta. Born in Lawiyan, Solo (Surakarta) as Soedarno Nadi, he was educated until SR (Sekolah Rakyat) but he didn’t graduate. After that he learned Islam in Surabaya, but this big city not in favour of muslims merchants. At the same time he traded *batik* in Solo and firming his pile of religous standing here. This central position of Solo expected could explain of why many ”terrorists” originate and operate from this quiet town of Java.[3] Samanhudi founded Sarekat Dagang Islam, or Islamic Trade Union in 1905. The Union consists of *batik* entrepreneurs in East and Central Java to protect their business from Chinese competition. The members of the organization were unified by a common religion, Islam, albeit one with many influences from mysticism and local traditions (Ruth T. McVey,1963: 56). Samanhudi remained as its chairman until 1914, two years after Tjokroaminoto transformed the organization into a political one. This

---

[3] See, Herdi Sahrasad, Muntasir, M., Rakhmat, J., Tamara, N., Salahuddin, Z., & Hidayat, T. *Islam, Fundamentalisme dan Ideologi Revolusi* (Jakarta: Madani Press, 2000). Herdi Sahrasad & Al-Chaidar. *Islamism & Fundamentalism* (Lhoksumawe, Aceh: University of Malikus-saleh Press, 2012). Al Chaidar & Herdi Sahrasad, *Negara Madinah: Refleksi tentang Agama dan Pluralisme* (Jakarta: Madani Press, 2000).

transformation of SDI into SI by Tjokroaminoto gave a space for next foundation of radicalism of Muslim in Indonesia. [4]

Since 1920, Samanhudi became inactive in the party. His health was bad, but his interest to national movement never calmed down (Ariel Heryanto, 2008). Up to this time, many Darul Islam people asways questioning the relevance of national awakening today, as for them SDI was the first organization ever established in East Indies, former Indonesia name. For a long time his name never appeared. After Indonesia's independence, he was active again. To defend Republic of Indonesia facing Dutch aggression, Samanhudi formed Solo Branch of Indonesian Rebel Front (*Barisan Pemberontak Indonesia Cabang Solo*). When the Netherlands launched Clash II, he formed an army named Hawk Union Movement (*Gerakan Kesatuan Alap-alap*). That army was assigned to provide equipments mainly foods for army union fighting in the front line. There were many services he gave when Indonesian National Revolution took place. He died in Klaten (28 December 1956) and was buried in Banaran, Grogol, Sukoharjo.

As Sarekat Dagang Islam grew, it was reorganized under the name Sarekat Islam. Sarekat Islam's general office was in Surabaya. Early prominent figures of Sarekat Islam included H.O.S. Cokroaminoto and Haji Agus Salim. H.O.S. Cokro-aminoto had three famous students, who went on to play a dominant role in Indonesian politics: Soekarno the nationalist, Semaun the socialist and Islamist Kartosuwirjo. Haji Agus Salim joined Sarekat Islam in 1915 and promoted

---

[4] See, Ruth T. McVey (ed.), *Indonesia* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1963).

Islamic modernism. Some of Agus Salim's students such as Kasman Singodimedjo, Mohammad Roem and Mohammad Natsir later became promintent Islamic and Nationalist leaders (Peter Malcolm Holt; Ann K. S. Lambton; Bernard Lewis, 1977: 191–192).[5]

HOS Tjokroaminoto (Sarekat Islam)

The end of the 19th century can bee seen as the dismemberment of most of the Muslim Ottoman Empire by non-Muslim European colonial powers. The empire spent massive sums on Western civilian and military technology to try to modernize and compete with the encroaching European powers, and in the process went deep into debt to these powers. Political reforms Netherlands (Ethical) at the beginning of the 20th century, the only merely make a change for the consolidation of a static situation back. These councils include mayors with the highest membership in the European Provincial Councils and, most important of all, the Council of the District in the rural areas, which is planned as the quasi-democratic control of the traditional authoritarianism of the ruling class, the priyayi. Karto-soewirjo, HOS Tjokroaminoto and real Hadji Samanhoedi is a gentry, but because of the influence of Islam, he would feel himself as a commoner.

And it is not surprising that the first organizational response to the Ethical Policy was going on among the members of the gentry class, where they felt they had benefited from the

[5]P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, Bernard Lewis, *The Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.304. See also, Bernard Lewis, *The crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2004).

holding of Western education. Budi Utomo organization formed as a partnership culture in 1908, showing his efforts to hold a self-development program --organisasi Budi Utomo many followers embrace Western-educated, those Indonesian professional- based on a combination of Western values and the values of Java. This organization is based on the degree of effect that appreciate the Western system and blood Javanese aristocracy. Here it can be seen that they are trying to maintain high expectations of the reformer associationist. Many of Darul Islam members are grateful that Kartosoewirjo lucky never entered this "mis-guided"organization.

Likewise, the first political party Indische Partij (East-Idies Party) of Douwes Dekker, who explicitly based on the principles of the association and led by people of Indo-European and people of Indonesia, but still calculate the background level based education. Thus, only those who are educated are "considered the" the figures we have the founding fathers. However, this organization with a high intellect scratching the sky is a group of people who are most demanding. Demands that that has given a lot of influence on the progress of the nation, even though the road is full of twists and steep so many lost cost and sacrifice. With demands autonomy for the good of all racial groups remain domiciled in the colonies, then formed an advisory board called the Volksraad.

All circles, not to mention Islam and secular, spent a lot of energy for the "people's house" which was created as a new playground for the natives who began to think of this. Very rapidly in Indonesian political movements, parties only SI

(SI), which these organizations do not walk on the street associationist. SI party is born in urban as Budi Utomo and Indische Partij both come from the city, as well as social background and education are the main leaders, such as Haj Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto and Haji Agus Salim; both educated in Western schools and each is a traditional Indonesian elite in Java and Sumatra. Which is very interesting from this organization is recruiting members, which is not limited to members who received Western education just as is done by the Organization Budi Utomo. So no wonder this party get followers from all classes, both in cities and in villages. Even its leaders took inspiration from sources different sources including Islam. As another reason, that the appeal brought by the SI organization is more far-reaching than just reaching a group of Western-oriented city. Because the SI party focused exclusively for the people of Indonesia, the Muslim traders, workers in the cities, kiyais and scholars, and even some gentry. Kartosoewirjo was involved in this party.

SI occupies a unique place but complex, both in the history of Indonesian nationalism and the history of Islam in Indonesia. Indonesian history past filled with dynamics has inspired the political elite SI to make planning more representative of the political development in Indonesia that is growing. Java is the first place where the organization is introduced as a modern container for the mission and ideals move. Then the first organization, SI, ideologically, he precedes a programmatic nationalism as later expressed in terms of an independent nationality. Religiously, he also precede the formulation of Islamic renewal program as it then specifically disclosed in the social values and political

Islam. However loud protests against the colonial status quo, complaints were loud in economic and social fields, and demands that can not wait anymore for greater autonomy, combining nationalist aspirations and Islam, however no details are explained, into a political program that is becoming increasingly militant and Indonesian specialties.

But radicalism is not a reflection of the ideological program leaders who by most of his followers, especially the majority of the people of the village, is considered incarnated in SI. The followers of the Islamic party, particularly in the village, gathered around the banner is not because of his struggle for autonomy or social and economic reform, but because he seemed to express anxiety and desire to rebel peasants who have been detained against changing times. Farmers Java requires only a leader as a tip, while they themselves are the rods and poles enforcement. SI that stand much earlier than Boedi Oetomo is cooler and at the same restlessness blood warmers to rebel. By making such action, SI is within the framework of Islamic conservatism for decades to inspire unrest in the village. This means that at the village level, ″membership″ of the party not in itself be an indication of something new-such as real-organizational strength but rather as a reaffirmation of something traditional. Dissatisfaction centered around the idol or hero last era (laudatores temporis acti) is kiyais and the scholars who fought against the government ″infidel″ and especially against the employees-gentry Indonesia from the government, which in the eyes of the peasantry is the representative par excellence of a undesirable social change.

Thus the SI brought a change of quantitative, qualitative in

nature rather than Islam in villages in Java. For several years, he weave local incidents because of dissatisfaction under the leadership of Muslims into a national phenomenon under the leadership of the people of the city. However, it is made without either direct or belief abangan militant orthodox belief into a positive streets and modern. Therefore, the SI has more social significance than ideology. By utilizing the administrative control of the Netherlands that is not too tight and gentry prestige weakened, the leaders of the SI has invaded the villages in remote Java and make it a social malaise spokesman aloud from the peasant population passed the Java and menghasutnya traditional religious leaders , to rebel against the ongoing power, although the nature abortive uprising and suicide.

In this context, the publications of Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1837–97), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935) preached Islamic alternatives to the political, economic, and cultural decline of the empire. Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida formed the beginning of the Islamist movement, as well as the reformist Islamist movement. Their ideas included the creation of a truly Islamic society under sharia law, and the rejection of taqlid, the blind imitation of earlier authorities, which they believed deviated from the true messages of Islam. Unlike some later Islamists, Early Salafiyya strongly emphasized the restoration of the Caliphate. (Raden Mas Hadji) Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (August 16, 1882 – December 17, 1934), better known in Indonesia as H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, was a nationalist, one of the leader of Syarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Union) after the founder Haji Samanhudi, later became Sarekat Islam) in Indonesia.

Born in Ponorogo as the son of RM. Tjokroaminoto (district chief of Kleco), grandson of RMA. Tjokronegoro (regent of Ponorogo), and grand-grandson of Kyai Bagus Kasan Besari of Tegalsari pesantren. According to his genealogy, his education was directed towards civil service eventually not his hope. After graduating from OSVIA (Opleiding School Voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, the then-highest civil servant education) in Magelang (1902), Oemar Said began to work as civil servant in Ngawi, but eventually he left it (1902-1905). In looking for other job he came in Surabaya. In the night he attended BAS (*Burgerlijke Avond School*) for some years. After graduating, he worked in a sugar refinery (1907-1912). In that time Tjokroaminoto began to write and became assistant in *Bintang Soerabaja* daily.

In that time, in Surakarta, H. Samanhoedi had founded Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI, in the late 1911). Tjokroaminoto was asked to prepare needed regulations for organization and next management handling. After that the statuten (statute) was prepared and strengthened by notarial act in Surabaya (September 10, 1912).The word Dagang (trade) in the organization's name was removed and SDI became SI (Sarekat Islam; Islamic Union). Its chairman was H. Samanhoedi, while Tjokroaminoto became commissioner. Few days later its statute was sent to Governor-General to be legalized as a corporate body (*rechtspersoon*).

A central committee was formed with H. Samanhoedi as chairman and Tjokroaminoto as vice-chairman. In explaining organization's aim, Tjokroaminoto stated that SI would not oppose Dutch East Indies Government. For organization's interest he and other manager went to the then-

Governor-General, Alexander Willem Frederik Idenburg (March 29, 1913). Idenburg stated that for public importance (algemeen belang) SI legalization couldn't be granted, but local SI's can be granted corporate-body status.

Because of rapid development of local SIs, it was necessary to establish a central SI coordinating them. On 1915, the Centraal Sarekat Islam (CSI) was founded with Tjokroaminoto as its chairman, Abdoel Moeis as its vice-chairman, and Samanhoedi as honorary chairman. Since then Tjokroaminoto was continuously chairman or member of SI Board of Administration until his death. The 1st CSI national congress (the 3rd SI congress) in his presidency was held in Bandung (June 1916). The usage of word national remembered to the things Tjokroaminoto had sounded, is the necessity of the unity of all Indonesian. As social strength, Sarekat Islam obtained acknowledgement with entrance of Tjokroaminoto and Abdoel Moeis as the newly opened Volksraad's member (1918). As successor of his organization's voice, in that representative body Tjokroaminoto tirelessly had government correct all people expect.

The whole SI under Tjokroaminoto continuously went forward, but inner opposition arose, when colonial government's trust decreased. The hardest challenge came from Marxist/Leninist fraction led by Semaoen who faced Tjokroaminoto. Eventually Marxist-Leninist fraction formed Red SI that later became Communist Party of Indonesia. In 1921 Tjokroaminoto was arrested for the charge of (assassination by) SI-afdelling B in Cimareme, Garut, West Java; he was released around 9 months later without trial (August 1922).

Migration of PSII

Indonesian Islamic State (NII) by the various factions is considered as a result of feeling hurt among Muslims, and spontaneity, was born when there was a vacuum of power in the Republic of Indonesia. Since 1926, it has gathered the scholars in Arabic from various parts of the world, including Oemar Said Haji (HOS) Tjokroaminoto, to discuss the reconstruction of Islamic *khilafah* which collapsed in 1924.

Once the SI appears as a symbol of courage and vatalisme and be releasing tensions that accumulate throughout a decade, who was born in the form of an explosion upheavals in the villages and among the proletarian strikes in the city, divisions within itself and government crackdowns colonial - mostly in the form of repressive measures and strengthen the power of the aristocracy-join and undermine the SI in a short time at the beginning of 1920. The Islamic leaders eventually decided alliance with communism in 1924 and has since turned into a pan-Islamic propaganda. Remnants of unrest in the village of blazing enlarged to a final rebellion and massive in West Java under the instigation of the communists at the end of 1926 —followed also by a similar uprising on the West Coast of Sumatra at the beginning of next year— which without the slightest difficulty extinguished by the colonial government by force.

With the extinction of these revolts, the first stage turbulent era ended and with it the mass-based political action ending support farmers as well, to give way to the new developments in Indonesia and the Indonesian Islamic nationalism. Because both become clearer crystallized in groups ideologically and organizationally, the framework of

unity and differences in Indonesian society are given clear boundaries. On the one hand, appear forces that strive towards the realization of a modern Islamic civilization, while embracing and at the same time go beyond the centers of students-century ago. On the other hand, nationalism Western-oriented and centered in the cities to the fore, at least partly rooted in the surrounding environment of the gentry were rejected and at the same time replacement. It is true, that Muslims and nationalists alike rejected the colonial administration. But the opposition together against the Dutch government was far from being successfully forged an enduring alliance, but merely obscures the widening chasm between nationalism 'secular' and Islam Indonesia were largely end goal can not be met each other. It is important that the SI, which is the shadow. beginning from and partially contain the seeds of nationalism and modern Islam, find themselves increasingly imprisoned between the two movements, and then destined to survive as a militant force is in the edges over the next year.[6]

As mentioned by Harry Benda (1980), political ideological streams that affect Indonesia in the early twentieth century originated abroad, the Indonesian Islamic renesans also stems from developments abroad Islam. Such as Chinese Muslims, Japan, Turkey, the Middle East, and India were in the grip of less harsh reaction against Western influence.[7] These politics and religion soon spread to other Muslim world. Islam later became one of the strengths in the map

---

[6] See, Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam*...; Al Chaidar,. "Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism..."

[7] Harry J. Benda, *Bulan Sabit dan Matahari Terbit Islam Indonesia Pada Masa Pendudukan Jepang* (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1980), p. 343.

political force in history. Young Turk rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in 1908 was followed by the fall of Sultan and Caliph decade later. Turkey's defeat in World War I led to the expansion. and the consolidation of power France and the UK in areas such as Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. The victory of the Wahhabis in Mecca in the mid 1920s also signaled an important change in central Islam itself. Then the wars that were then taken by the Netherlands and other invaders to Indonesia is a "war without mercy" the most cruel and barbaric. All of this is to destroy Islam and is a continuation of the Crusades in West against Islam.

Political developments is also parallel with the rise of Islamic reformism, who was born in this century exchange in the Middle East and India, and the puritanical Wahhabism in Saudi. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 allows the improvement of relations and the increasingly close relationship between Indonesia and the Middle East and Al-Azhar University in Cairo and Islamic centers in India such as Lahore, Qadian, and the Islamic University in Aligarh.

The reformists Indonesia tried to stem the tide of Westernization by identifying Islam with the separation centered Indonesia, contrary to the submission round to the values and norms of the West-both Christian and secular. Although Western education is limited in range, and apart from *kebijaksanaan*-associationist discretion on the part of the rulers of the West, the reformists see Western-educated intellectuals, whatever their political orientation against the Dutch government, as enemies of Islam are most concerned about. Again they hold the same opinion in this deep suspicion alongside orthodox. However, in contrast to the

scholars, they are trying to fight the ideology of Westernisation with Western organizations that use the weapon itself. *Jong Islamieten Bond* (Islamic Youth League) established Haji Agus Salim in the capital of Batavia at the end of 1925, into an organization which is politically very important in the backlash against the reformists alienation among students who are educated in the Netherlands. He grew into a training center for Islamic leadership is different from Indonesian intellectuals 'secular' is oriented to the West.

Arrival device-war technology, education and ideology of the West has led to the Islamic and non-Islamic each split in two; that one reformist and the other orthodox. Java also occur later in a state where reformism Indonesia was forced to collide with the colonial status quo itself. It is an almost inevitable consequence not only of Islam deep consciousness arising from the activities of the diverse-wide among the people of the city and among people more prosperous villages that are in the sphere of influence, but Also from Dutch policies that support traditional institutions -as will be seen in the next chapter where colonial rule turned at the end of the 1920s and beyond. It seems everything is possible in the "Island of Ignorance" is.

Unfortunately, the *Shura ulama* is to no avail and unsustainable. Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo is the belief Tjokroaminto follow Islamic caliphate reconstruction efforts by preparing a brochure attitude moved by congressional decision PSII 1936. Then on April 24, 1940, together with the scholars Kartosoewirjo founded in Malangbong. Shuffah Institute is an educational laboratory

where educating cadres of jihadists, such as in the time of Prophet Muhammad. Institute founded shuffah has spawned defenders of Islam with Islamic science perfect and unwavering faith. Alumnus shuffah then becomes forerunner Laskar Hizbullah-Sabilillah. Laskar Hizbullah-Sabilillah not allowed to hjrah to Yogyakarta following the steps taken by the Indonesian army, as a result of silliness political figures. Warriors this was what eventually became the Army of Islam Indonesia (TII).

On February 10, 1948, held a conference in Cisayong which resulted in the decision to form the Islamic Council and a lift Kartosoewirjo as High Commander of the Darul Islam/ Islamic Army of Indonesia (DI/TII). The conference also agreed that Cisayong must struggle through the following millenarian steps: (1). To educate people to fit into a citizen Islam; (2) to provide an explanation to the people that Islam is not biased won with feblisit (referendum); (3) to build the base area (daerah basis); (4) to proclaim the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia; (5) to build the Islamic State of Indonesia so sturdy outward and inward, in a sense, in the country can implement Shari'ah Islamseluas as possible and as perfect as possible, while outside, can stand in line with other citizens; (6) to assist the struggle of Muslims in other countries so that it can quickly implement its sacred obligation; (7) to joint other Islamic countries in the world in order to establish the Imamate Council to elect the caliph in the world.

On December 20, 1948, SM Kartosoewirjo echoed a holy jihad against the Dutch colonialists with Imam issued notices stating that the situation of the country in a state of

war, and imposed Islamic law in a state of war. After nine months of the call for jihad holy, then on August 7, 1949, proclaimed the establishment of NII which echoed throughout the world. Various sources of literature about the birth NII stated that in fact is not the result of human engineering, but af'alullah, the program directly from Allah. Objectives and programs carried NII government is aware that their human is a servant of God and strive to uphold the caliphate *fil ardhi*.

NII was established with reference to the State of Medina at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. After the collapse of the last Islamic Caliphate in Turkey in 1924. State law underlying the medina or state law is Islamic law. Then, Islamic State of Indonesia was in Qanun Asasy (constitution) of his, namely Chapter I Article 1, asserts that: (1) The Islamic State of Indonesia is the gift of Allah Subhanahu wata'ala to the Indonesian nation. (2) Nature of the State *jumhuryah* (republic) by the federal government system. (3) The State guarantees the Islamic shariah enactment within the ranks of the Muslims. State gives freedom to people of other religions in the conduct of worship.

The establishment of Indonesian islamic State had a canonic or Quranic reference in its theological explanations. So, the ultimate goal of the Islamic State of Indonesia, among others, are: (1) Implement the teachings of Islam"How Firm Hold to the rope of Allah be with you all (in the sense of: believe, understand and implement the rule of God) in congregation and do safarruq" (Qur'an, 3: 103). Islamic countries is a form of congregation of Muslims who aim to implement the teachings of Islam in all aspects of life, creating an

unwavering faith community (tauhidullah) and loaded shalihnya charity. (Because only with faith and charity of God's promise in Quran Sura 24:55, 16: 9, 2:82, 5: 9, 2:62, 10: 3) can be achieved. (2) Enforce justice because Allah countries. "O you who believe, be with you all the upholder of justice as witnesses for Allah, even on yourself or your parents, or your kin. If they are rich or poor and then remain God take precedence over keduanya.Janganlah you follow the passions, because it is a fraud and if you putarbalikkan or reject (truth) then indeed Allah is Aware of what you do. "(Qur'an, 4: 145). "Be just, he was very close to piety." (Qur'an, 5: 8). Islamic countries (the people and their leaders) should be able to realize keadlian essentials, namely tauhidullah and justice based on the rule of Allah. simply, good interpersonal, family, community and between countries, both in matters jinayah, muamalah, siyasah, and so on. (3) prosperity of the earth Allah. "God has made you all of the earth, and prosper you to him." (Qur'an, 11:16). "That the earth is the beneficiary is righteous servants." (Qur'an, 21: 105). Islamic state with all its power is aimed at prosperity of the earth for the greatest welfare of the community and the country. (4) Establish a robust security force "Prepare combat power with all the equipment as strong as you are able, so that the enemy of Allah and your enemy and other enemies will be terrified by it." (Qur'an, 8:60). Islamic countries should be able to form a strong security force so that the enemies of Islam do not dare move and creating a safe and secure situation. (5) In cooperation with other Islamic countries in order to create the caliphate fil ardhi and other cooperation "And verily, your people are the people that one and I am your Lord, so taqwalah to Me."

(Qur'an, 23:52). "Be cooperate each other you all, on the basis of goodness and piety and do not bertolong-help on the basis of sin and enmity. "(Qur'an, 5: 2).

Islamic countries should be able to create concrete cooperation with other Islamic countries and other Muslims to build a world that is haq haq leadership system anyway, so it really realization of Muslims as a one and united people (*ummatan wahidah*). The Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) was a pre-war political organization in the then-Dutch East Indies. Following a split brought about by the increasing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), at the organization's 1923 conference, Tjokrominoto set up the Islamic Association Party (Partai Sarekat Islam - PSI) to rid the organization of the PKI (Ricklefs, 1991: 164-167). The PSI supported Sukarno's efforts to united Indonesian political organizations following the establishment of the Indonesian National Party (PNI) in 1927. The PSI changed its name to the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII) in 1929 and in the next few years attacked nationalism of other parties, claiming that nationalism came from men rather than God. The party's fortunes waned in 1934 when the Dutch colonial authorities clamped down on nationalist activities and party leader Tjokroaminoto died. Following this, political Islam broke into factions. In 1942 the occupying Japanese banned all political activity (Ricklefs, 1991: 174-190). [8]

However in 1943 the Japanese established an organization called Masyumi in an attempt to control Islam in Indonesia. The following year the Masyumi military wing established,

---

[8] See, Merle C.Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1200* (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1991).

with many pre-war pro-cooperation faction PSII members in the leadership (Ricklefs, 1991: 194, 196). CSI became weak, and its name was changed to PSI (Partai Sarekat Islam; Islamic Union Party) on February 1923. Tjokroaminoto made an effort to unite outer Javanese group. After a propaganda, insurgency broke out wherever, until he and Abdoel Moeis was forbidden to visit some areas. In that time, Pan-Islamism was launched. Tjokroaminoto and KH. Mas Mansoer of Muhammadiyah was delegated to attend Islamic conference in Mecca (1926). In that time Tjokroaminoto made a hajj, the 5th Islamic pillar.

Political suggestion of hijra, non-cooperative attitude to colonial government eventually accepted by Congress, caused Tjokroaminoto's refusal when he would be elected as Volksraad's member (1927). Relationship with Dr. Soetomo of Indonesische Studieclub became tense. Ulema Committee was founded to discuss Tjokroaminoto's Qur'anic interpretation that don't obtain agreement (1928). Later PSI was changed to PSII (Indonesian Islamic Union Party, Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia) in early 1929. There was a confrontation between nationalist Soekiman and religious Tjokroaminoto that led to Soekiman's departure to form a new party, the Indonesian Islamic Party (Partai Islam Indonesia). After the 20th PSII Congress in Banjarmasin (May 1934), Hadji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto was sick and died in Yogyakarta (17 December 1934). PSII's leadership was succeeded by his brother Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso.[9]

Post-independence realm of Indonesia sparked major split of Islamic political power. In 1947, the PSII split from Masyumi

[9] Sarikat Islam, *Ensiklopedi Umum* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1993).

in 1947 because of disagreements with the leadership, especially Natsir. The new PSII claimed to be same organization as pre-war party. It did not cooperate with Masyumi after the split although leaders of both parties claimed their differences were minor. It was not as strong as Masyumi nationally, but several of its members served in Indonesian cabinets in the 1950s (Feith, 2007: 138-9). The party came fifth in the 1955 legislative election with 2.9 percent of the vote, winning eight seats in the People's Representative Council (Feith, 2007: 434). In the 1971 election it won 2.4 percent of the vote and ten seats, but shortly after was fused into the United Development Party, ending its existence as a separate political entity.

Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (January 7, 1907 - September 5, 1962) was an Indonesian Islamic mystic who led the Darul Islam rebellion against the Indonesian government from 1949 to 1962, with the objective of overthrowing the secular Pancasila ideology and establishing Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia) based on sharia law. Kartosuwirjo was born in Cepu, an oil-producing town in Central Java, son of minor government official. His education was mostly in secular and Dutch-medium schools. While attending NIAS (*Nederlands-Indische Artsen School*/Netherlands Indies Medical College) in Surabaya, Kartosuwirjo boarded at the house of Islamist leader Tjokroaminoto and became actively involved in Tjokrominoto's PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Union Party). Kartosuwirjo abandoned his medical studies to be fully immersed in politics. In the mean time his touring Malangbong, near Garut in West Java, Kartosuwirjo met and married daughter

of a local PSII leader. He settled down in this area, where he established a madrasa. In 1937, he resigned from PSII to establish his own political movement advocating a future Islamic State of Indonesia based on Islamic law.

SM Kartosoewirjo and the Establishment of ”Negara Islam Indonesia” (1949 – now)

Thus Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo born January 7, 1907 in Cepu, a small town between Blora and Bojonegoro the border areas of East Java, Central Java. Cepu city is a place where the culture of eastern Java and the middle line meet in a unique culture. His father, who named Karto-soewirjo, working as a paramedic in an office that coordinates the sellers of opium in the small town Pamotan, near Rembang. At that time the paramedics opium equal to the post of Secretary of the District. In this position, the father Kartosoewirjo have a fairly important position as a native then, raises an enormous influence on the formation of the line of his history. Kartosoewirjo rope was then followed this influence until the age of adolescence.

With the special position of the parents and the increasing consolidation of ″Indonesia enlightenment movement″ when it is, Kartosoewirjo bred and grown. He terasuh under a rational system of the West begin grafted Dutch East Indies colony. The political atmosphere is also coloring parenting parents who try to revive the liberal atmosphere of family life. Each member of the family to develop a vision and direction of his thinking to the various orientations. He has an older sister who lived in Surakarta in the ′50s who live with full communality, and a brother who led the Railway

Workers' Union in the 20s, when in Indonesia formed various Trade Unions.

In 1911, when the activists busy to set up an organization, when it Kartosoewirjo six years old and entered the School ISTK (Inlandsche School der Tweede Klasse) or School "second class" for the Bumiputra in Pamotan. Four years later, he went on to his school (Hollandsch-Inlandsche School) in Rembang. In 1919 when his parents moved to Bojonegoro, they enter school Kartosoewirjo ELS (Europeesche Lagere School). For a son of "native", HIS and ELS are elite schools. Only by a special intelligence and talent possessed Kartosoewirjo then he can go to school is planned as an educational institution for the European and Indo-European society.[10]

As a teenager in this Bojonegoro Kartosoewirjo get religious education of a character named Notodihardjo who become "teachers" religion. He is a modern Islamic figures that follow Muhammadiyah. No exaggeration when it, itself Notodihardjo then embed the many aspects of Islamic modernity into a natural thought Kartosoewirjo. His thoughts greatly affect how Kartosoewirjo behave in response to the teachings of Islam. In the times that we might call it the formative age. In 1923, after completing school in the ELS, Kartosoewirjo go to Surabaya continued his studies at Nederlandsch Indische Artsen School (NIAS), School of Medicine Netherlands for Natives. At the time of

---

[10] See, Al Chaidar, "Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: An Anthropological Analysis of Darul Islam, Jamaah Islamiyyah, and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid," *paper,* Post Garduate Faculty of Anthropology, University of Indonesia, Depok, 2015; Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam...*; Al Chaidar, "Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism..."

this study (l926) he was involved with many activities of the Indonesian nationalist movement organization in Surabaya .

During college Kartosoewirjo became acquainted with Islamic thoughts. He began to ″recite″ seriously. So serious, he then so ″obsessive″ by shibghatullah so he later became Islam minded. All activities later only to learn Islam alone and do for Islam alone. He was then often leave college activities and become not so concerned with the sciences taught by the Dutch school, of course, after she reviewed and read a lot of books from a variety of disciplines, from medicine to social sciences and politics.

With this educational capital, with Western sciences are not a bit of it, plus he also entered the political organization Sarekat Islam under the leadership of Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto. Tjokroaminoto's Thoughts much influence attitudes, actions and orientation Kartosuwirjo. Then a year later, he was expelled from school for allegedly became a political activist, and found to have a number of socialist and communist books obtained from his uncle that Marko Kartodikromo, a journalist and writer who is quite famous in his day. School where he studied did not dare accuse him of as ″obsessive″ Islamic sciences, but was accused of ″communist″ because this ideology is often seen as an ideology that would endanger. Yet the ideology of Islam that is very dangerous for the ruling that wrongdoers. It is not surprising, if Kartosuwirjo will grow into a conscious political Islam and also have high integrity. He was a great scholar, even if we read his writings, we will definitely recognize him as a scholar of Southeast Asia's largest.

Since 1923, he has been active in the youth movement, including youth movement *Jong Java*. Then in 1925, when members of Jong Java who prefers establish their Islamic ideals *Jong Islamieten Bond* (JIB). Kartosoewirjo moved into this organization because of his pleading attitude to religion. Through these two organizations then took him into one of the perpetrators of the history of a very well-known youth movement, "Youth Pledge". In addition to serving as general secretary PSIHT (Partai Sarekat Islam Hindia Timur), Kartosoewirjo also worked as a journalist at the daily newspaper Fajar Asia. Originally he was a proofreader, later became a journalist. In 1929, the relatively young age of about 22 years, has been the editor of the daily Kartosoewirjo Fadjar Asia. In his capacity as editor, he began to publish numerous articles whose content is a lot of criticism, both the native and the Dutch colonial rulers.[11]

When in the course of his duties that he went to Malangbong. There met with the leader of the famous local PSIHT named Ajengan Ardiwisastera. It was here too he became acquainted with Siti Dewi Kalsum Ajengan Ardiwisastera daughter, who later married in April 1929. sakinah marriage was later blessed with twelve children, three of the last born in the forests of West Java wilderness. So many experiences have exposed himself as an intellectual actor in the arena of national movement.

In 1943, when Japan was in power in Indonesia, Kartosoewirjo active in the political field, which had been halted. He entered an organization of MIAI (*Madjlis Islam 'Alaa Indonesia*) under the leadership of Wondoamiseno, as

[11] See, Al Chaidar, "Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia..."

well as a secretary in the Assembly Baitul-Mal on the organization. During the Japanese occupation, he was re-creating *Suffah* institution he had ever form. But this time more to educate the Japanese military because it has opened up its military education. Then students who received military training at the *Institut Suffah* it finally enters one of the main Islamic guerrilla organization after the war, Hizbullah and Sabilillah, which later became the core of the Islamic Army of Indonesia in West Java.

In August 1945 before the end of Japanese rule in Indonesia, accompanied Kartosoewirjo Hezbollah soldiers were in Jakarta. He also knew the Japanese defeat of the allies, he even has a plan: it is time the people of Indonesia, especially Muslims, wrest independence from the hands of the invaders. Indeed he had proclaimed independence in August 1945. But the proclamation was withdrawn after no declaration of independence by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta. For a time he remained loyal to the Republic and received the basic "secular" it.

However, since Indonesian independence was proclaimed (August 17, 1945), secular nationalists who hold the reins of state power and tried to apply the principles of the modern secular state. Since then, the Islamic nationalists are systematically excluded and until the late '70s Islamists are outside the country. From this the start of a serious conflict between Islamists and secular nationalists. Because secular nationalists began to effectively hold state power, then this conflict hereinafter be referred to as a conflict between Islam and the state.

The situation is chaotic due to the two Dutch military aggression, especially with the signing of the Renville Agreement between the Government of the Netherlands. Where the agreement contains, among others, the ceasefire and the recognition of the demarcation line van Mook. While the Indonesian government should recognize Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia, it is a bitter pill for the Republic. Places of strategic importance for its forces in areas controlled by the Dutch troops should be emptied, and all the troops must be withdrawn-or "vague" in terms of people DI-- to Central Java. Because of this agreement, the official Republican Army in West Java, Division Siliwangi, comply with its provisions. Sukarno called the "blurring" of the TNI is using the Islamic term, "migrated". With this title he is deceiving millions of Muslims. But unlike the Hezbollah guerrilla forces and Sabilillah, substantial portions of the two guerrilla organizations in West Java, refused to comply. Hezbollah and Sabilillah better know what the meaning of "migrated" it.

In general, the wheels of government Islamic State of Indonesia goes according to Human Qanun, but because of the circumstances that force; where the Islamic State of Indonesia was born in wartime, the government system adapted to the conditions encountered, namely the wartime. In accordance Human Qanun, State agencies are supposed to tangible, namely: (1) The Shura Council, (2) Advisory Board, (3) Imam and the Imamate Council, (4) Fatwa Council, (5) the Supreme Court, (6) Audit Board, (7) Army Islam Indonesia (TII), and (8) Polisi Islam Indonesia (PII). Other institutions that have not been tangible as the desired setting is added in the Qanun Asasy NII. So, because of his

Qanun should their governing institutions of the country not yet exist, then the state institutions is not tangible. And is written in the Qanun Human institutions are as described above.

Imam of the Islamic State of Indonesia's first namely Ash-Shaheed SM Kartosoewirjo, raised through Cisayong Conference on 12-14 February 1948. In accordance with the authority and conditions into consideration, then the government system first formed, then called with the term Islamic Assembly Center (MIP, Majelis Islam Pusat) for the central government and to the regional level is called the Regional Islamic Council (MID, Majelis Islam Daerah). This government agency called the Islamic Council, because of the presence of government at that time were in the area of Dutch occupation, in other words; the area became seat of government of the Islamic State of Indonesia has not ruled de facto, primarily to position the Central Government.[12]

In accordance with the strategy of control of the territory, as embodied in the Edict No. 1 In 1948, in which the territory is divided into three classifications, namely: first, Region One (Daerah I) is an area or region can be 100% controlled by the Islamic government and regardless of the occupation of the Netherlands, then in the region corresponding system of Islamic government at the village level and Government called Desa (Village Head of Government, called Kuwu), Government of the District (the District Head of Government called camat), local government (head of district administration, called Bupati), the Government

[12] See, Al Chaidar, "Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia..."; Herdi Sahrasad & Al-Chaidar, *Islamism & Fundamentalism*..; Al Chaidar & Herdi Sahrasad, *Negara Madinah*...

Kresidenan (Head of Government Karesidenen, called resident), and the Provincial Government (Head Provincial government called Governor); Secondly, Region Two (Daerah II) is half of the area or areas controlled by the government and the Army of Islam, and half controlled by the occupying forces (the Netherlands); and Third, Region Three (Daerah III) Local or Regional is still 100% controlled by the army of occupation. For the Islamic government in the Region Two (Daerah II) and Region Three (Daerah III) is executed and the Assembly called Islam (Assembly of Islamic village, subdistrict Islamic Council, etc.).

At the end of 1948, the region Kresidenan level (Priangan) has become a Regional One, the Islamic Council which was originally located in the center area is occupied, then move to the DI because the position of the Islamic Council has been at the Regional Center One, the Islamic State of Indonesia government system changed its name to the Government of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Since then the government of the Islamic State of Indonesia has domiciled in the territory de facto, although new territory covering Kresidenan region. And pemerintaha system applied at the national level is the government system Imamate Council, where the Imam serves as Chairman of the Board of Imamate, and the chief of the Assembly serves as Board Member of the Imamate.

Chart 4.1. The Structure of NII (1948)

At levels of government below it, which is domiciled in the territory of the DI system of government is run in accordance with the de facto conditions in the region. Because the names of the government in the region DI is the Village Government, District Government, District Government, and the Government Kresidenan. For the provincial government, did not exist at that time, because the DI area is not an area of the province. The government is based in the region D.ii and D. III is the Islamic Assembly village, subdistrict Islamic Council, the Islamic Assembly District, and Regional Islamic Council.

Later, the head of the army in each region Daerah I, Daerah II, and Daerah III held by government leaders with status as Commander of Defence in each level of government. This ecclesiastical structure is a bit of what Turner (1969: 191) concept called as expressive structure or pragmatic

structure. This of And in the execution of duty, each Commander of Defense to coordinate directly with commanders Unity in each level.

Chart 4.2. The Structure of Imamate Board of NII

Levels of struggle and achievement levels in an effort mendlahirkan power of God on earth Indonesia at that time increased, until then through Edict No. 5 In 1948 the thought (ijtihad) that now the time has come to do the absolute Holy War, War Totalitarian, Total People's War in the face of the Netherlands, then with this ijtihad Imam of the Islamic State of Indonesia has echoed General Command; "1) Ordered to seloeroeh Oemmat layer Islamic nation of Indonesia, oentoek moelai melakoekan moetlaq Soetji War, the War of Totalitarian itoe, to colonialism moesna missing altogether. And 2) Ordered to seloeroeh Armed Forces of the Islamic State of Indonesia, oentoek pioneered and membantoe Ra'jat, until Revoloesi Islam is completed and the Islamic State of Indonesia stood with perfect, in all over Indonesia.

Therefore, the general command has been echoed, then through subsequent notices Imamate of Imam and the Council argues, that: (1) From the very moelai today's date

Ma'loemat di'oemoemkan, the Islamic State of Indonesia dinjatakan in a state of war (*Staat van Oorlog*); (2) That the Code in which berlakoe diseloeroeh Islamic State of Indonesia, Islam is the Code in future wars (Daroel Islam fi waqtil harbi); (3) That the Supreme Council of the Imamate become commandment, which holds General Command , for people and Army for the whole of Islamic State of Indonesia; (4) That the State and soesoenan Oemmat soesoenan selandjoetnja compulsory disesoeaikan the Code in future war-Code in Islam; (5) That since the date of this announcement released, only known Doea (prayers) group which fought for the Islamic State of Indonesia against the Netherlands Indies; and (6) That further Acts will be completed by each Head of the Islamic State of Indonesia in each and every place and Leaders Madjlis-madjlis all over Indonesian Islam.[13]

In accordance with *ijtihad* from Imam and the Imamate Council as referred to above, where the Islamic State of Indonesia, had been in Van Orloog Staat, therefore this condition, the Islamic State of Indonesia was declared as Darul Islam *fi waqtil harb* (in the time of war). Logical consequence of this condition, and as a strategic step, then the Islamic State of Indonesia government system has undergone a change, of the governance system of the Imamate Council commandment transformed into a system of government, where the Supreme Council of the Imamate becomes commandment.

[13] See, Al Chaidar, "Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia..."; Herdi Sahrasad & Al-Chaidar, *Islamism & Fundamentalism*..; Al Chaidar & Herdi Sahrasad, *Negara Madinah*...

Fruits of the General Command and its implementation is dikumandangkannya Proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia on 12 Shawwal 1368 H which coincides with the August 7, 1949. Then, as a follow up that has been set in the Edict No. 7 In 1948, the system of government in which the Islamic State of Indonesia has changed from a civilian government into civilian-military government (commandment). Later confirmed this commandment in the system of government notices Top commandment (MKT) No. 1 Year 1949. With this provision, the Tanzim (structure and organizational structure) Islamic State of Indonesia is as presented in the figure below:

This pseudostructure were designed for the pseudo-bureaucratic structure to transform the structural inferiority of every ceremonial structure of the millenarian hirarchy. In the system of government in accordance with the MKT No. 1 In 1949, then there are a few things changed, especially in the designation. In this regard Imam concurrent positions as Supreme Commander of the Army of Islam Indonesia, and often abbreviated Priest / Plm.Tertinggi TII. Then, the status of Member of the Board Member of the Imamate transformed into a commandment Top and shortened to AKT or AAKT (Members of the Supreme commandment). Thus, after the entry into force of the system of government in accordance MKT No. 1 In 1949, the Member of the Board of Imamate designation no longer apply.

In the previous system of government, or the Imam and Commander and Commander does not have a representative, also the daily leader held directly by the Imam and or the Commander and Commander. But after that the system of government in accordance MKT. No. 1 In 1949, the Imam and or The Commander and the Commander at each level have a commandment except on the commandment village representatives, namely copies held by the Chief of Staff. In this case, the status of chief of staff at all levels commandment not existed as Secretary commandment or as Clerk, but he was Chief of Staff of the Territorial Command, serves as the Deputy Imam and or the Commander and Deputy Commander at all levels commandment, except commandment village. Also to the chief of staff attached to its status as the youngest Chief who served as Chief of the Daily. The system of government in accordance with the MKT No. 1 1949 is quite effective so as

to keep used to discharge ordinance changes commandment enhanced governance system, which is set forth in the MKT. No. 11, 1959.

Post-proclamation and also with the system of the organization as part of the strategy, the level of struggle increasingly widespread, so some Regions outside Java to integrate, to be part of the struggle of the Islamic State of Indonesia. The integration of Aceh under the command of Muhammad Daud Beureuweh in 1952 is the integration Refresentative Sumatra highway, as well as the integration of Sulawesi under the command of Abdul Kahar Muzakkar in 1951 is the integration Refresentative entire regions are in the eastern part of Indonesia, and also the integration of West Kalimantan Under the command of Ibnu Hajar is the integration refrentative region Central Indonesia.

Therefore, the struggle of the vast welcome for the enforcement power of God in the land of Indonesia, and semkin great resistance from the Dutch infidels and polytheists of the Republic of Indonesia; Imam or the Prime Commander. Together with the Member highest commandment Highest considers it important for a change in some of the things that are strategic. At that time, Imam/Prime Commander and the AKT with consideration that, "Leadership was created for war or the War Command which is more in strength, and perfection of system or Stelsel commandment which thus more effective, so as to guarantee increasingly more severe and to welcome war and so the aims reached with God's help and the victory of clarity in Islam and the victory of the Islamic State of Indonesia, are the one and the only gate to the greatness of Islamic State of

Indonesia, independent and with full of sovereignty, de facto and de jure. [14]

Then from consideration and this opinion, ultimately Priest /Plm. Highest decided, that Indonesia was divided into seven (7) regional war, or known as Sapta Palagan. And also Imam/Plm. Top decide the composition of the command associated with the war along with his duties. On the essence and substance of the change of government system is an enhanced system changes commandment, in other words, through the provision MKT. No. 11 In 1959, the Islamic State of Indonesia government system turns into a total system of military rule. Where the previous administration system is a combined system of government (civil and military). Islamic State of Indonesia government system in accordance MKT No. 11, 1959 This is a response to the ever-expanding territory and increasingly bitter war of resistance of the enemy.

Through the provision MKT No. 11 Year 1959, in addition to the setting of the division of a war zone, also in the directive stipulated on the transitional leadership if the leadership in charge is absent temporarily or permanently indisposed. With this provision, the transition of leadership is very practical and in accordance with the conditions, namely in times of war, for example; if the Sub-Sector Commander was unable to keep the penggantinnya taken from and between platoon commanders, as well as when the Sector Commander remains incapacitated, then the successor is from among commanders and Company, and so on, except

[14] See, Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam...*; Al Chaidar, "Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism..."

When Commander KPWB remains incapacitated, his successor instead of and Commander among Bragde Great, but his successor will be taken from and between A.AKT, and the Brigade Commander of the APNII could be a candidate for replacement when the Great Brigade Commander serves as AKT. Related how the transition of leadership in wartime, including in this case regarding the transition of leadership at the level of KPSI, consider and observe carefully what has been stipulated in the MKT No. 11, 1959.

It is important to know and be hold, that APNII fighter posts defeat in 1962, the Islamic State of Indonesia government system is in accordance with that set forth in MKT No. 11 Year 1959. Because of this, as well as their general condition has not changed, mainly refers to a brief description of the proclamation, in which the conditions for switching to the Darul Islam fi waqtil amn, the conditions have not been fulfilled. So for us as a successor generation of this struggle, the system refers to the system of government is embodied in the MKT No. 11, 1959.

In 1949, Indonesia experienced a massive political change. At the time of West Java experienced a power vacuum, so when it came to pass a proclamation of an Islamic state in the archipelago, a *al-jumhuriyah* Islamic state of Indonesia which later became known as ad-Daulatul Islamiah or Darul Islam or Islamic State of Indonesia, better known by the public as DI in the history of Indonesia is often called the observer phobia with the Islamic State as Islam emerged in a tense face. In fact, these events manipulated as a ″rebellion″. Even if this event is referred to as a ″rebellion″, then he is not an ordinary rebellion. He is a holy struggle anti-brutality of the largest in the world in the early 20th century. ″Uprising″ which had drained the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia logistics is not a small rebellion, nor a revolt that are regional, not a ″rebellion″ that appeared because of pain or other political disappointment, but because of an ″ideal″, a ″dream″ inspired by the teachings of Islam that straight.[15]

The long struggle for 13 years Kartosoewirjo vanished after Kartosoewirjo himself was captured. Mahadper court, 16 Agustur l962, stating that Kartosoewirjo holy struggle in upholding the Islamic State of Indonesia was an ″uprising″. The death sentence is then given to this consistent mujahid. Kartosoewirjo death story, it turns out Sukarno and AH Nasution quite aware that Kartosoewirjo is a great character that even if the death of the people will continue to be missed (Awwas, 2007). Then they with any conspiracy, supported Umar Wirahadikusuma, trying to hide their evil plans when executing this Imam of the Islamic State. Even

---

[15] See, Al Chaidar, "Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia...". Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam...*

the bodies he has gone and where his grave is not known to be due to certain reasons of the Sukarno government, but the soul and the struggle to remain alive all time. Indonesia's history has been recorded although manipulated and now increased again with the blood of martyred mujahid SM Kartosoewirjo (Awwas, 2008: 165).

The Java differences Western lifestyles and Islam, as well as between modern Islam orthodox Islam, has begun to show its disintegraqtive impact. The resurgence of Islamic reformism, in the spirit of opposition which also directed to orthodox Islam, indigenous, people Indonesian Western style, evoke hatred and hostility among Muslims of Indonesia and the Indonesian people in general. Orthodox mobilize its strength against the reformism, and for several years even invited the support of its traditional enemies, the head of customs and elite gentry - and even the colonial government itself-for against newcomers such overzealous. Similarly, the reformists experiencing increasing conflict with the Western-educated elite; initially centered on his opposition to the jalanjalan organization, who are political or religious sosial-- most appropriate to increase the self-discovery (self-realization) Indonesia itself, but not so long ago shifted to the deepening divisions of Indonesia's social development objectives itself. In addition the Dutch colonial policy that gives his reaction to the tensions created by the increasing deployment of reformism, as well as to new concerns to the development of Islam abroad, for some time tend to sharpen the divisions within Islam itself. But at the same time the colonial setting themselves tend to obscure certain divisions that separate Muslims from the nationalist-nationalist 'secular' until the end of Dutch rule. Faced with

these obstacles, the rise of Islamic reformism as an organizational movement is strongest in colonial Indonesia is a phenomenon worth noting.

Java, since the past until now, is central to the ideological clashes: secular and Islam; more dynamic than any other place in this world. The rise of nationalism 'secular' does not only affect the SI; he raised a serious issue for all Islamic movements in Java. Faced with a strong challenge this, the reformists and the orthodox were forced to close ranks to survive. Even more importantly, impressed by the spectacular decline of the SI and fear of government atrocities then Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama consciously take the path of non-political, and leave the political actions of Islam to the SI increasingly paralyzed and the small group of parents The young people who organized the Islamieten Jong Bond. It is not inevitable that a conscious separation between the primary and the orthodox stream reformist organizations of political Islam - seems to correspond with the dictum Snouck - will create a gap between nationalism and Islam, between the Indonesian culture is oriented to the West and culture students.

Java is also where the emergence of various doings of the leaders and supporters or followers. Islamic leaders reluctance to involve its organizations openly in the Indonesian nationalist movement, and what is worse, his willingness to be shy to receive a little help from the colonial government, bisalah understood when interpreted as acts of treason both by the national 'secular' and the SI spokesman. However, quite paradoxically, the split between religion and politics in certain respects more artificial than real - and

therefore for most local and temporary nature than the universal and enduring - whereas in certain things he was rooted in reasons More fundamental is blocking the development of Islamic political forces lasting for decades to come. So in Java is very important politically than economically.

Outside Java, the division between politics and not so noticeable as in the economic field. Particularly in Sumatra, Islamic reformism almost from the beginning involved in politics, and some times even radical movements become hard, even though it caused concern among leaders in the center of Java. This is not due to the fact that the Sumatra reformism in him (sui generis) but more due to the social environment in which he moves. In Sumatra, especially in the Minangkabau region on the west coast of the island, has risen a new middle class that is almost exclusively derived from the introduction of export crops-particularly rubber in the area. While in Java, it is not visible. The response capacity of the people of Sumatra higher than those in Java. If Java if it were no 'middle class' then it is primarily a social phenomenon, rather than economic, in Sumatra he is rooted in the changing economy. When in Java intelligentsia who acquire Western education is more powerful than the trade-oriented society to Islam, then in Sumatra opposite is true. Thus the significance of political reformism Sumatra are largely the result of the absence of the political elite on the island who acquire Western education and Western-oriented. It is true that the people of Sumatra, to benefit from the Dutch school as large, if not larger relative, with people Javanese and Sundanese. However, because of higher learning, as well as vacancies become government

employees more can be obtained in Java, Sumatra, the people who have acquired Western education instead of returning to the region but settled in Java, where they play an important role in the nationalist movement 'secular' based on Java. Thus, Java early 20th century is a very heterogeneous region, but also very colorful, full of oddities and absurdities spectrum.

The Java looks much injustice and create a lot of different camps: receiving facilities and the dianaktirikan by the authorities. Indonesian elite who acquire Western education can do more because the accommodation provided by the colonial government against the Western-educated students. Java also lifestyle Jahiliyah first started in this archipelago. Unlike the religious leadership, which has fortified residence in the centers of the Indonesian people, mostly leaders of nationalist groups in the surrounding cities of western style, especially in the capital of Batavia, the residence of colonial rule and the Volksraad, which becomes the fulcrum national politics. Style religious people into ridicule and Western style idol. Secular indigenous people have the ability to express himself well not only in the political tradition of liberalism and the legacy of Western socialism, but also in the game of parliamentary politics in representative institutions at the center and in the provinces, the nationalists 'secular' as such an impact a kind of expertise which, for many Muslim leaders.

Java is a place where education has eliminated consideration of religious considerations to loyalty to the leader. When this is true for leaders it is also equally true for the members of the second echelon followers respectively. Because Western-

style education is a prerequisite for civil servants and for jobs in Western companies, some Indonesian people who take advantage of Western education became acquainted with methods of administration West and, most small, entrepreneurial methods of the West, of which Most graduates of Islamic schools ipso facto excluded.

In Java anyway, because of Western influence so great, religion becomes something that is no longer rational in the midst of the society. Compared with the political goals of Islam, nationalism Indonesia offers reasonable criticism against colonialism and a program for Indonesia is a secular state, which is based on representative institutions, which are dedicated to the principles of nationalism and democracy as well as tasks of economic and social planning - If not socialist - or simply the reproduction of the Western political system under the auspices of the West understand that, paradoxically, anti-Western (anti-Westernism) which is so typical for most non-Western countries. This paradox is only found in Java, not in Aceh or other areas. Then such conditions here that describes how jahiliyahnya Javanese population in the early 20th century.

In Java early 20th century this was seen arrogance of those who claim to intellectual; they look down on religion. Although there are a few people in Indonesia who acquire Western education who managed to build a bridge between Western culture with Islamic reformism, the majority of nationalists who are politically conscious, embrace the attitude of arrogant and insulting to Islam, an attitude which is clearly taken from the West, and is very similar to attitudes that exist in the Western circles. Secular and

modern state that craved only a few pointless for the students and scholars as well as for customs and gentry. Both, in his view represent the elements that are intrinsically conservative who was destined to crumble in the country's political evolution. In fact, they began to mock and accuse the religion (Islam) with various terms that do not make sense. Some leaders even see in Islam an element of historical destroyer Indonesia greater unity in the past, while worshiping the greatness of pre-Islamic kingdoms such as Srivijaya and Majapahit, as ideal models of Indonesia Raya according to his political aspirations. Though Islam that brought all their hearts at the beginning and the end.

Then on the island of Java, was a war logic high level. Muslims see Western-educated intelligentsia as a product of the West without God and materialistic, that is cunning in fact underestimate the basic identity of Indonesia, which is similar to Islam in his own conceit. Specifically, a spokesman for the orthodox against the idea of nationalism with Islamic cosmopolitanism as a world culture. And even the reformists, who was more sympathetic to the idea of a national state, said that the independent state of Indonesia, as far as him being a secular state, will be a big enemy of Islam as the colonial powers 'infidel'. War logic high level is then lowered to a lower level. They began to resent the fact that Indonesian nationalism ideological inspiration came from foreign sources, while the Prophet himself, in his message, preparing ethical norms which contains and exceeds all political speculation owned barren Western thinkers.

Intellectuals and all those who are not intellectually and sane

in Java are the ones who "patient" and slowly. However, when the atmosphere is already so settles in the bottom of the subconscious, the uprising against static situation began to emerge. Beginning of the uprising is a conflict. Secular nationalists and Muslim nationalists are in a conflict that is increasing in the period of colonial rule, in the case of the nationalists is the case because they are increasingly impatient with the colonial power change so slowly and irritating, whereas in the case of Muslims, especially because of the direction taken by these changes. Differences remain decisive imprint in the history of Indonesia subsequently, a history, that because the problem was, still in the process that never reach the end. All people in Indonesia, almost crazy waiting at the end of all this human drama, when the Islamic State had the opportunity to arrange all these irregularities.

During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942–1945), Kartosuwirjo established armed militias in Garut area, one of many such groups supported and armed by the Japanese in order to help them resist any future Allied invasion. During the Indonesian National Revolution, his Darul Islam militia remained in amicable terms with the secular Republican forces until the latter withdrew from West Java according to the terms of Renville Agreement in 1948, while Kartosuwirjo continued the guerrilla struggle against occupying Dutch forces. After the second Dutch offensive (Operatie Kraai) on December 1948, Republican guerillas slipping back into West Java was attacked by Kartosuwirjo's militia, resulting in a triangular war between the Republican forces, the Darul Islam, and the Dutch army.

On August 7, 1949, he declared establishment of Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State) with himself as Imam. After the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch, Kartosuwirjo refused to acknowledge returning Republican authority and continue attacking returning Republican forces, eventually culminating to a full-blown insurgency.

During the 1950s, weak central government and uncoordinated military response from the government allowed Darul Islam to flourish, controlling one-third of West Java and even launching raids as far as the outskirts of Jakarta. Islamic rebels in South Sulawesi and Aceh joined the Darul Islam and acknowledged Kartosuwirjo as their highest authority through in practice there was little coordination between the rebels in the different provinces. In 1957, agents sent by Kartosuwirjo unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Sukarno by grenade attack during a primary school function at Cikini, Central Jakarta.

Darul Islam is an Islamist group in Indonesia that aims for the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia. It was started in 1942 by a group of Muslim militias, coordinated by a charismatic radical Muslim politician, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo. The group recognized only sharia as a valid source of law. The movement has produced splinters and offshoots that range from Jemaah Islamiyah to non-violent religious groups.During the Indonesian National Revolution, Kartosuwirjo founded his own band of freedom fighters in West Java, called Hizbullah and Sabilillah. As a protest toward the Renville Agreement signed by Indonesian leaders in 1948, which ceded West Java to the Dutch, Kartosuwirjo proclaimed a Darul Islam (meaning "Islamic

State") in West Java on August 7, 1949. Darul Islam did not disband itself after the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, resulting in a clash with the government of the Indonesian Republic. Rebels in South Sulawesi led by army deserter Abdul Kahar Muzakkar joined the Darul Islam Movement in 1951. On 20 September 1953, Daud Beureu'eh declared that Aceh was part of the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia) under the leadership of Kartosuwirjo.

The pledge (baiat) of the NII:

Wallahi, Demi Allah,

1) Saya menyatakan baiat ini kepada Allah di hadapan dan dengan persaksian komandan tentara pemimpin negara yang bertanggung jawab.

2) Saya menyatakan baiat ini sungguh sungguh karena ikhlas dan suci hati lilahita `ala semata mata dan tidak sekali kali karena sesuatu di luar dan keluar daripada kepentingan Agama Allah,Agama Islam,dan Negara Islam Indonesia.

3) Saya sanggup berkorban dengan jiwa, raga, dan nyawa saya serta apapun yang ada pada saya berdasarkan sebesar besar taqwa dan sesempurna sesempurna tawakal Allalloh bagi :

a). Mentegakkan kalimatilah li`ilahi kalimatilah

b). Mempertahankan berdirinya Negara Islam Indonesia hingga hukum Syariat Islam seluruhnya berlaku dengan seluas-luasnya dalam kalangan Umat Islam Bangsa Indonesia di Indonesia.

4) Saya akan taat sepenuhnya kepada perintah Allah, kepada perintah Rosulullah, kepada perintah ulil amri saya dan menjauhi segala larangannya dengan tulus dan setia hati.

5) Saya tidak akan berkhianat kepada Allah, kepada Rosulullah dan kepada Komandan Tentara serta Pemimpin Negara dan tidak akan pula akan berbuat noda atas Umat Islam Bangsa Indonesia.

6) Saya sanggup membela Komandan-Komandan Tentara Islam Indonesia Dan Pemimpin-Pemimpin Negara Islam Indonesia daripada bahaya, bencana dan khianat darimana dan apapun juga.

7) Saya sanggup menerima hukuman dari ulil amri saya sepanjang keadilan hukum Islam bila saya ingkar daripada baiat yang saya nyatakan ini.

8) Semoga Allah berkenan membenarkan pernyataan baiat saya ini serta berkenan pula kiranya ia melimpahkan tolong dan kurnianya atas saya sehingga saya dipandaikannya melakukan tugas suci ialah hak dan kewajiban tiap-tiap mujahid menggalang Negara Karunia Allah, Negara Islam Indonesia.Amien....

9) Allahu akbar, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar.[16]

The movement flourished in the 1950s due to chronic instability within the central government during the Liberal Democracy Era. In 1957, it was estimated that the Darul Islam controlled one-third of West Java and more than 90% of South Sulawesi and Aceh provinces where the government only controlled the cities and towns. The movement had 15,000 armed guerillas operating under the banner of Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army). In that year, Darul Islam agents unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Sukarno by throwing grenades at him during a school function in Cikini, Central Jakarta.

---

[16]Translation: *Wallahi, For The Sake Of Allah, (1) I declare allegiance to God in the presence and with the testimony of army commander responsible state leaders. (2) I declare allegiance is earnestly as sincere and pure in heart lilahita `ala solely and not at all times because of something beyond and out rather than the interests of the Religion of Allah, Islam, and the Islamic State of Indonesia. (3) I am able to sacrifice the body, mind, and my life and whatever is in me based at great piety and trust Allah as perfect as perfect for: (a). To uphold kalimatilah li`ilahi kalimatilah; (b). Maintaining the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia to fully apply Islamic Sharia law with the broadest in the Muslim nation of Indonesia in Indonesia. (4) I will be obedient to God's command, the command Muhammad, to command amri ulil me and stay away from all prohibitions with sincere and faithful heart. (5) I will not treason to God, to Muhammad and the Army Commander and Chief of State and will not be disgraced also on Muslims of Indonesia. (6) I am able to defend the Islamic Army Commander Commander-Leaders of Indonesia and the Indonesian Islamic State rather than danger, disaster and where and any treacherous. (7) I am willing to accept my punishment from ulil amri all fairness I reject Islamic law rather than allegiance when I stated this. (8) May God deign to justify this statement my allegiance and are pleased he would also please and bestow on me smart enough to perform the sacred duty is to the rights and obligations of each mujahid raise this gift of God state, Islamic State Indonesia. Amien .... (9) Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar.*

Declaration of martial law in 1957 and establishment of Guided Democracy by Sukarno in 1959 proved to be a turning point for Darul Islam's fortunes. The military introduced effective "fence of legs" method to encircle the guerillas' mountain bases and cutting off their supply and escape route, forcing the rebels to surrender or face annihilation in face of superior firepower. Kartosuwirjo responded by declaring "total war" in 1961, in which Darul Islam guerillas increasingly used terror tactics and banditry against civilians, further alienating the population. He also sent agents to Jakarta, where on May 1962 they made another unsuccessful assassination attempt on Sukarno during the Eid al-Adha prayers.

On June 1962, Kartosuwirjo was eventually captured in his hideout at Mount Geber near Garut. In captivity, he issued order for his followers to surrender. The last Darul Islam band in West Java, operating at Mount Ciremai, surrendered on August 1962. Kartosuwirjo was brought to Jakarta, where he was tried by military court-martial. He was found guilty of rebellion and attempted assassination of the president, and was sentenced to death. He was executed by firing squad on 5 September 1962.

Implementation of martial law in 1957, followed by declaration of Guided Democracy by Sukarno in 1959, marked the reversal of fortunes for Darul Islam. Smaller Darul Islam bands operating in Central Java under Amir Fatah was crushed by Colonel Ahmad Yani's Banteng Raiders in 1954–1957. Darul Islam forces in South Kalimantan under Ibnu Hadjar were forced to surrender in 1959. Amir Fatah was killed in 1954, while Ibnu Hadjar was

eventually executed in 1962.

Three years of negotiations (1959–1962) led to a peace agreement that ended the conflict in Aceh, in which Aceh was restored as an autonomous province with special rights for Islamic law. Introduction of effective ″fence-of-legs″ method of encircling rebel mountain hideouts in 1959 succeeded in breaking the strong rebel grip over West Java's rural areas. On June 1962, Kartosuwirjo was captured on his hideout of Gunung Geber near Garut. In captivity, Kartosuwirjo issued order for all his followers to surrender, after which he was quickly tried and executed. The last Darul Islam in West Java defeated on August 1962. Successive military operations also crushed the Darul Islam in South Sulawesi. On February 1965, its leader Kahar Muzakkar was killed in a military ambush in the interior of Southeast Sulawesi province, but this is not ending the Darul Islam insurgency in Indonesia.

***

REFERENCES:

Benda, Harry J. 1980. *Bulan Sabit dan Matahari Terbit Islam Indonesia Pada Masa Pendudukan Jepang*. Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya.

Chaidar, Al. 199. *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia SM Kartosoewirjo: Fakta dan Sejarah Darul Islam.* Jakarta: Darul Falah.

Chaidar, Al. 2015. "Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: An Anthropological Analysis of Darul Islam, Jamaah Islamiyyah, and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid," *paper,* Post Garduate Faculty of Anthropology, University of Indonesia, Depok, 2015.

Chaidar. Al. 2002, "Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Darul Islam's Response Towards Indonesian Democracy, 1949–1982," *paper,* in a conference on regional workshop on ''Contemporary Islamic Movements in Southeast Asia: Militancy, Separatism, Terrorism and Democratisation Process,''organized by The RIDEP Institute/FES, Bogor, Indonesia, 2002.

Holt, P. M., K.S. Lambton, Ann & Lewis, Bernard. 1977. *The Cambridge History of Islam.* Cambridge University Press.

Kartosoewirjo, S.M. 1946. *Haloean Politik Islam.* Malangbong: Penerbit Poestaka Daroel-Islam.

Lewis. Bernard. 2004. *The crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror.* Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Ricklefs, Merle C. 1991. *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1200.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Sahrasad, Herdi & Chaidar, Al. 2000. *Negara Madinah: Refleksi tentang Agama dan Pluralisme.* Jakarta: Madani Press.

Sahrasad, Herdi & Chaidar, Al. 2012. *Islamism & Fundamentalism.* Lhoksumawe, Aceh: University of Malikus-saleh Press.

Sahrasad, Herdi, Muntasir, M., Rakhmat, J., Tamara, N., Salahuddin, Z., & Hidayat, T. 2000. *Islam, Fundamentalisme dan Ideologi Revolusi.* Jakarta: Madani Press.

Sarikat Islam. 1993. *Ensiklopedi Umum.* Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

T. McVey, Ruth (ed.). 1963. *Indonesia.* New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Inc.

THE DECLINE OF JIHAD LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA: DARUL ISLAM (DI), JAMAAH ISLAMIYYAH (JI) AND JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID (JAT)

"Unsur kebudayaan yang paling susah diubah adalah agama..."
(The most difficult element of culture to be modified is religion)
- Achmad Fedyani Saifuddin, 2011: 81-

ISLAMIC terrorism in Indonesia is a form of millenarism where the actors of Darul Islam (DI) , Jamaah Islamiyyah (JI) and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) were and are reaching a power to contest in the secular realm of Indonesia and the longing expectation for a new religious power system. The rise of Islamic millenarian movement in Indonesia in rebellion in the odd *zeitgeist*. Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past (Marx, 1974: 143). This *zeitgeist* are different from what is normal or expected, the ideas behind Islamic terrorism are not in line with the rise of idea of humanity. The rise of idea of Islamic state (and the *Khilafah* altogether) in Indonesia was happening in a way that is not regular or without corresponding mate with or separated from a set of nation-state, democracy and civil society. Indonesia's current struggle with terrorism has a long and complex history.[1]

[1]For a comphrehensive analysis on the backgound of terrorism in Indonesia, see, Solahudin, Dave McRae, Greg Fealy, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2013). This book is based on a remarkable array of

Islamic terrorism is, by definition, terrorist acts committed by groups or individuals who profess Islamic or Islamist motivations or goals. Islamic terrorists have relied on particular interpretations of the tenets of the Quran and the Hadist, citing these scriptures to justify violent tactics including mass murder in form of suicide bombings, kidnappings, assasinations of prominent political and social figures, genocide, and slavery.

In recent decades, incidents of Islamic terrorism have occurred on a global scale, occurring not only in Muslim-majority states in Africa and Asia, but also abroad in Europe, Russia, and the United States, and such attacks have targeted Muslims as well as non-Muslims. In a number of the worst-affected Muslim-majority regions, these terrorists have been met by armed, independent resistance groups, state actors and their proxies, and politically liberal Muslim protesters.

Although the literal existence of Islamic terrorism is not disputed, some have criticized what they perceive to be the blanket usage of the term. Such use in Western political speech has variously been called ″counter-productive″, ″unhelpful,″ ″highly politicized,″ ″intellectually contest-able″ and ″damaging to community relations″. This view, in turn, has been criticized by those who perceive it to be an act of evasion. In the times of DI, JI and JAT were born, the concepts of Islamic state (*daulah Islamiyyah*), *i'dad, jihad,* and *khilafah* were and are not in fit of modern popular secularism

---

documentary and oral sources, many of which have never before been publicly cited. Solahudin's rigorous account fills many gaps in our knowledge of jihadist groups, how they interacted with the state and events abroad, and why they at times resorted to extreme violence.

ideology. Recently, anthropologists and historians have been concerned with the concept of nation-state and the prospect of its development in non-Western societies. When the Islamic terrorism came into arena, anthropologists remain sceptical. The category of ″terrorism″ is one more example of conceptual objectification of a psychic state of sudden momentary fright. The comparison with the history of some anthropological categories prompts us to question whether the real theoretical issue is not that of simply dropping the category altogether as unsound (Douglass and Zulaika, 1990: 256).

The Bali bombing events was considered as *jihad*, and according Imam Samudra, the bomber, it was done on the basis of faith, where faith can be accounted for truth, can be tested the validity of the sources of law ... I mean the belief that Islamic shariah sourced from al Quran and *sunnah* of the prophet of Allah. The process of understanding towards the source was not undertaken haphazardly or randomly... My understanding patterns are *ahlus sunnah wal jama'ah* with *manhaj salafus shalih*.″(Imam Samudra, 2004:198-199).

The Decline of Jihad Leadership in Indonesia

The NII, JI and JAT are factional entities which engage in what Lewellen conceptualised as ″conflict with official power structure″ by any means of discourse, action and violence. Factionalism[2] is a concept in political anthropology

[2] The term factionalism derives from faction, which has its roots in the French language from the 14th-century. Ultimately it derives from the Latin word factio, meaning "political party, class of persons, or a making or doing." Before that, it appeared in ancient Rome, where it meant, "one of the companies of contractors for the chariot races in the circus" (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2013).

that is used to describe groups of people formed around a leader who reject the status quo and actively work against established authority within a society, such as state institutions, political parties, or economic interests. In other words that fit the Turner concept of 'communitas', these DI (regardles the time of SM Kartosoewirjo), JI, MMI, JAT and even the JAS has been an encapsulated people who trapped into permanent structural inferiority. Groups classed as factions engage in conflict with official power structures by means of verbal contention and often-physical action and violence (Lewellen, 1983: 104-105). The anthropological study of factionalism is part of an effort to understand sub-groups in a society, and how they relate to the groups within the establishment. It was born from the principles of structural-functionalism, which sought to take an anthropological understanding of the relations between groups that composed different societies (Siegel and Beals, 1960a: 108-116).

Now, in circles outside of anthropology and the social sciences, it came to be used to describe more prolific terrorist or what so ever they perceived themselves as mujahidin or warriors or even a plain groups such as the DI, JI and JAT.In anthropology, the term arose during the 1940s and 1950s as a part of structural-functionalism, and later grew in prominence. In its earlier form, factionalism sought to explain separatist groups within small villages and tribes. It continues to be a term used to define the actions of groups that push against authority outside of the established institutions of dissent, most often in political arenas. Factionalism has also been used to describe contemporary struggles and conflicts in developing regions of the world.

As an anthropological concept, the study of factionalism has declined in recent years. This is perhaps due to its roots in structural-functionalist thinking, and the difficulty of adapting it to newer theories in the discipline (Lewellen, 1983: 104-105). So, by researcher this factionalized entity or entities, hoped that there will be a bright theoretical explanations on this mess.

In order to be considered factions in an anthropological sense, groups must contain certain elements and act in certain capacities. This includes the organizational structure of the group, their leadership style, and their recruitment and members. It is also based on the time span of their activities, their strategies and tactics used against established authority, and their relation to the wider society which they operate in. Humans ″know″ reality through discourse. Discourse tell, giving understanding, giving directions, the man so he thought, know, understand, and realize certain behavior towards reality. Discourse was the one who had the power to form and provide knowledge, and give thought to the human pattern. So that the culture is the product of power (Saifuddin, 2013: 1).

Within anthropology, there are three types of factions. Their structure and characteristics are similar, but they differ with respect to strategies and tactics; (1) Common Factionalism is the general type of faction, used in explaining fundamental differences between subgroups in nation-states. These subgroups are well established, and confront each other as a result of the failure of a larger group (Lewellen, 1983: 104-105). Anthropologists such as Nicholas stress that these are defined as small groups with strong ties regardless of

broader groups. Nicholas argues that when such groups grow beyond interpersonal relationships, they can no longer be defined as a faction (Nicholas in Swartz, 1966: 52); (2) Schismatic Factionalism concerns the demarcacy between segments within large groups or coalitions. Disputes that start at a small level expand to a larger context that involves the entire society or state, which can lead to rebellion or even civil war (Siegel & Beals, 1960: 394) Somehow like JI and JAT, they developed their own factional identity to make a shade of grey diffirences or they distinguished their own group to be similarly different with their counterpart rebels. (3) Pervasive Factionalism is a way to describe the continual degradation of trust within societies that gives way to reliance on factional groups until a formal power structure is established (Lewellen, 1983: 231). I think few groups of radicals in Indonesia could be incorporated into this taxonomy: Hizbut Tahri Indonesia (HTI), Khilafatul Muslimin (Khilmus), the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) and other Islamic political parties or Ormas (Organisasi Masyarakat).

Elaborating factional segmentary political system in Indonesia Islam is not the old-fashioned academic quest. Eventhoug that anthropologists predominantly conducted research on factionalism in the mid to late twentieth century. Although intellectuals such as Karl Marx have used the term "faction" in previous periods of social research, none of their work defined it as a concept that could be used when studying culture. The following researchers have been among the most detailed in their discussion of factionalism, and have been cited extensively for their contributions. Theory of factional organization within the traditional

societies should move to the more complex communitas like E. Evans-Pritchard has did, who along with M. Fortes produced African political systems, was one of the first anthropologists to discuss factions as they are understood today, but he did not elaborate a comprehensive concept. The anthropology of politics should be inside out of what Pritchard-Fortes discussed factions which mostly in terms of political splits between tribal elites, and the ways that certain individuals separated from their group and worked to organize a counter coalition against the current leadership (Fortes & Pritchard, 1940: 177-178). The more complex society the more anthropology demanded to explain clearly.

There is a common power, a limited material, a public power that Ralph W. Nicholas who is one of the most cited anthropologists for his contributions on factionalism, and his effort to define the term as an important concept in anthropology. In contributions such as segmentary factional political systems, he focused on subgroups using an understanding of political factionalism. Nicholas wrote, "I regard factionalism as primarily a political activity or phenomenon. By 'political activity' I mean organized conflict over public power" (Swartz, 1966: 52). Nicholas outside-in speaks of politics as playing out in an arena, in which factions exist and actively seek to dismantle the establishment (Swartz, 1966: 54).

Factionalisme, in some sense, are can be found in the permanent structural inferiority groups which still have organization with pseudohirarchies, ecclesiastical structure, ceremonial strucuture or even the pseudo-bureaucratic structure. J. Siegel and A. R. Beals conceptualized factional-

ism as ″overt, unregulated (unresolved) conflict which interferes with the achievement of the goals of the group″ (Siegel & Beals, 1960a: 108). However, they were not contenful with a single definition of factionalism, and broke it down into groups that on one side were more political, and on the other were more interpersonal conflicts. They also looked at how these factions become stressed and how this stress influences the duration of the group's activities in hostilities and peace time (Siegel and Beals, 1960a: 108-116).

The majority of santri, or ′nominal′ Muslims in Indonesia (and who represent around a half of Indonesia's total population) are affiliated with either the modernist, urban-based, somewhat scriptualist mass-based organization Muhammadiyah or the largely rural, mystical, somewhat syncretic, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Both of these massive organizations, the largest of their kind in the Muslim world, are moderate and tolerant in orientation. Both organizations have important links with political parties but strive, nevertheless, to remain non-partisan. The majority of their members, though rather more in NU —with its roots in traditional Sunni scholarship with its pragmatic quietism— than in Muhammadiyah, reject Islamism.

One of the most helpful and accurate terms to emerge in recent years is that of ′Islamism′. Islamists or those who hold to Islamism believe that Islam can and should form the basis of political ideology. Handled with sensitivity, the term ′Islamism′ is one that both ′insiders′ and ′outsiders′ can relate to with a reasonable degree of common understanding which is considerably more than can be said of terms like ′fundamentalism′ and ′radicalism′, both of which can be

profoundly ambiguous. If Islamists find in Islam something of a blueprint for political engagement, non-Islamist Muslims finds nothing more specific than values and principles. A significant minority, however, find in these core values of Islam a counter-argument to Islamism. They argue that not only should Islam be first and foremost a personal faith, it should also accept and respect differences of opinion, commitment and practice. They embrace terms such as 'liberal' and 'progressive' fully aware of connotations of these terms in post-enlightenment western thought.

The results of this research on radical Islamic political movement in Indonesia that are complexity, a kind of disorientation, dislocation and the disposition situation is likely to experience the turning point the the birth of a new leader which is different from Ustadz Abdusshomad or also known as Ustadz Abubakar Ba'asyir. Abubakar Ba'asyir is the last charismatic leader of the Indonesian jihadists who broke down divisions within the throes of a long history. The split that occurred after the last statement of his bai'at (*religious vow*) allegiance to the Islamic Khilafah of Iraq and Sham leader Abubakar Al-Baghdadi is the last stage (the last frontier) for the much-admired figure among Indonesian radical movement and is very respected by the jihadists in various parts of the world . ABB *bai'at* statement has caused some splits (*firqah*). This will be the end of a series of splits that occurred in the long history of the jihadist movement in Indonesia.

History of Jihad movement in Indonesia is almost the same as the history of the emergence of consciousness of Indo-

nesian nationalism in the late 19th century. This history in the early days was a modern history of continuity or or known as *estafeta*of jihad leadership in the archipelago. Starting from Hadji Samanhoedi in Surakarta with Sjarikat Dagang Islam (SDI) in 1905, followed by Haji Mas Tirtoadisoerjo, then formed a more political awareness by Haji Oemar Said, better known by the name of HOS Tjokroaminoto with Sarekat Islam (SI), continues with the establishment of Partij Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) and then Masjoemi (Madjlis Sjoera Muslimin Indonesia). Continuity of the modern jihadist movement is reaching the peak of perfection when Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) 1949, the long history of the Islamic movement of Kartosoewirjo resulted in a long and complicated history of the split of this radical movement.

Post-1962, the development of the jihadist movement had a point involution of complex and tiring since Abdul Fatah Wirananggapati, is asynchronous to Tahmid Rahmat Kartosoewirjo, then Adjengan Masduki, winding to Haji Ismail Pranoto (Hispran), to Ustadz Abdul Halim Abdullah Sungkar or until then falls to ABB hands. Post-1962, the history of the jihad movement can not be called a historical continuity, also can not be called a discontinuity due to the ongoing uncertainty in the process. Post-1962 history is the history of change (history of change) or history of split of Indonesian jihadist movement that can not be glued together again in the form of integration. I predict the turning point will happen after this is the point of integration that will have an impact on the entire community of Indonesian polity. Or will the emergence of what is called by Clifford

Geertz (1972) as an integrative revolution?

Karl Jackson (1976) illustrates that the Islamic political movement is determined by a charismatic leader. Factors that spiritual leadership figures, sometimes mystical and magical even the main reason for the unification of the *ummah* (Islamic polity) Indonesia under the care of the cleric driving political consciousness even pushed up to the modern nature. BC Kartosoewirjo in this context is a charismatic figure who is able to become a statesman. Modern state as a political entity was raised in the scientific management under Imam Kartosoewirjo to NII became an important milestone in the history of political Islam Indonesia that converts traditional style to modern style. Abdullah Sungkar who later went on this modern style into corporate form of jihad is an ultra-modern by adopting a plot of Al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda plot plan 2020 is a blueprint for corporate political influence of radical Islamic Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia until sublimedin to the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI).

Abubakar Ba'asyir charismatic leadership is built starting from the case of the alleged New Order plot against Abdullah Sungkar and Abubakar Ba'asyir in Central Java. The kingpin progressors Hispran saw spiritual light shining from the consistent stand in defense of truth and, consequently, in the middle of New Order's authoritarian-ism as notorious and ruthless. Abubakar Ba'asyir's capabilities in Islamic reference and management movement succeeded in sending his followers to Moro and Afghanistan has made Abubakar Ba'asyir regarded as the incarnation of the divine God. Charisma can not lasting too long in a

political climate that is constantly changing.

The first split was taken place in early 1992, when the birth of Jemaah Islamiyah after the parting of Indonesian jihadist who strive and successfully participate in the process with the Taliban *futuh* (victory) Afghan in 1989, Abdullah Sungkar and Abubakar Ba'asyir broke away from the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) or Darul Islam (DI) and restart from the beginning entities, JamaahIslamiyah (JI). As acknowledged by Nasir Abbas, his departure to Afghanistan was a representation of the NII and, therefore, *futuh*of Afghanistan was a sort of Darul Islamjihadistspolitical participation on the global stage. JI then walk alone because they thought that NII has been hijacked in ashobiyyah by traditional families in West Java. In a further development, JI into a single political partner Al Qaeda in Indonesia, and even Southeast Asia. Exposure to terrorism has made JI closed and forced diving in the ocean depths hidden harakah jihad. Arrest of some militants and martyrs makes JI inertia. ABB recognition that refusing testimony in the trial Bali bombing suspect, Faiz Bafana, into boiling jihad JI corporate divisions that have been built a long time in the land of exile, Malaysia. This Jihad Corporation is then pulled by Dr. Azhari and Noordin M Top with a different dipper and survived until now in a situation that bleary.

Second split occured since the establishment of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) which in 2000 is an organization that tries to give breath to the JI dead faint at the beginning of this millennium. Abubakar Ba'asyir was lifted to the surface and appear as a very notorious in the eyes of the world spotlight. Over a decade above the dipper

full of new breeze filled preaching openness and reform, Abubakar Ba'asyir remains consistent until at one time he did not like the internal political system MMI system which considers adopting Jewish. The split was wet cheeks mujahidin sunk in humble attitude and just dare stand in opposition to the charismatic figure of Abubakar Ba'asyir.

Third split, when the founding of Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid in 2010 occured an inevitable split makes Indonesian jihadist community just behind some tragedies. With a little carriage, JAT rate closer to the goal while stopover in prison. JAT increasingly falling into the valley of radicalism and intolerance Islam getting him away from the public that has begun fullness with hard style and started to take a position as a political party and occasional constituent breathe in the fresh air of democracy. JAT situation experienced from 2010 to 2014 this is a situation that shows jihad deadlock disorientation, dislocation and severe disposition in conjunction with ABB charged in Nusa Kambangan prison. Prison is not always a place that can give the effect of sympathetic supporters, sometimes it may lead to the emergence of friction and factionalism. Moreover, accompanied by a lot of Aman Abdurrahman contributed ideas of ultra-radical Wahhabismcan be understood that then lead to the collapse of charisma Abubakar Ba'asyir.

Four split, when the emergence of the issue of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Sham) and statements of ABB oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi Abubakar figure which resulted in the breakup of JAT and the birth of the JAS (Jamaah Ansharus Sharia) under the leadership of Muhammad Ustadz Abubakar Ba'asyir, Ustadz Muhammad Achwan and

biological children named Abdurrahim Ba'asyir or better known as Ustadz Iim. Abubakar Ba'asyirhas been abandoned by its loyal defenders, even his son was forced to eject and form new bonds of the pieces are wasted. This split is a split last a jihadist organization in the archipelago that would not have been able to split again afterward. Like the glass that fell into pieces, then this split is that the smallest pieces Even if thrown again not able to split again (least ability to split). I predict, after this split will experience a turning point where the revolution of integration is something that is very historical inevitability. This historical necessity would require a more comprehensive analysis of the wear of the jihad movement split in futuh Indonesian archipelago until the forth death of Pancasila.

The collapse of Indonesiancharismatic jihad leadership Abubakar Ba'asyir will creates a vacuum of leadership situations that will open up opportunities for young leaders who had long been a dream to knit integration of Muslims in politics. Young leaders of radical Islam communitas in this country only a few remaining, this could lead to Turner's notions of permanent structural inferiority. With religious leaders and management capabilities of modern movement that might come up is Ustadz Irfan S. Awwas and Abdurrahim Ustadz Ba'asyir or best known as Ustadz Iim. Despite the excess of other young leaders deemed not to have sufficient capacity Islamic political vision.[3]This non-charismatic figure is another Indonesian Islamic radicals

[3]Some other names comes up to the surface like Rahmat Gumilar Nataprawira, Budhi Santoso, Faisal Utomo,and Ahmadi. These communitas of Darul Islam, JI and JAT have a limited human resources and in a liminality of factionalized pseudo-bureacratic structure that almost become a permanent structural inferiority.

generally wallowing in the intake of democracy and capitalism and liberalism in the smoke billowed.

The types of communitas are phases, not permanent conditions; but it could be a permanent conditions then Turner's theory of communitas could be revisited. If we take for example the jihadist movement from 1940s to 1980s and from 2000s to 2010s, following the communitas scheme, its development can be outlined as having started with the ideological communitas which occurs in ″terrorism″ (bombings, killings, kidanapping, beheading and other violences). Around these happenings a union of followers was ideologically organized, with their own places and times where communitas could be experienced on the margins of the society at large. Eventually complete ideologies were developed to promote, ideally for all members of the society, the type of communitas the jihadists experienced. In the end, however (as was the case with the jihadist movements), the fate of any type of communitas is inevitably a ″decline and fall into structure and law″ (Turner 1969a:132).

The Integration of Jihad Organizations

This study predicts that in next few years, there will a an integration process of the jihadist organizations in Indonesia. Ideologically, among Indonesian Muslims, especially after the Reformasiperiod (1999 - now) discourse about the caliphate, Islamic state, *jihad*, allegiance to the study of the Charter of Madinah and Madinah State, have not been strange anymore. Since this period many radical movements and fundamentalist movements turn into terrorists. They

have monopolized the interpretation of discourse about the state of Islam, caliphate, these terms jihad and Islamic politics. In the era of President Abdurrahman Wahid, the discourse about the Islamic state spread on college campuses, the Islamic movements and activists' mosque. Discourse is power instruments and effects, as well as constraints, a form of resistance, and the starting point of the opposition strategy (Saifuddin, 2013: 1).About the caliphate, Islamic state Madinah to the study of the State is, perhaps, only one of the most ideal Islamic state, the State Medina with its Charter of Madinah during the Prophet Muhammad SAW (in seventh century). However, for most people, the Medina state is almost like a "fairy tale" ever existed in history.

The muslims *ummah* in Indonesia are longing for a new social and political system to be out of this prevailed Indonesian entropies. There is a millenarian expectation to hope the best Islamic system ever established by the Prophet Muhammad fifteen centuries ago. To avoid "mythologization", then we need to examine the Islamic state has ever appeared in the heart of Europe: Spain Islamic era (Islamic Spain). Muslim countries and Muslims in Spain is one of the most remote areas of the world the heart of Islam,but very tolerant. Bernard Lewis suggests that early Islam was apparently tended to be more tolerant than Islam is more recent. At the beginning of the Islamic period, a lot of social interaction that takes place smoothly between Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Although embrace different religions, they form a single community, where interpersonal friendship, partnership in business, teacher-student relationships in the life sciences, and other forms of normal

activities with other ongoing and even very common. Thus, the basis of power is the power relations. In general, relations force consists of anything that is in the social interactions that encourage, urge, preventing, force others to do anything as desired (Saifuddin, 2013: 1).

Cultural cooperation is evident in many ways. Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived in an atmosphere of civilization, mutual respect, and mutual develop science and art and culture. There is no discrimination in the slightest. Therefore, the problem of pluralism is a matter of how Muslims adapt themselves to the modern world. This will inevitably involve matters how they perceive and assess the history of Islam, and how they view and assess the changes and the need to bring in Islamic values and universal normative into dialogue with the reality of space and time. Countless deradicalisation projects to eradicate and domesticate the terorists in Indonesia and elsewhere have failed because that hard statistical approach of economic modeling was flawed and inappropriate. In Indonesia the disastrous consequences of this blindness can be seen in the fields of prevention, social support and counter discourse of terrorism. It was an awareness of this discrepancy between the apparent soundness of antiterrorism policies on paper and their failure in the field, because people for whom they were intended did not want to take up the new initiatives, such as the counter-discourse actions. The presence of good anthropologists in teams planning and implementing development is not a guarantee of success of counter radicalism programs but it makes the chance of it far more likely.

Further Studies

Muslim history, like the history of any community of human beings, always has the potential to make a mistake or turn from the right path. In addition to the simple truism as the English poet Alexander Pope said, all by itself is a clear history of human history, and no ordinary human being is sacred and holy. History of Islam in Indonesia is also the history of power struggle (caliphate) which has not been completed until now. Efforts to realize the power it has implications for the emergence of insurgency of Darul Islam (from 1949) to terrorism (1999 to present). Power must be understood at the micro level as the relations of forces (Saifuddin, 2013: 1).The cultural cooperation, as noted Anthony Reid, seemed in many ways the people of Islam, Hindu-Buddhist and Christian run life and culture. Even in the era of the national movement to achieve independence, the struggle in this pluralist spirit of the Youth Pledge in 1928. And until Soekarno era of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, Muslims and non -Muslims living in an atmosphere of civilization, mutual respect, and mutual develop science and art and culture. There is no discrimination in the slightest, because nation-building and character (nation and character building) is running fine. Therefore, the problem of pluralism is a matter of how Muslims adapt themselves to the modern world, which until the 1950s was outside-in guaranteed by the constitution.

Looking at the reality of JI and JAT in Indonesia, this ecclesiatical structure of a radical minor, there are some differences between traditional organization and a modern political party. Janet M. Bujra helped to update the concept of factionalism. She contributed to a critique of factionalist

theory of earlier anthropology, criticizing its tendency to focus heavily on political structure. She advocates for a different, more distinct understanding between a faction and a party. She organized these characteristics on opposing sides of a table, with a continuum that spans between them (Bujra, 1973: 132-152). With the possibilities to follow the ethnographical subjects who hide themselves in the concealment of political party, the study of this factionalism will be important again in the next future.

Challenged by the development of new and more complex societies or small groups, anthropology will be urged to leave a light on at future further researches road-map. In an anthropological context, the study of factionalism has shifted over time and still inadequete when applying for researching the Darul Islam, the most deep factionalised group in this world. From its roots in the discipline in the 1930s and 1940s, it was focused on tribal systems and separatist elements within these small societies, especially on the continent of Africa (Fortes & Pritchard, 1940: 177-178). These factionalised DI groups were labeled factions, but a widespread use of the term factionalism did not fully emerge until the 1970s and 1980s. This was a time when anthropologists defined the concept more fully, and broadened the definition beyond its previous application to tribal systems. After structural-functionalism faded in the following decades, there were critiques of these early definitions from other anthropologists. Bujra argues, "factions and factionalism are currently fashionable concepts enjoying a vogue which outstrips their present clarity on usage" (Bujra, 1973: 132). In contrary, nowadays Islam in Indonesia will be clearer if we approach with this theoretical

tool in building taxonomy of various complicated groups.

At that time Islam respecting plurality and respect the existing culture. The spirit of pluralism and tolerance enforced developed with enriched intellectual repertoire. However, under Suharto's New Order, all of them have cracks: state building (or nation building) has been exceeded and destroy nation building (or nation building). Increasingly repressive and hegemonic states bulldoze people across ethnic, class, and layers. Political split of the Darul Islam and Jamaah Islamiyyah under the regimentation of Suharto's New Order has devastated the spirit of nationality and humanity for decades.Therefore, the intellectuals and the elite of Islam must find a way out of the crises of social, economic, and political ideology today, so that no reform has stagnated, so that this nation does not disintegrate. Anthony Giddens (2013) called "third way" politically to emphasize the "no rights without responsibilities". In the era of the Prophet of Islam, "no rights without responsibilities" that accentuated in the Medina Charter, which guarantees the freedom, equality and justice. In the Islamic era Cordova, Spain, spirit and conception"Medina Charter" that then makes their community a pluralistic, cosmopolitan, multicultural and universal, so they are willing to learn and accept everything of value from the experiences of other communities.

Theoretically, we tend to rely on the Huntington (1996) theory of clash of civilization between Islam and the Western Christian Secular world. Eventhough that Mohammad Khatami, reformist president of Iran (in office 1997–2005), introduced the concept of Dialogue Among Civilizations as a

response to Huntington's theory, but there is an intrinsic affirmation of the Huntington's chalsh of civilization theory. In recent years, the concept of Dialogue Among Civilizations, a response to Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, has become the center of some international attention. The concept was originally coined by Austrian philosopher Hans Köchler (1972) in an essay on cultural identity. Köchler had earlier proposed that the cultural organization of the United Nations should take up the issue of a "dialogue between different civilizations". Eventhough that the Iranian president Mohammad Khatami (2001) introduced the concept at the global level his initiative, the "dialogue among civilizations" was the basis for United Nations' resolution to name the year 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, the Muslim Islamist will contest the secular world with its millenarian believe and actions. It is in line with what Imam amudra, the Bali bomber, that: "I will only perform an act despite any risks after I truly believe in good faith, (*ijtihad* first, then *jihad*) without giddiness and without wavering. Anyone can disagree with me" (Imam Samudra, 2004: 199). Eventhough that the year 2001 was proclaimed as the "United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations", the muslim power strife to fight the unjust world system of capitalism. As well as physical, social interaction is none other than relations of force in this case we call the power relations, while the relations of force itself in the context of the interaction is the driver, the originator, stimulants, Foucault called as the substrate. Power relations, but not beyond immanent in contexts other relationships (eg, economics, science, health, education, sexuality, etc.). Power is not an institution or

structure, nor the capacity of individuals, but rather a complex linkage forces in society (Saifuddin, 2013: 1).

The clash of civilization will be unevitable in the next few years or decades. Eventhough that there is so many proposal has been launched in debunking the Huntington's theory of civilization clash, makes terrorism into a seemingly incomprehensible phenomenon, in which the individual innocence or guilt of the victim or executioner is superseded by decisions obtained at a higher structural level and in which a logic of chance frames the context of ritual action (Douglass and Zulaika, 1990: 256). The initiative is intended to galvanize collective action across diverse societies to combat extremism, to overcome cultural and social barriers between mainly the Western and predominantly Muslim worlds, and to reduce the tensions and polarization between societies which differ in religious and cultural values. As Achmad Fedyani Saifuddin (2011: 67) writes that it is the religious (Islam) identity as cultural identity that will confront the rest of the world with its distinguished identity. The identity of being Muslim —which is thicker than nationalism or capitalism— will be reproduced in many ways (especially by the Al Qaeda and the Darul Islam of Indonesia), including in the way of pursuit the power tu rule the whole world. The identity of being Muslim is the universal primordialism where the concept humanity will be incorporated within the global political Islam movements.

***

REFERENCES:

Abas, Nasir. 2005. *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI*. Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu.

Abuza, Zachary. 2006. *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*. Rouledge.

Adas, Michael, and M. Tohir Effendi. 1988. *Ratu Adil: Tokoh dan Gerakan Millenarian Menentang Kolonialisme Eropa*. Rajawali Pers.

Alhadar, Smith. 2000. "The forgotten war in North Maluku." *Inside Indonesia,* Vol. 63.

Alhadar, Smith. 2009. *Lintasan Sejarah Iran: Dari Dinasti Achaemenia ke Republik Revolusi Islam, Iran*. Jakarta: Fauzimandiri.

Ali, Fachry. 1994. *The Revolts of the Nation-state Builders: A Comparative Study of the Acehnese Darul Islam and the West Sumatran PRRI Rebellions (1953-1962)*. Melbourne: Monash University.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi, Carool Kersten, and Marat Shterin, (eds). 2012. *Demystifying the Caliphate: Historical Memory and Contemporary Contexts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Amrozi. 2009. *Senyum Terakhir Sang Mujahid: Catatan kehidupan Seorang Amrozi.* Jakarta: Ar-Rahmah Media.

Anderson, Benedict R O'Gourman. 2000. "Petrus Djadi Ratu." *Indonesia,* Vol. 70.

Anderson, Benedict R O'Gourman.1991. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. 2nd edition. London: Verso.

Anshori, Ahmad Yani. 2009. *Untuk Negara Islam Indonesia: Perjuangan Darul Islam dan Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah.* Yogyakarta: Siasat Press.

Aqsha, Darul, Dick van der Meij, & Johan H. Meuleman.

1995. *Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events and Developments from 1988 to March 1993*. Vol. 26. INIS.

Arce M., D.G. & Sandler, T. 2003. "Fitting in: Group Effects and The Evolution of Fundamentalism." *Working paper*. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California.

Arce M., D.G. and Sandler, T.2005. "Counterterrorism: A game theoretic approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, forthcoming.

Arifin, Syamsul. 2014. "Membendung Arus Radikalisasi di Indonesia." *Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman,* Vol.8, No.2.

Arthur, Saniotis. 2006. "Unpacking Amrozi's Smile", *Borderlands.* Vol. 5. No. 2.

Awwas, Irfan S. 1982. *Perjalanan Hukum di Indonesia,* Yogyakarta: Ar-Risalah.

Awwas, Irfan S.2001. *Mengenal Majelis Mujahidin: Untuk Penegakan Syariah Islam*. Yogyakarta: Markaz Pusat Majelis Mujahidin.

Awwas, Irfan S.2007. *Jejak Jihad S.M. Kartosuwiryo: Mengungkap Fakta yang Didustakan*. Yogyakarta: Uswah.

Awwas, Irfan S.2008. *Trilogi Kepemimpinan Negara Islam Indonesia: Menguak Perjuangan Umat Islam Dan Pengkhianatan Kaum Nasionalis-Sekuler*. Yogyakarta: Uswah.

Axtell, J. 1979. "Ethnohistory: An Historian's Viewpoint." *Ethnohistory,* Vol. 26, No. 1.

Azca, Muhammad Najib. 2011. *After jihad: A biographical approach to passionate politics in Indonesia*, Ph. D. Diss. Amsterdam: Faculty FMG, Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR).

Azra, Azyumardi. 2004. "Recent Developments of Indonesian Islam." *Indonesian Quarterly,* Vol. 32, No. 1.

Azra, Azyumardi. 2005. *Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism. Centre for the Study of Contemporary Islam.* Melbourne: Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne,

Bambang Imam Eka Respati Sabirin. 2003. *Lajur Kanan Sebuah Jalan: Dinamika Pemikiran dan Aksi Bintang Bulan, Studi Kasus Gerakan Darul Islam 1940 - 1962* (Lane Right A Way: Dynamics Of Months Of Thought And Action Star (Case Study Darul Islam Movement 1940-1962), *Master Thesis*, Jakarta: University of Indonesia.

Barkun, Michael. 1974. "Millenarianism in the Modern World." *Theory and Society, Vol.1, No.2.*

Barkun, Michael. 2003. *Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America*, University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California.

Barton, Greg. 2004. *Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam*. Sydney: UNSW Press.

Bateson, Gregory. 1935. "Culture contact and schismo-genesis." *Man*, Vol. 35.

Bateson, Gregory. 1972. *Steps to an ecology of mind*. New York: Ballantine Books

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2001. *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*. Cambridge: Polity.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2002. "Modernity and the Holocaust", in A. L. Hinton (ed.) *Genocide: An Anthropological Reader*, London: Blackwell.

Beny, Beny. 2011. *Konsep Takfīr Dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Radikalisme Agama (Studi atas Pemikiran Teologi Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb)*. Diss. Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta.

Bergesen, Albert and Omar Lizardo. 2004. "International Terrorism and the World-System." *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 22.

ISLAM AND RADICALISM IN INDONESIA: THE MILLENARIANISM OF NEGARA ISLAM INDONESIA (NII), JAMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI), JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID (JAT) AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

"A truely scientific analysis must be real, simplifying, and explanatory."

- Claude Lévi-Strauss (1968) -

Structural Anthropology, The Penguin Press.

ONE ideology that plays a role in Islamic terrorism is the principle of *jihad*, which broadly means strive (battle or war). Militants generally use *jihad* to mean defensive or, at a stretch, retaliatory warfare against actors that have allegedly harmed Muslims. Transnational Islamist ideology, specifically of the militant Islamists, assert that Western policies and society are actively anti-Islamic, or as it is sometimes described, waging a "war against Islam". Islamists often identify what they see as a historical struggle between Christianity and Islam, dating back as far as the Crusades, among other historical conflicts between practitioners of the two respective religions. Osama bin Laden, for example, almost invariably described his enemy as aggressive and his call for action against them as defensive. Defensive jihad differs from offensive jihad in being "*fard al-ayn*," or a personal obligation of all Muslims, rather than "*fardhu-*

kifaya", a communal obligation, that is, some Muslims may perform it but it is not required from others. Hence, framing a fight as defensive has the advantage of both appearing to be a victim rather than an aggressor, and of giving the struggle the very highest religious priority for all good Muslims.

In addition to discussing the history of the movement of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Solahudin (2013: 55) [1]also discusses the relationship between its NII Kartosoewirjo and allied with JI. Solahudin explained, according Muchlas alias Ali Ghufron, he and Imam Samudera the duo Bali bombers embraced the ideology of Jamaah As Salafi Jihadi. Salafi jihadism is a religious sect in Islam who admitted making the Salaf Salih as a primary reference source. This understanding quite similar to Salafism, but have different views about jihad. Among these Salafi jihadism looked into the main worship after the monotheistic God. In fact, jihad is seen as more mainstream worship than fasting, charity, pilgrimage and others.

The DI, JI and JAT has bee living in the liminality, at the point of no return in Indonesian politics. Liminality, marginality, and structural inferiority are conditions in which are frequently generated myths, symbols, rituals, philosophical systems, and works of art (Turner, 1974: 231-271).[2] In the meanwhile of the rebellion, the DI, JI and JAT

[1] Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah* (National University of Singapore, 2015).

[2] Victor Turner, "Passages, margins, and poverty: religious symbols of communitas," *Dramas*, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society, 1974.

generated philosophical systems of Abdullah Azzam[3] (1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c), a major figure in the development of the jihad movement, said, "People who break the fast during Ramadan deliberately, without hindrance and in a healthy state it was smaller sin than those who leave jihad, because the people who break the fast was harming himself, while people leaving jihad is detrimental to all the people! " What is the meaning of jihad for them, the Salafi jihadism? For them, the meaning of jihad syar'i only qital alias war. There are no other meaning. Hadith which says jihad akbar is against lust regarded as false hadith. Jihad verses in the Koran that its meaning is not a war that has been removed by the surah At Tawbah verses 5 and 36 of the Quran. In fact, they consider the terror-terror is one part of jihad, referring to Sura Al Anfal 60, "And prepare against them whatever you are able of and of horses tethered to war (which the preparation of it) you rattle (*turhibuna bihii*) the enemies of Allah ... "The word *Turhibuna bihii* is a command to commit terror against the enemies of Islam.

One can find examples of such shifting relations between values in much of Dumont's work on the West in his discussions of the Christian origins of individualism (Dumont 1986 : 23–59) [4]and of the historical transformations of German ideology (Dumont 1994). This raises the question of why one associates Dumont's work with the idea that cultures tend to be marked by structured hierarchies of

---

[3] Abdullah Azzam, "Ulama Pencinta Syuhada, Syahid di Hari Jum'at", at *http://www.eramuslim.com/profil/abdullah-azzam-ulama-pen-cinta-syahid-syahid-di-hari-jumat.htm*

[4] See, Dumont Louis, *Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1986); Dumont Louis, *German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back* (*Chicago*: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

value. It is perhaps because even as I describes contest and change in value hierarchies, in this research, the dominance of the paramount values of jihadism/Islamism in Indonesia are taken to be stable. Everyone who reject terrorism, including Muslims, according to the Salafi Jihadists are infidels. Because *irhab* (frightening, terrorizing) infidel enemies is an obligatory according syar'iah under the preceding paragraph. And whoever denies mean infidel. Salafi Jihadists also categorizes infidels into two parts, namely the *thogut harby* aka Far Enemy (The Far Enemy), the US and its allies, including civilians. They are considered to have occupied Muslim lands like Iraq and Afghanistan. Both are *thogut Ajnaby* or Near Enemy that the Indonesian government and its officials-officials who are considered infidels because they do not apply Islamic law. Among the conditions that allow the killing of people who are protected blood intentionally is when the Muslims wanted to take revenge on the infidels. They treated the Muslims in punishment. If the infidel makes women and children and old people of the Muslims as a target killing, then in such circumstances it is allowed to do the same: to make women and children and old people of the disbelievers as a target for assassination.

Darul Islam has a doctrine that seemed to appear similar to the Salafi jihadism. For example, JAT consider Indonesian government who do not want to apply Islamic law as (indifinite) infidel. Not only that, they also fight Muslims who do not want to join the DI. In the matter of governance of worship, DI different from Salafi. Kartosuwirjo and DI own people are adherents of traditional Islam is precisely in the eyes of the Salafi often considered heretical.

Kartosuwirjo often commissioned 40 scholars to remembrance in order to capture the victory cues from the sky. DI has an expressive structure, a pragmatic structure in their adaptive organization as what Patricia Lund Drolet mention as an ecclesiastical structure (Drolet, 1984). [5]This is a big different with the JI and JAT which had psedo-hirarchies and strucural inferiority of their organizational management.

Throughout the 1971-1985's, the teachings of DI undergone a process of mixing of Islamic teachings that come from the Middle East, especially Pakistan as Jamiat Al Islamy, the Muslim Brotherhood (IM), and Salafi understandings. This happens because of the many literature books, JI, IM, and Salafi are entered in the period. Examples doctrine of *tawhid* RMU (*Rububiyah, Mulkiyah, and Uluhiyyah*) DI version which many refer to the book Maalim Fi Thariq works Sayid Qutb and Al Musthalahaat Al Arbaah. In addition, the mixing understand DI also caused a lot of new cadres DI / TII who come from among the modernists. Examples Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, both activist Al Irshad and DDII, which joined DI in 1976. From 1985 to the early 1990s, about 200 NII people dispatched to Afghanistan to participate in Harby Pohantum askary idad owned Shaikh Rasul Sayyaf. The goal is to study military science is then used jihad against the New Order government. Not only *i'dad askary*, in Afghanistan as well as those AT learn new understanding, namely Salafi jihadism. Adoption of Salafi jihadism understood by those DI in Afghanistan pose a problem in the internal among DI. Ideological hardening

[5]See, Patricia Lund Drolet, "The Congo ritual of Northeastern Panama: an Afro-American Expressive Structure of Cultural Adaptation," *Dissertation*,. 1984.

occurs among people DI, especially alumni of Afghanistan. They attacked the religious understanding of older people who are still affected DI traditional Islamic understanding. Including those criticizing Ajengan Masduki, priest DI sound belief when it is considered deviant because embrace *thariqat* schools (sufi).

Finally, there is a split between those who embrace the NII ideology of Salafi Jihadisme led by Abdullah Sungkar with those faithful with Ajengan Masduki. These processes are called schizmogenesis (Bateson, 1972: 324).[6] On January 1, 1993, Abdullah Sungkar and his followers decided to get out of the DI and formed Jemaah Islamiyah. This is the first Islamic movement in Indonesia that openly embrace schools of Salafi jihadism. Lately, many activists involved in various cases of terrorism in Indonesia. Many of the violent terrorist groups use the name of jihad to fight against certain Western nations and Israel. An example is bin Laden's al-Qaeda, which is also known as "International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders". Most militant Islamists oppose Israel's policies, and often its existence. I have tried to separate the distinctive from the incidental features of factional politics by comparing reported instances of factions from five different kinds of society and social institution. The darul Islam, JI and JAT indicated as what Ralph W. Nicholas analysis as a "segmentary factional political systems" (Nicholas, 1966: 45-59). [7]

The influence of Sayyid Qutb in JI and JAT can be seen from

---

[6] See, Gregory Bateson, *Culture contact and schismogenesis* (Man, 1935); Gregory Bateson, *Steps to An Ecology of Mind* (New York: Ballantine Books)

[7] See, Nicholas, R. W., "A Reply to Beals and Siegel," *American Anthropologist*, 1968.

many dakwah and writing of JI and JAT. JI and JAT filtered the tenets of Qutbism as being a belief that Muslims have deviated from true Islam and must return to ″pure Islam″ as originally practiced during the time of Muhammad. According to Dale C. Eikmeier, ″ideology″, rather than any individual or group, is the ″center of gravity″ of al-Qaeda and related groups, and that ideology is a ″collection of violent Islamic thought called Qutbism.″ The path to ″pure Islam″ is only through a literal and strict interpretation of the Qur′an and Hadith, along with implementation of Muhammad′s commands. Muslims should interpret the original sources individually without being bound to follow the interpretations of Islamic scholars. That any interpretation of the Quran from a historical, contextual perspective is a corruption, and that the majority of Islamic history and the classical jurisprudential tradition is mere sophistry.

The historic rivalry between Pancasila and Muslims in the Indonesia has also often been the primary motive behind some of the most deadly terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Indonesia topped the list of countries most affected by Islamic terrorism. In addition, Islamist militants, scholars, and leaders opposed Western society for what they see as immoral secularism. Islamists have claimed that such unrestricted free speech has led to the proliferation of pornography, immorality, secularism, homosexuality, feminism, and many other ideas that Islamists often oppose. Although Usamah bin Laden almost always emphasized the alleged oppression of Muslims by America and Jews when talking about them in his messages: ″We call you to be a people of manners, principles, honour, and purity; to reject

the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling's, and trading with interest; You separate religion from your policies; You are the nation that permits Usury, which has been forbidden by all the religions; You are a nation that permits the production, trading and usage of intoxicants; You are a nation that permits acts of immorality; You are a nation that permits gambling in its all forms. You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women." This message then transmitted to Indonesia as a call for war against the power of infidels. This messages of Osama echoed by Imam Samudra, the JI and perhaps by JAT and other components of radicals in Indonesia to be a call to combat the western ideologies together with its statecrafts and even the iinocent citizens.

Al-Qaeda has developed an ideology which claims that Islam is under attack, and needs to be defended. This is a powerful narrative that weaves together conflicts from across the globe, presenting the West's response to varied and complex issues, from long-standing disputes such as Israel/Palestine and Kashmir to more recent events as evidence of an across-the-board determination to undermine and humiliate Islam worldwide. Although Islamic terrorism is commonly associated with the Salafis (or "Wahhabis"), the scholars of the group have constantly attributed this association to ignorance, misunderstanding and sometimes insincere research and deliberate misleading by rival groups. Following the September 11 attacks, Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh, the Grand Mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, made an official statement that "the Islamic Sharia (legislation) does not sanction" such actions. A Salafi

Committee of Major Scholars in Saudi Arabia has declared that "Islamic" terrorism, such as the May 2003 bombing in Riyadh, are in violation of Sharia law and aiding the enemies of Islam.

Criticism of Islamic terrorism on Islamic grounds has also been made by Abdal-Hakim Murad (Timothy Winter) that neither bin Laden nor his principal associate, Ayman al-Zawahiri, are graduates of Islamic universities. And so their proclamations ignore 14 centuries of Muslim scholarship, and instead take the form of lists of anti-American grievances and of Koranic quotations referring to early Muslim wars against Arab idolaters. These are followed by the conclusion that all Americans, civilian and military, are to be wiped off the face of the Earth. All this amounts to an odd and extreme violation of the normal methods of Islamic scholarship. Had the authors of such fatwās followed the norms of their religion, they would have had to acknowledge that no school of mainstream Islam allows the targeting of civilians. An insurrectionist who kills non-combatants is guilty of baghy, armed aggression, a capital offense in Islamic law. To questioning this religious credentials of many Islamist Qutbists, can be a means to discredit them. With the exception of Abul Ala Maududi and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, none of Qutbism's main theoreticians trained at Islam's recognized centers of learning. Although a devout Muslim, Hassan al-Banna was a teacher and community activist. Sayyid Qutb was a literary critic. Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj was an electrician. Ayman al-Zawahiri is a physician. Osama bin Laden trained to be a businessman.

Many of the Islamic scholars, ulamas or western orientalists refused to relate jihad with terrorism, refused to state that terrorism is the product of oppressed religions. Fethullah Gülen, a prominent Turkish Islamic scholar, has claimed that "a real Muslim," who understood Islam in every aspect, could not be a terrorist. There are many other people with similar points of view such as Karen Armstrong, Ahmet Akgunduz, Harun Yahya and Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri. Huston Smith, an author on comparative religion, noted that extremists have hijacked Islam, just as has occurred periodically in Christianity, Hinduism and other religions throughout history. He added that the real problem is that extremists do not know their own faith. Ali Gomaa, former Grand Mufti of Egypt, stated not only for the Islam but in general: "Terrorism cannot be born of religion. Terrorism is the product of corrupt minds, hardened hearts, and arrogant egos, and corruption, destruction, and arrogance are unknown to the heart attached to the divine."

Religious identity-based frameworks for analyzing Islamist-based terrorism.

Islamist-based fundamentalist terrorism against Western nations and the U.S. in particular, has numerous motivations and takes place the larger context of a complex and tense relationship between the 'West' and the Arab and Muslim 'world,' which is highlighted in the previous section on motivations and Islamic terrorism. Religious or cultural identity-based theoretical frameworks including theories of social identity, social categorization theory, and psycho-dynamics are used to explain the reasons terrorism occurs. Imam Samudra wrote: the entire income derived from a

business that has to do with the Sari Club, Paddy's Pub, or other similar names, as well as activities that support the process of 'animalisation' in the outskirts of Kuta and the surrounding sea, is unclean. Something the unclean shall indeed destroyed, destroyed, and eliminated (Imam Samudra, 2004:158). [8]This is a kind of clash of civilization in the modern time between Islam and the western. This clash could be a kind of cultural friction based on different social (religious) identity.

Social identity is explained by Karina Korostelina as a "feeling of belonging to a social group, as a strong connection with social category, and as an important part of our mind that affects our social perceptions and behavior". This definition can be applied to the case of Osama bin Laden, who, according to this theory, had a highly salient perception of his social identity as a Muslim, a strong connection to the social category of the Muslim *Ummah* or 'community,' which affect his social perceptions and behaviors. Bin Laden's ideology and interpretation of Islam led to the creation of al-Qaeda in response to perceived threats against the Muslim community by the Soviet Union, the U.S. in particular due to its troop presence in Saudi Arabia, and American support for Israel. The Islamist terrorist group al-Qaeda has a group identity, which includes "shared experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and interests of ingroup members," and is "described through the achievement of a collective aim for which this group has been created," which in this case is to achieve "a complete break from the foreign influences in Muslim countries, and

[8] See, Imam Samudra, *Aku Melawan Teroris* (Solo: Jazeera. 2004).

the creation of a new Islamic caliphate."

Social categorization theory has been discussed as a three-stage process of identification, where "individuals define themselves as members of a social group, learn the stereotypes and norms of the group, and group categories influence the perception and understanding of all situations in a particular context" This definition can be applied to the U.S.-led war on terror, in which conflict features such as the phenomenon of Anti-Americanism and the phenomenon of non-Arab countries like Iran and Afghanistan lending support to Islamist-based terrorism by funding or harboring terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda against Western nations, particularly Israel and the United States are, according to social categorization theory, influenced by a three-stage process of identification. In this three-stage process of identification, the Arab and Muslim world(s) are the social group(s), in which their members learn stereotypes and norms which categorize their social group vis-à-vis the West. This social categorization process creates feelings of high-level in-group support and allegiance among Arabs and Muslims and the particular context within which members of the Arab and Muslim world(s) social group(s) understand all situations that involve the West. Social categorization theory as a framework for analysis indicates causal relationships between group identification processes and features of conflict situations.

Radicalism and Fundamentalism

From the elaborations in previous chapters, there something different within the inner desire of the member of DI, JI,

MMI and JAT and consequently should amend the meaning of radicalism and fundamentalism or at least this two concept should be distinguished each other. With the Islamic revival, a new "Fundamentalist" movement arose, with some different interpretations of Islam, often with an increased emphasis on jihad. The Wahhabi movement which spread across the Arabian peninsula starting in the 18th century, emphasized jihad as armed struggle. Wars against Western colonial forces were often declared jihad: the Sanusi religious order proclaimed it against Italians in Libya in 1912, and the "Mahdi" in the Sudan declared jihad against the British and the Egyptians in 1881.

Millenarianism could be by now defined as a unvictorious jihadist movements in the fading power of global Islam in Turky and whence the spread of colonialism to Muslims' soils. Other early anti-colonial conflicts involving *jihad* include: Padri War (1821–1838); Java War or Diponegoro War (1825–1830); Barelvi Mujahidin war (1826-1831); Caucasus War (1828–1859); The Fulani jihad states of West Africa, c. 1830; Algerian resistance movement (1832 - 1847); Somali Dervishes (1896–1920); Moro Rebellion (1899–1913); Aceh War (1873–1913); Basmachi Movement (1916–1934). The so-called Fulbe jihad states and a few other jihad states in western Africa were established by a series of offensive wars in the 19th century. None of these *jihad* movements in the colonial period were victorious. At this point, I would like to view the DI, JI, and JAT were born in the bitter time of power loss of Islamic communities (ummah) everywhere. The muslims perhaps knew that they were lived in a defeated age and has no chance to contest the modern secular Christian powers from the West.

After the New Order, Indonesia entered a phase of very sharp ideological conflict. Religious ideology, often accompanied by violence and other forms of emotional expression, became ideological opposition is strong enough, even with a relatively small number of supporters. Indonesia's Islamic ideology in this period appeared in its roughest form: terrorism. Recognition of an act of terrorism suspects Bali Bombing 12 October 2002, a clear expression of religious emotion. Ali Gufron, one of the Bali bombing terror perpetraitors, a member of Jamaah Islamiyyah, even expressed his attitude to the firm and simple: "...reply to injustice and tyranny US and its allies against Muslims with the intention that they stop their tyranny." There is a value work and dictating the way their minds. Ali Ghufron for example, stated that the bombing was "act of devotion to God." So Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and the group felt a delusion of grandeur, a feeling of having or representing or get the word and be part of the elements of greatness which believes itself to carry special mission from God.

The terrorists, the Jamaah islamiyyah or the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) or other factions the Darul Islam, always feel themselves as "God's warriors" who are called to act in the name of God and religion , a "hand of God" on earth to "realize" his wrath in the form of resistance: the bombings and other terrorist acts. Result of interpretation and expression of religious emotion delusif this, the tragedy took place and a large number of speculation arose in the midst of the public.

The tragedy of a series of terrorist bomb attacks in Bali,

Makassar, Jakarta and other places in Indonesia has led to speculation of a series of apologists to the a priori. The first is speculation about who the perpetrators of terror attacks very well planned and carried out by people who have advanced technical knowledge. Arbitrarily identified the culprit as the anti-America, anti-Israel, anti-democratic, anti-capitalism economic strength, and global military. The second is speculation about the motives of the terrorists in action excessive destruction of places of where economic power, politics, and the US military are. The third is speculation about what objectives are to be addressed to the US and Israel. The culprit is allegedly identified as Islamic fundamentalists are now a sworn enemy of the United States, Osama bin Laden is hiding in Afghanistan first. If not Osama, the world assumed that the culprit is the other people from Islamic fundamentalists who have doctrinal relationship with the Al Qaeda network.

Ideologically, among Indonesian Muslims, especially after the Reformation Period (1999 - now) discourse about the caliphate, Islamic state, jihad, allegiance to the study of the Charter of Medina and Medina State, not a stranger. Since this period many radical movements and fundamentalist movements turn into terrorists. They have monopolized the interpretation of discourse about the state of Islam, caliphate, these terms jihad and Islamic politics. In the era of President Abdurrahman Wahid, the discourse about the Islamic state spread on college campuses, the Islamic movements and activists mosque. About the caliphate, Islamic state Madinah to the study of the State is, perhaps, only one of the most ideal Islamic state, the State Medina with its Charter of Madinah during the Prophet Muhammad

(VII century). However, for most people, the Medina District is almost like a ″fairy tale″ even exist in history.

To avoid ″mythologization″, then we need to examine the Islamic state has ever appeared in the heart of Europe: Spain Islamic era (Islamic Spain). Muslim countries and Muslims in Spain is one of the most remote areas of the world the heart of Islam, but very tolerant. Bernard Lewis suggests that early Islam was, apparently tend to be more tolerant than Islam is more recent. At the beginning of the Islamic period, a lot of social interaction that takes place smoothly between Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Although embrace different religions, they form a single community, where interpersonal friendship, partnership in business, teacher-student relationships in the life sciences, and other forms of normal activities with other ongoing and even very common.

Cultural cooperation is evident in many ways. Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived in an atmosphere of civilization, mutual respect, and mutual develop science and art and culture. There is no discrimination in the slightest. Therefore, the problem of pluralism is a matter of how Muslims adapt themselves to the modern world. This will inevitably involve matters how they perceive and assess the history of Islam, and how they view and assess the changes and the need to bring in Islamic values and universal normative into dialogue with the reality of space and time.

Muslim history, like the history of any community of human beings, always has the potential to make a mistake or turn from the right path. In addition to the simple truism as the English poet Alexander Pope said, all by itself is a clear

history of human history, and no ordinary human being is sacred and holy. History of Islam in Indonesia is also the history of power struggle (caliphate) which has not been completed until now. Efforts to realize the power it has implications for the emergence of insurgency (DI from 1949 to 1964) to terrorism (1999 to present). The cultural cooperation, as noted Anthony Reid, seemed in many ways the people of Islam, Hindu-Buddhist and Christian run life and culture. Even in the era of the national movement to achieve independence , the struggle in this pluralist spirit of the Youth Pledge in 1928. And until Sukarno era of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, Muslims and non - Muslims living in an atmosphere of civilization, mutual respect, and mutual develop science and art and culture. There is no discrimination in the slightest, because nation-building and character (nation and character building) is running fine. Therefore, the problem of pluralism is a matter of how Muslims adapt themselves to the modern world, which until the 1980s was guaranteed by the constitution.

At that time Islam respecting plurality and respect the existing culture. The spirit of pluralism and tolerance enforced developed with enriched intellectual repertoire. However, under Suharto's New Order, all of them have cracks: state building has been exceeded and destroy nation building. Increasingly repressive and hegemonic states, bulldoze people across ethnic, class, and layers. Political regimentation to split the Islamic radical movements during the Soeharto's New Order has devastated spirit of nationality and humanity.

Therefore, the intellectuals and the elite of Islam must find a

way out of the crises of social, economic, and political ideology today, so that no reform has stagnated, so that this nation does not disintegrate. Giddens called political ″third way″ to emphasize the ″no rights without responsibilities″. In the era of the Prophet of Islam, ″no rights without responsibilities″ that teraksentuasikan in the Medina Charter, which guarantees the freedom, equality and justice. In the Islamic era Cordova, Spain, spirit and conception ″Medina Charter″ that then make their community a pluralistic, cosmopolitan, multicultural and universal, so they are willing to learn and accept everything of value from the experiences of other communities.

There needs to be a distinction between the term or the concept of fundamentalism and radicalism as has been shown by the results of this study. At least differentiate between the two terms that can be used any mention fundamentalism and theoretical techniques to elaborate on the problems posed by both. The term fundamentalism is understood to refer to religious groups that prefer the ritual and the theological and eschatological beliefs of a religious group. While radicalism should refer to the identification of religious groups with strong political awareness and a combination of modern rationality (and even West) with religious beliefs. With the distinction of this terminology, it will facilitate the taxonomy in breaking down the problems and characteristics of religious groups and will make it easier to enter the religious group examined more deeply. Taxonomy error religious groups, between the fundamentalist and radical, will result in errors in associating with a network of these groups are more outside.

In this study, I often find a lot of Islamic groups that have the trust of Mahdiism rigorously and fanatics, but they do not necessarily become terrorists. There are a lot of confidence in the Mahdiism associated with traditionalism religious understanding. While terrorist groups are becoming involved with terrorism (although they reject and do not like being called terrorists) appeared to have a more selective millenarian understanding, modern and able to transform and sort things millennial with superstitious.

The Idea of *Khilafah* and Steps of Islamic Struggle

The DI perception of Islamic state and khilafah is very millenarian-like. This millenarian view can be found in the 1948 Cisayong Conference where many Muslims gathered in garut, West Java, to formulate a clear-cut steps in establishing Islamic state. According to the results conference Cisayong 1948, this program struggle of Muslims of Indonesia that they must achieve in order responsibility us to Allah SWT as caliph (they refered to the verse Qs. 2:30 of Quran) and enforcement Deen of Islam (they refered to the verse Qur'an, 42:13): (1) To educate people to fit into citizens islam; (2) to provide information that Islam can not win with a plebiscite/ referendum/election; (3) to establish a base area (*daerah basis*); (4) to proclaim the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia; (5) to strengtheng NII in and out, into: Enforce Islamic Law in the broadest and as perfect as possible. out: Strengthening its international identity, so as to stand at the same level with other countries; (6) to assist islamic state struggles of other countries, so that they can immediately do compulsory holy, as the servant of God who

enforce the law of Allah on the earth of Allah; (7) to joint other Islamic countries, forming the World Imamate Council to elect a Caliph, and to uphold the establishment of *khilafah* on earth. This Seven programs should the NII people proceed (this struggle called as Estapeta in NII metaphor). And once again the Islamic State of Indonesia will always be there, even if the mujahideen are scattered in various "*harokah jihadiyyah*". This Cisayong Conference results are a sort of Mahdi-isme (Millenarian-ism), and their modern Qutubian way of how to deal with *Dajjal* and welcoming a *Khilafah minhajjin Nubuwwah.* The practice of periodic raids by Bedouin against enemy tribes and settlements to collect booty predates the revelations of the Quran, and according to some scholars, while Islamic leaders "instilled into the hearts of the warriors the belief in jihad holy war, the "fundamental structure" of this old muslim belief of warfare remained, raiding to collect booty.

From an early date Muslim law laid down jihad in the military sense as one of the principal obligations of both the head of the Muslim state, who declared the jihad, and the Muslim community. Within classical Islamic jurisprudence – the development of which is to be dated into the first few centuries after the prophet's death – jihad is the only form of warfare permissible under Islamic law, and may consist in wars against unbelievers, apostates, rebels, highway robbers and dissenters renouncing the authority of Islam. The primary aim of jihad as warfare is not the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam by force, but rather the expansion and defense of the Islamic state. In theory, jihad was to continue until all mankind either embraced Islam or submitted to the authority of the Muslim state. There could be truces before

this was achieved, but no permanent peace. One who died 'on the path of God' was a martyr, (*syahid*), whose sins were remitted and who was secured immediate entry to paradise.

To see the entities of DI, JI, JAT more in the context of unvictorious age in every corner of the world, I try to comprehend the ummah of Muslim politically in Indonesia. They developed an ideology of loss with a struggle conception of jihad. Classical manuals of Islamic jurisprudence often contain a section called Fiqh Jihad (Yusuf Qardhawi), with rules governing the conduct of war covered at great length. Such rules include treatment of nonbelligerents, women, children (also cultivated or residential areas) Although some Islamic scholars have differed on the implementation of Jihad, there is consensus amongst them that the concept of jihad will always include armed struggle against persecution and oppression.

The DI, JI and JAT memories on early Muslim conquests, connected with the history of the Age of the Caliphs: (1) Expansion under Muhammad, 622–632 or the first ten years of the prophethood 1-11; (2) Expansion during the Rashidun Caliphate, 632–661 or the Hijri date of year 11-40; (3) Expansion during the Umayyad Caliphate, 661–750 ranged from the year of 40-129 hijri date. In the early era that inspired classical Islam (Rashidun Caliphate) and lasted less than a century, jihad spread the realm of Islam to include millions of subjects, and an area extending "from the borders of India and China to the Pyrenees and the Atlantic". The two empires impeding the advance of Islam were the Persian Sassanian empire and Byzantine. By 657 the Persian empire was conquered and by 661 the Byzantine Empire was

reduced to a fraction of its former size. The role of religion in these early conquests is debated. Medieval Arabic authors believed the conquests were commanded by God, and presented them as orderly and disciplined, under the command of the caliph. Many modern historians question whether hunger and desertification, rather than jihad, was a motivating force in the conquests. Some recent explanations cite both material and religious causes in the conquests. jihad World enters a new phase at the end of this age. The new round of struggle against predators of jihad is very fierce and frightening. Not just abortion jihad as analysis sheikhs Abu Mus'ab As Suury jihad has many consequences, amongst is the killing anyone who does not want to support it, even though it was the senior person jihad once. It's a very dark era.

The idea of Islamic state or Islamic Superstate in Southeast Asia or a khilafah from DI, JI and JAT has similarity each other. As JAT member used to refer to Tarbiyyah Jihadiyah[9], mentioned that the idea of Islamic state is the replacement of the nation-state and nationalism. In one discussion of JAT where JAS, DI and JI members attend the session in 2006, there was a small sorrow talk on nationalism. Muslims have been limited by Allah Almighty in terms of the support-jib, and making it as the only crutch, which is to make aqidah as nationality, Darul Islam as his homeland, his Lord as the sole ruler and makes the Qur'an as the enactment its laws. The portrayal of the homeland, nationality and family that is very high here that must be embedded in the soul of preachers who call people to the path of Allah. So the subject

[9] Dr. Abdullah Azzam, *Fie At-Tarbiyah Al-Jihadiyah wal Bina' Juz Awwal* [Tarbiyah Jihadiyah I].

matter becomes clear, where proselytizing is not penetrate into it *khufyah shirk* (hidden shirk). Shirk with the earth, with nationality Shirk, Shirk with populist, Shirk with *nasab* (descent), shirk the benefits achieved little faster. Prophet has stated unequivocally regarding *qaumiyah* (nationalism/ populism): "Leave nationalities for that he is something rotten smell". Something smelled sickening and nauseating. Then he said to those who utter foul words again wasted it: "Let the people who boast of their ancestors that stop (actions) or they became the more despicable in the sight of God than a *gambreng*". [10]

As for JAT and JAS and MMI, the steps to establish an Islamic state should be refered to *qa'idah shalabah* (nuclear groups). Shalabah Qa'idah has become the focus of coaching Prophet in a long time. From this group emerged qualified figures, such as Abu Bakr, 'Umar, Uthman, Mus'ab, Hamzah, and others. The group that fostered this Munawarah in Medina, at the time of mass apostasy in the Arabian peninsula who have mastered Islam, can restore the entire peninsula to the control of Muslim rule, due to the strong and solid group. This group has spawned a figure of the caliber of Abu Bakr, at which time several Arab tribes refused to pay zakat (after the Holy Prophet) How can these groups be built? How this Qa'idah shalabah fostered? How high prototype was built? This group, this large building, everything is enforced only on two buttresses. *First*, the Darul Arqam phase where the length forging period where a

[10] *Gambreng* is insect smaller than cricket which interpreted as the habit of rolling feces (human/other animals) with the tip of his horns like the Ba'ath Party in Arabs and the nationalists and their allies in Indonesia. They talked about book of "Iqtidha Ash Shirathal Mustaqim fie Mukhalafati Ash-habul Jahim", written by Ibnu Taimiyah.

commander of the soldiers around him. From Darul Arqam, the place where he spends most of his time to build generation options. *Second*, guidance for spiritualism. Spiritual guidance can be achieved by many means. The most important thing at the beginning is *Qiyamul Lail* (prayer *tahajjud*).

The DI, JI and JAT communitas live in transnational influences of Islamic ideas came from many places, especially from the Middle East. These external dynamics has contributed to the split of the entity instead of unification. These processes in Bateson theory are called schizmogenesis (Bateson, 1972: 324).[11] In July 2014, an imprisoned Ba'asyir pledged allegiance (*bay'ah*), to the militant Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. JAS was established on 11 August 2014 at Asrama Haji, Bekasi. JAS establishment background for responding to conditions disagreements occur in JAT members in dealing with the phenomenon of the claims of the Caliphate by ISIS. Amir where pilgrims JAT, Ust. Abu Bakar Baasyir has decided that all members of JAT were rejected claims Khilafah (ISIS) that should come out of the Jamaat and no longer in JAT bond. JAS was established on August 11, 2014 Asrama Haji, Bekasi. JAS establishment background for responding to conditions disagreements occur in JAT members in dealing with the phenomenon of the claims of the Caliphate by ISIS. Amir where pilgrims JAT, Ust. Abu Bakar Baasyir has decided that all members of JAT were rejected claims Khilafah (ISIS) that should come out of the Jamaat and no longer in JAT

[11] See, Gregory Bateson, *Steps to An Ecology of Mind*...

bond. In the word Ustadz Muhammad Acwan, "JAS goal is to realize that beraqidah ummatan wasathon Islam according salafusshalih understanding and have ruhul jihad for the sake of Islam in all aspects of life in the shade of the Khilafah Rasyidah which is in accordance with prophetic *manhaj* to reach the pleasure of Allah in this world and hereafter." These words are purely messianic statement. JAS assess the caliphate declaration made Daulah Islamiyah Iraq wa Sham (ISIS/ISIL) is still not in accordance with the instructions of the Prophet sallallaahu alaihi wasallam, the Islamic leadership is built on Manhaj Nubuwwah. JAS believes the issue of allegiance leader of the Muslims should follow the steps Salafushalih involving Ahlul Halli wal Aqdi were blessed by the majority of the Muslims.

While based on research conducted by the JAS and refer fatwa scholars in various parts of the world, then JAS concluded that the methodology of the caliphate and declared ISIS creed is the creed and *manhaj ghuluw* (extreme). That the theology and methodology of ghuluw that forced the Muslims to pledged by the caliph has resulted in divisions and hostility in the body of Muslims until the stage of bloodshed among brothers and sisters. Furthermore, in a release signed by Ustadz Muhammad Achwan, JAS and Ustad Amir Word Taufikuroman, Katibul 'Aam this JAS JAS explicitly reject explicitly declared caliphate ISIS. "JAS appealed to Muslims not to rush pledged to the caliph who was named a leader in ISIS caliphate. It is better if the Muslims refer opinion of most scholars.

Membership Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) which does not support the movement of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

(ISIS), considered to be at odds with the ideology of JAT. By doing so, the membership of the core group should be stripped of all attributes associated with JAT. "Membership we had taken out of Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) for refusing ISIS movement in Indonesia. Furthermore, we established and declared Sharia Jamaat Ansharusy (JAS)," said Amir Jamaat Sharia Ansharusy, Ustadz Muhammad Achwan.

The background of the establishment of JAS, said Muhammad Achwan, ISIS-related movements as opposed to the Islamic faith. "JAS formed due to respond to the disagreements that occur in JAT members in addressing the Caliphate by Daulah Islamiyah in Iraq and Sham (ISIS). Amir JAT, Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, has decided that all JAT members who rejected the claim that the caliphate should exit and no longer in the bond JAT, "he said. Even so, he said, the relationship between JAS with JAT is still maintained, as befits the relationship between worshipers to edify each fellow Muslims. JAS members cling to Islamic values derived from the Quran and Sunnah (teachings of the prophet). When deliberation formation JAS, JAS other officials also attended, among others, Secretary of the Islamic Assembly of JAS Fuad Al Hazimi, Deputy Spokesman JAS Abu Al Izz, as well as the Chairman of the Shura Council Abdurrochim Ba'asyir.

Currently, membership JAS has recorded about 2,000 people spread across six regions of the archipelago. "The area that formed our membership, among others, East Java, Central Java, West Java, Jakarta, West Nusa Tenggara and Bengkulu. Embryo membership already appear in Tangerang, Sama-

rinda and Balikpapan," Fuad Al Hazimi claims. JAS activities, said Fuad Al Hazimi, proselytizing to mosques as usual and enforce Islamic Sharia. As mentioned related Pancasila ideology which became the basis of the state, it said, JAS enforce Islamic Sharia. "We run the ideology of Islam. Fighting for the establishment of Islamic law in Indonesia," he added. JAS is a fraction of JAT. Previously, JAT itself is a fraction of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI). Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was the leader of the MMI but eventually came out and established JAS. The rise of JAS can be explained anthropologically by utilizing the theory of schizmogenesis of David Grabber (2013).[12] Many aspects of culture better be seen as acts of self-conscious rejection, or as formed through a schizmogenetic process of mutual definition against the values of neighbouring societies (David Graeber, 2013: 19). Conscious rejection of the values of secular civilizations of the world or towards the ghuluw of takfirism and aspire for an just Islamic ecumene (ummah) of the Darul Islam, Jamaah Islamiyyah, MMI and JAS effecting a social order that could justifiably be described as self-consciously anti-heroic, the anti-ghuluw, anti-takfirism, and anti-murjiah.

The Integration of Jihad Movements

After the split of the Darul Islam, JI and JAT, there would be cyclical turn to an integration of jihadist movements in Indonesia. The Islamic resurgence movement began in late 1949s when Darul Islam proclaimed an underground Islamic

---

[12] See, David Graeber, *Culture as Creative Refusal* (Cambridge Anthropology, 2013).

State of Indonesia (NII, Negara Islam Indonesia). Recently, this resurgence has paved the ways to organize their activities, develop their networks, and consolidate the power. Darul Islam network is largely constituted by the approximately 35,000 Indonesians. Some are those who returned from Afghanistan after fighting alongside the *mujahidins* against the Soviet Union; those who collaborated with the Moro's struggle in southern Philippines; those who participated in Maluku and Poso's sectarian riots in eastern Indonesia as well as those who participated in the southern Thailand Muslim's struggle for independence.

There is a tradition of free, critical, and creative reasoning and thinking within Islam, called *ijtihad.* In terms of organization and structure, factions are bodies built on close ties between leaders and followers. They have no formal structure, but tend to form a tight core of hierarchical arrangement based on their personal attributes and abilities. The leader and this core actively recruit others to expand the faction, finding people who are dedicated to the vision of the leader. The leader and the core confer directly with others in the group, and do not delegate through intermediaries. More specifically, they are "comprised of nodes and linkages, the total network is made up of partial networks that are defined by egocentric foci" (Barnes as quoted by Silverman, 1980: 6). While the establishment sees them as the fringe elements in society that act irrationally, internally they are constituted of this core with very specific motives. These factions are also ephemeral. They cease to exist if they fail, or if they overthrow the establishment (Bujra, 1973: 134).[13]

[13] J. M. Bujra, "The Dynamics Of Political Action: A New Look At Factionalism", *American Anthropologist*, 1973.

Factions of DI —in the Victor Turner concepts— are a sort of pseudo-bureacratic structure and an expressive strucure that we can see many fundamentalistic and radical tendencies in the groups.

In the early decades of the emergence of Darul Islam, three schools of thought flourished, the Kamil Hanafi, the Masduki, and the Abdullah Sungkar school of thought. In Masduki and Sungkarian, scholars taught their students to abandon ″expert″ opinions about the Koran if their own conversations with the ambiguous book produced more compelling evidence for their peaceful ideas. On the other hand, Kamilan being one of the most sophisticated *sufi* schools in Indonesia, published around 70 literatures as the outcome of their thought exercise. At this point, it is noteworthy to indicate that Masdukian and Sungkarian, which were not literature-minded, had then developed a more radical and fundamental way of Islamic struggle in Indonesia.

The Masdukian and Sungkarian thought schools believed that Islam was able to and should have formed the basis of political ideology. The Sungkarian, which later on formed Jamaah Islamiyah, was the most extreme form of Darul Islam. This school led their protégées to become radical, revolutionary, and utopian individual who engaged in ′terrorism′ or other ′extreme′ and violent political activities. In contrast, the Kamilan tended to draw more selectively on such ideas and, instead it argued that society would overcome the problems of modern life only when the society became truly Islamic. The *sufi* schools of Darul Islam (The Kamils) tended to place great stock in legislative reforms.

They committed to take a greater interest in the Islamization of society and many saw the implementation of *shari*ah as the panacea for society's ills.

The Clash of Civilizations

Out of DI, the JI and JAT developed strategic warfare towards Western civilization by murder, kidnaping, and other violences that lead to the clash of civilizations[14]. Although the murder of Muslims is always forbidden in Islam, the murder of non-Muslims is also prohibited in certain circumstances. Many Muslim scholars have presented subjective evidence against the religious justification of terrorism against certain non-Muslims, a notable example being that of Muhammad ibn al Uthaymin[15] who states regarding killing a non-Muslim who is living in an Islamic state or with whom Muslims have a peace treaty: "As for a non-Muslim living under Muslim rule and an *ahlul zimmy* (Non-Muslim ally with whom Muslims have a treaty, trust, peace, or agreement), the prophet said: "Whoever kills a *ahlul zimmy* will not even smell the fragrance of paradise and its fragrance can be smelled from the distance of forty years away." and he also said: "Certainly, one of the most difficult situations for which there is no turning back for whomever casts himself into it —shedding sacred blood without right." However this does not address the killing of non-Muslims living outside the Islamic world who do not have a specific treaty with Muslims. Another example is that

[14]Samuel P. *Huntington-*, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, 2011)

[15] See, Shaykh Muhammad bin Saalih Al-'Uthaymeen, "Tafseer Ayatul-Kursi", at *http://salaf-us-saalih.com/2011/11/03/tafseer-ayatul-kursi*

of late scholar Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz (2012: 6) who stated: ″It is well-known to anyone with the slightest amount of common sense that hijacking planes and kidnapping embassy officials and similar acts are some of the greatest universal crimes that result in nothing but widespread corruption and destruction. They place such extreme hardships and injuries upon innocent people, the extent of which only Allāh knows.″

Numerous *fatwās* (religious decisional statement) condemning terrorism and suicide bombing as haram have been published by Islamic scholars worldwide, one of the most extensive being the 600-page ruling by Sheikh Tahir-ul-Qadri (2010: 4),[16] whose fatwa condemned them as kufr. Qadri's fatwa was an ″absolute″ condemnation of terrorism without ″any excuses or pretexts.″ He said that ″Terrorism is terrorism, violence is violence and it has no place in Islamic teaching and no justification can be provided for it, or any kind of excuses or ifs or buts.″ Qadri (2010: 12) said his fatwa, which declares terrorists and suicide bombers to be unbelievers, goes further than any previous denunciation. Iranian Ayatollah Ozma Seyyed Yousef Sanei (2010: 14)[17] issued a fatwa (ruling) that suicide attacks against civilians are legitimate only in the context of war. Sanei did not say whether other types of attacks against civilians are justified outside of the context of war, nor whether jihad is included

[16] Sheikh Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri's, "Struggle Against Radicalism in Islam", at *http://www.usip.org/events/shaykh-dr-muhammad-tahir-ul-qadri-s-struggle-against-radicalism-in-islam*

[17] Ozma Seyyed Yousef Sanei, *http://www.zastory.com/wiki/Ozma_Seyyed_Yousef_Sanei*

in Sanei's definition of war.[18] The rise of terrorism in Sunni regions showed that it is not the Shia the most radical in this jihad advancement era.

According to Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (2005: 9), Jihad is considered one of his most important contribution towards understanding the religion according to the principles of interpreting the Qur'an introduced by Farahi and Islahi) the Qur'an does not allow waging war except for against oppression under a sovereign state. He holds that jihad without a state is nothing but creating nuisance in the land when hijacked by the individuals and groups independent of the state authority defeats the purpose. The principle behind this study of the issue in the basic sources is the principle that there are divine injunctions in the Qur'an which are specific to the age of the Rasulullah Muhammad SAW. He says that nobody can be punished for apostasy or being non-Muslim after the Prophet who acted as the divine agent when he punished the disbelievers by sword who had rejected the message of God and his messenger even after the truth was made manifest to them. Ghamidi and his associates have written extensively on the topics related to these issues. Meezan Ghamidi (2006: 2) has concluded that: Jihad can only waged against persecution Islamic jihad has

[18]An influential group of Pakistani scholars and religious leaders declared suicide attacks and beheadings as un-Islamic. 'Ulama' (clerics) and 'mushaikh' (spiritual leaders) of the Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnah, who gathered for a convention, declared suicide attacks and beheadings as un-Islamic in a unanimous resolution. Chairman of the Pakistani Ruet-e-Hilal Committee, Mufti Muneeb-ur-Rehman, said in his address that those who were fighting in the name of implementing Shariah or Islamic law must first abide by these same laws and killing minors is contrary to the teachings of Islam. Some contemporary scholars who have followed a textual based approach to the study of the Qur'an with an emphasis over the coherence in the Book and the context of situation offered a radical interpretation on the verses and prophetic narratives that are usually quoted by the militants to promote militancy.

only two purposes : putting an end to persecution even that of the non-Muslims and making the religion of Islam reign supreme in the Arabian peninsula. The latter type was specific for the messenger of God and is no more operative: Jihad should be commanded under a sovereign state. There are strict ethical limits for jihad which do not again allow fighting for example non-combatants. Seen in this perspective acts of terrorism including suicide bombing becomes prohibited.[19]

The terrorism has a firm relation with the sophistication of media technology, they use it as a channel to spread fear rapidly in global scale. Michael Rubin[20] argued that hostage-taking became popular among terrorist groups as a tactic that can hold the attention of a public that had become inured to mass death techniques such as suicide bombing, and that it can garner significant "political and diplomat" payoff. ubin writes that Islamist kidnappers have the additional, "ideological goals" of using hostages both to

---

[19]Islamic terrorism sometimes employs the hijacking of passenger vehicles. The most famous were the "9/11" attacks that killed nearly 3.000 people on a single day in 2001, effectively ending the era of aircraft hijacking. Along with bombings and hijackings, Islamic terrorists have made extensive use of highly publicised kidnappings and executions, often circulating videos of the acts for use as propaganda. A frequent form of execution by these groups is decapitation, another is shooting. In the 1980s, a series of abductions of American citizens by Hezbollah during the Lebanese Civil War resulted in the 1986 Iran–Contra affair. During the chaos of the Iraq War, more than 200 kidnappings foreign hostages (for various reasons and by various groups, including purely criminal) gained great international notoriety, even as the great majority (thousands) of victims were Iraqis. In 2007, the kidnapping of Alan Johnston by Army of Islam resulted in the British government meeting a Hamas member for the first time. Islamist militants, including Boko Haram, Hamas, al-Qaeda and the ISIS, have used kidnapping as a method of fundraising, as a means of bargaining for political concessions, and as a way of intimidating potential opponents.

[20]See, Shaul Shay, *Islamic Terror Abductions in the Middle East* (Sussex Academic Press, 2007).

″shock the outside world″ and to ″appeal to their own constituency″, and that the public humiliation of hostages is a specific Islamist goal. e also deems hostage taking as an effective technique for cowing a population by making governments appear weak and by inspiring fear of opposing the Islamists. e does not regard kidnapping as an effective recruitment technique. In his 2007 book, Islamic Terror Abductions in the Middle East, military historian Shaul Shay (2007 :14) that Islamists consider hostage taking as a strategic tool that can effectively gain concessions from targeted governments.

Kidnapping as political tactic has been practiced by jihadist or Islamist and the JI and the Abu Wardah (Santoso) of the KMIT[21] of Poso have imitated this kind of strategy. In September 2014, the German Foreign Ministry reported that the Islamist militant group Abu Sayyaf had kidnapped two German nationals and was threatening to kill them unless the German government withdraw its support for the war against ISIS and also pay a large ransom. In September 2014 an Islamist militant group kidnapped a French national in Algeria and threatened to kill the hostage unless the government of France withdrew its support for the war against ISIS.

The JI, through the lens of Imam Samudra and Amrozi, tried to give any religious legitimation by saying that taking hostage, kidnapings and other atrocities towards Western is legally accepted by the religion. There is Islamist self-justifications of its right to take non-Muslims hostage, and

[21] Abu Wardah Santoso, wanted since 2007, is the leader of a small East Indonesia Mujahideen command (KMIT) in Poso on the island of Sulawesi.

decapitate, ransom or enslave them. British Muslim cleric Anjem Choudary told The Clarion Project that kidnapping and even beheading hostages is justified by Islam. Kidnapping as revenue has also practced by Nasir al-Wuhayshi leader of the Islamist militant group Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula describes kidnapped hostages as "an easy spoil... which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure." From a somewhat haphazard beginning in 2003, kidnapping grew into the group's main fundraising strategy, with targeted, professional kidnapping of civilians from wealthy European countries - principally France, Spain and Switzerland - illing to pay huge ransoms. US and UK nationals are less commonly targeted since these governments have shown an unwillingness to pay ransom.

In this study, the notions of liminality and communitas to phenomena in complex societies, such as the Darul Islam, the Jamaah Islamiyyah and the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid can be seen as an ideological communitas. Communitas in jihad refers to Turner's concepts of liminality, marginality, inferiority, and equality (Turner 1969a:94-97, 125-130; 1974a:45-55).[22]Turner introduced the concept of communitas to denote the egalitarian feeling of comradeship among the liminal personae as Turner has stated some of millenarian movements in his analysis. The DI, JI, and JAT are encapsulated in an ideological communitas respectively. Boko Haram kidnapped Europeans for the Ransom their governments would pay in the early 2010s,[23] is a kind of

[22] See, Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine Publications, 1969); Victor Turner, "Passages, Margins, and Poverty..."

[23]For example, in the spring of 2013, Boko haram kidnapped and within 2 months released a French family of 7 and 9 other hostages in exchange for a payment by the French government of $3.15 million. According to Yochi Dreazen

ideologica communitas who has place to return to normal strutured society. In September 2014, following the release of ISIS Beheading videos of journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff, British Prime Minister David Cameron appealed to members of the G7 to abide by their pledges not to pay ransom ″in the case of terrorist kidnap.″ Holding foreign journalists as hostages is so valuable to ISIS that Rami Jarrah, a Syrian who has acted as go-between in efforts to ransom foreign hostages, told the Wall Street Journal that ISIS had ″made it known″ to other militant groups that they ″would pay″ for kidnapped journalists. ISIS has also kidnapped foreign-aid workers and Syrians who work for foreign-funded groups and reconstruction projects in Syria. By mid-2014, ISIS was holding assets valued at US$2 billion, which made it the world's wealthiest Islamist group.

According to Islamism expert Jonathan N.C. Hill, under the influence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram had begun kidnapping large numbers of girls and young women for sexual use. The attacks echoed kidnappings of girls and young women for sexual use by Algerian Islamists in the 1990s and early 2000s. Haleh Esfandiari from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars has highlighted the abuse of local women by Islamic State of Iraq

---

writing in Foreign Policy, although ISIS received funding fm Qatar, Kuwait and other Gulf oil states, "traditional criminal techniques like kidnapping", are a key funding source for ISIS. Armin Rosen writing in Business Insider, kidnapping was a "crucial early source" of funds as ISIS expanded rapidly in 2013. n March, upon receiving payment from the government of Spain, ISIS released 2 Spanish hostages working for the newspaper El Mundo, correspondent Javier Espinosa and photographer Ricardo Garcia Vilanova, who had been held since September, 2013. Philip Balboni, CEO of GlobalPost told the press that he had spent "millions" in efforts to ransom journalist James Foley, and an American official told the Associated Press that demand form ISIS was for 100 million ($132.5).

and the Levant militants after they have captured an area. ″They usually take the older women to a makeshift slave market and try to sell them. The younger girls ... are raped or married off to fighters″, she said, adding, ″It′s based on temporary marriages, and once these fighters have had sex with these young girls, they just pass them on to other fighters.″ peaking of Yazidi women captured by ISIS, Nazand Begikhani said ″[t]hese women have been treated like cattle. They have been subjected to physical and sexual violence, including systematic rape and sex slavery. They′ve been exposed in markets in Mosul and in Raqqa, Syria, carrying price tags.″ The UN confirmed in 2014 that 5,000–7,000 Yazidi women and children had been abducted by ISIL and sold into slavery.

The attraction of violence has become a most gravity for Islamism. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant justifies its kidnapping of women as sex slaves citing Islamic theology. The revival (of) slavery before the Hour,′ (of Judgement Day), ublished in the ISIL online magazine, ″Dabiq″, claimed that Yazidi women can be taken captive and forced to become sex slaves or concubines under Islamic law, ″One should remember that enslaving the families of the *kuffar* — the infidels— and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shariah, or Islamic law. Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, a Nigerian extremist group, said in an interview ″I shall capture people and make them slaves.″ when claiming responsibility for the 2014 Chibok kidnapping.

In controlling the captured communities, most Islamism using kidnaping as a political control to the people and

areas. Kidnapping as Psychological warfare when Boko Haram which has been described as using kidnapping as a means of intimidating the civilian population into non-resistance. There is also a strategy in using the internet for recruiting. In the beginning of the 21st century emerged a worldwide network of hundreds of web sites that inspire, train, educate and recruit young Muslims to engage in jihad against America and the West, taking less prominent roles in mosques and community centers that are under scrutiny. Online recruiting has exponentially increased, with Face-book, YouTube and the increasing sophistication of people online.

The Power Shift after the Clash of Civilization

Non-Western countries can attempt to achieve isolation in order to preserve their own values and protect themselves from Western invasion. However, Huntington argues that the costs of this action are high and only a few states can pursue it. According to the theory of ″band-wagoning″ non-Western countries can join and accept Western values. Non-Western countries can make an effort to balance Western power through modernization. They can develop economic, military power and cooperate with other non-Western countries against the West while still preserving their own values and institutions. Huntington believes that the increasing power of non-Western civilizations in inter-national society will make the West begin to develop a better understanding of the cultural fundamentals underlying other civilizations. Therefore, Western civilization will cease to be regarded as ″universal″ but different civilizations will

learn to coexist and join to shape the future world.

In Huntington's view, intercivilizational conflict manifests itself in two forms: fault line conflicts and core state conflicts. Fault line conflicts are on a local level and occur between adjacent states belonging to different civilizations or within states that are home to populations from different civilizations. Core state conflicts are on a global level between the major states of different civilizations. Core state conflicts can arise out of fault line conflicts when core states become involved. These conflicts may result from a number of causes, such as: relative influence or power (military or economic), discrimination against people from a different civilization, intervention to protect kinsmen in a different civilization, or different values and culture, particularly when one civilization attempts to impose its values on people of a different civilization.

Critics of Huntington's ideas[24] often extend their criticisms to traditional cultures and internal reformers who wish to modernize without adopting the values and attitudes of Western culture. But, in general, what have the Msulim of DI, JI and JAT had developed so far, is that we can see culture such as a creative refusal towards other civilization. These critics sometimes claim that to modernize is necessary to become Westernized to a very large extent. In reply, those who consider the Clash of Civilizations thesis accurate often point to the example of Japan, claiming that it is not a Western state at its core. They argue that it adopted much Western technology (also inventing technology of its own in

[24]See, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster: 2011)

recent times), parliamentary democracy, and free enterprise, but has remained culturally very distinct from the West, particularly in its conceptions of society as strictly hierarchical. Contradictory evidence on a more granular scale in turn comes from empirical evidence that greater exposure to factories, schools and urban living is associated with more ′modern′ attitudes to rationality, individual choice and responsibility.

Huntington has fallen under the stern critique of various academic writers, who have either empirically, historically, logically, or ideologically challenged his claims. In an article explicitly referring to Huntington, scholar Amartya Sen argues that ″diversity is a feature of most cultures in the world. Western civilization is no exception. The practice of democracy that has won out in the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that has emerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, and particularly in the last century or so. To read in this a historical commitment of the West—over the millennia—to democracy, and then to contrast it with non-Western traditions (treating each as monolithic) would be a great mistake.

In his book *Terror and Liberalism*, Paul Berman (2003: 22) argues that distinct cultural boundaries do not exist in the present day. He argues there is no ″Islamic civilization″ nor a ″Western civilization″, and that the evidence for a civilization clash is not convincing, especially when considering relationships such as that between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In addition, he cites the fact that many Islamic extremists spent a significant amount of time living and/or studying in the Western world. According to

Berman, conflict arises because of philosophical beliefs various groups share (or do not share), regardless of cultural or religious identity.

Edward Said (2001: 293) issued a response to Huntington's thesis in his article, "The Clash of Ignorance". Said argues that Huntington's categorization of the world's fixed "civilizations" omits the dynamic interdependency and interaction of culture. A longtime critic of the Huntingtonian paradigm, and an outspoken proponent of Arab issues, Edward Said (2004)[25] also argues that the clash of civilizations thesis is an example of "the purest invidious racism, a sort of parody of Hitlerian science directed today against Arabs and Muslims" (Edward Said, 2004: 293). Noam Chomskyhas criticized the concept of the clash of civilizations as just being a new justification for the United States "for any atrocities that they wanted to carry out", which was required after the Cold War as the Soviet Union was no longer a viable threat.

Concerning this region, Huntington departs from Kitsikis contending that a civilizational fault line exists between the two dominant yet differing religions (Orthodox Christianity and Sunni Islam), hence a dynamic of external conflict. However, Kitsikis establishes an integrated civilization comprising these two peoples along with those belonging to the less dominant religions of Shiite Islam, Alevism, and Judaism. They have a set of mutual cultural, social, economic and political views and norms which radically differ from those in the West and the Far East. In the Intermediate Region, therefore, one cannot speak of a civilizational clash

[25] Edward Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," *The Nation,* October 4, 2001.

or external conflict, but rather an internal conflict, not for cultural domination, but for political succession. This has been successfully demonstrated by documenting the rise of Christianity from the hellenized Roman Empire, the rise of the Islamic caliphates from the Christianized Roman Empire and the rise of Ottoman rule from the Islamic caliphates and the Christianized Roman Empire.

Darul Islam —an Islamic religious communities that are closed and radicals in Indonesia— does not recognize the separation of human activities in the domains of religious activity on the one hand, with the domains of activities secular (worldly) on the other. According to Hasan Zaman, Islam manifests itself as a deen, or way of life that is balanced, with a comprehensive conception of worship, covering all aspects of individual and social life, based on the principles of monotheism, mulkiyah, caliphate, treatise, sharia, and ijtihad. Which principles are applied through methods of action and implementation of worship such as prayer, alms, and jihad. Their permanent ideals to establish an Islamic state led by the best Muslims have made them perform a series of actions that are blue-print of their understanding of the ideas and ideals are.

Adhesives for national integration that have occurred as a national political uniformity and a large concentration of real power is commonplace in the politics of the nation state maintenance (Achmad Fedyani Saifuddin, 2011: 46). However, the national regulatory mechanism is disrupted when global selection - my statement is influenced by the natural principle of natural selection in the process of evolutionism no longer want (not favor) forms of the nation-

state as a form of national regulation in this new century. The condition of our country is completely weak in many sectors makes it we become vulnerable to no longer desired in a global selection process. Other figures known theoretical ideas about nationalism, especially Indonesia, is Benedict Anderson (1983: 6) that defines a nation as ″an imagined political community″ and imagined both inherently limited and sovereign. The word ″imagined″ here is meant ″people who define themselves as members of a nation, even though they″ never known, met, or even heard of any other citizen, but in the minds of those living an image (image) of the komunion unity together ″(p. 6). So different from the opinion Gellner more focused on the political aspects of nationalism, Anderson prefers to understand the strength and persistence of identity and national sentiment. The fact that many people are willing to die to defend the nation showed extraordinary strength.

Although Gellner and Anderson [26]focus on different themes, principles and sentiments of identity politics, they actually support each other. Both stressed that the nation is the ideological construction in order to find the link between cultural groups (as defined citizens concerned) and the state, and that they create a community of abstracts (abstract communities) of a different order from the state dynasty or kinship-based communities that were targeted attention anthropology past .[27] Anderson's own attempts to provide

---

[26] See, Benedict R O'Gourman Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 2nd edition.

[27] See, Achmad Fedyani Saifuddin, *Catatan Reflektif Antropologi Sosial Budaya* (Jakarta: Institute Antropologi Indonesia, 2011);. Saifuddin, "Dengan Foucauldian, Menjadi Diri Sendiri," *paper,* presented on discussion of Paradigma Institut Pertanian Bogor, May 24, 2013.

an explanation for the so-called ″anomalies nationalism″. In the view of Marxist and liberal social theories of modernization, nationalism should no longer relevant in the post-Enlightenment world individualist, because it smelled of loyalty primodial nationalism and solidarity-based origins and the same culture. So, if we are now witnessing a ″faltering″ nationalism in Indonesia, this may be caused partly by the entry and development of liberal thought in the social sciences in Indonesia, and become part of the social sciences to think of nation-states and nationalism of our own.

Anthropological study about ethnic boundaries and identity processes may help solve the problem of Anderson. Research on the formation of ethnic identity and the preservation of ethnic identity tends to be most important in situations of uncertainty, change, competition to obtain resources, and threats against those limits. So no surprise that political movements are based on a strong cultural identity in a society that is undergoing modernization, even though this does not mean that these movements became nationalist movements. According to nationalism, ethnic political organizations should be because this organization represents the interests of a particular ethnic group. Instead, the nation-state contains important aspect of political legitimacy which represents the actual mass support as a cultural unit. With the gut feeling among the masses, and no less among the Christians, the interest in the return of the Khilafah has risen high. For the Muslims it is because it is he who is expected to terminate the tyrannous modern devilish civilization.

Obviously, the Ummah will have to get rid of the Jihad-shy regimes, and reform the Shari`ah-shy Muslims, before a Khalifah can be looked for. This is because his first duty would be enforcement of the Shari`ah in full. But, (to take an example), if the Islamic world is teeming with people who cannot enforce the family laws of Islam on themselves or on their home folk, if their women are loitering about without Niqab or Hijab, working for their own bread (but denied butter), and if their sons know more about film actors, sportsmen, fashion models, singers and dancers than about Islam, and refuse to acknowledge that they are required to earn bread (and butter) for their women, then by what magic would the Khalifah turn the whole Ummah into an exemplary pious community submitted to Islam?

Another means of reworking the anthropology of politics and power was to take a new look at the relationships structuring these local societies that typically were at the centre of their ethnographic studies. Some anthropologists began to argue that communities once portrayed as egalitarian, instead possessed some degree of internal inequalities in decision-making and unequal access to resources. Now the question: how is it for a common Muslim to work for the establishment of the Khilafah? The answer is, so long as the case and its surrounding details are understood well, and the objective is clear, there can be no harm, but much to benefit.

That is, one has to be clear about the concept, be sure that his efforts will not create the Khilafah per se, that his exertions might help create the sort of people among whom Khilafah can appear. In other words, those who are working for it,

especially in the non-Muslim environments, are creating the atmosphere of acceptance for it. They are clear that they are preparing the grounds for its appearance somewhere in the world – if not immediately, then some time in future, if not at their place, then elsewhere. The care that is to be observed is that the individuals working for or with any group that endeavors to restore the Khilafah, should not be at the cost of personal development and liberty. In many cases, the groups so working claim the entire time, life, and personality of the individuals who associate with them. The result is, although achievements could or could not be made at the group level, the individual does not develop as he could if all his time and energy were not taken away by the group. In short, the group should not – as has been observed with some other religious movements – be treated as the 'religion' of the individual member, requiring him to submit not the best, but all his time, energies, resources, in short, his whole being. (We use religion here in the sense of something for which the individual's first loyalty is reserved, Islam and Muslims coming next).

A Muslim must learn to differentiate between a political agenda and a religious obligation. The political agenda, even if it is 'Islamic political agenda' – limited by its very ideology – endeavors at the fulfillment of the agenda of the party, while a purely Islamic agenda aims at benefiting Islam and Muslims, groups and individuals, in this world and the next – whether of the party, or against the party – a friend or foe, with non-Muslims not missing their benefits. A political agenda assures the success of the party in question, without any assurance of the growth and flowering of the individuals involved, whereas a purely religious agenda

assures the success of the individual standing sinless in front of his Lord on the Day of Judgment, while having fully performed his services to Islam, Muslims and mankind in this life. A political agenda requires a careful study of its literature, ideology, leadership, culture and methodology, to assess its Islam-ness, while a religious agenda requires the study of Islamic sources (primarily the Qur'an and Sunnah), with the Prophet as the role-model, to attain an understanding and undertakings of Islamic causes, independent of outside influences.

In anthropology can be found also theories about ritual symbols which in the context of this discussion also illustrates the duality of meaning and politics, the common good we find in the study of ethnicity and nationalism studies. Quoting Victor Turner (1969: 108)"symbols multivokal because it has a polar instrumental and sensory (meaning)". That is why, Turner's opinion is relevant to what is stated Anderson (1991) that nationalism draws its strength from the combination of political legitimacy and emotional strength. In line with the above, an anthropologist another, Abner Cohen (suggests that politics can not be completely instrumental, but must always involve symbols containing the power to create loyalty and a sense of belonging. Anthropologists who study nationalism generally regard this issue as a variant of ethnicity. Of course, the question that may arise if nationalism is discussed in or as part of an ethnicity, and nationalism based on ethnicity was imaginable - if we follow the view Anderson - then what nationalism is built not by ethnicity?

Researchers of nationalism emphasize the aspects of modern

and abstract. Anthropological perspectives is particularly important here because the anthropologists prefer explores nasionalsme character and nation-specific and unique through comparisons with, or thought that is rooted in small-scale societies. In this perspective, the people (nation) and the nationalist ideology at least appears as ″equipment″ symbolic for the ruling classes in society, that without it the nation's symbolic equipment susceptible threatened schism. Most experts argue that nationalism and national community can have strong roots in the ethnic community before or ethnies, but undoubtedly not appropriate to claim that the continuity of pre-modern society or community ″ethnic culture″ became a national well preserved. Norwegian example shows that tradition and other national symbols have a different meaning in the modern context than in the past meaning, state concept in anthropology is an extension of the concepts of ethnicity, ethnic group, ethnicity, which in each concept is the concept of national-ism enveloping well as giving spirit. In this context the state is a form of organizing citizens are intrinsically derived from the nationalities or ethnic groups. The concept of the nation-state, for example, clearly shows the orientation of this anthropological thinking.[28]

Viewed from this perspective, a successful nationalism determined by the ideology of ethnic entanglement with the state apparatus. The nation-state, as well as many other political systems, looking at the importance of ideology that

[28]. See, Ahmad Fedyani Saefuddin, "Kesukuan, Nasionalisme dan Multikulturalisme," at *http://interseksi.org/essays/kesukubangsaan-nasionalisme-dan-multikulturalisme*, 2007; S.N.Nordholt, N. S., "Violence and The Anarchy Of The Modern Indonesian State," *Nijmegen Studies In Development And Cultural Change,* 2002.

political boundaries should be mutually supportive with the boundaries of culture. Furthermore, state-bangsaa have a monopoly on eligibility for the tax levy, and that acts of violence against citizens who are considered to deviate from the will of the state. This monopoly is the most important source of power (Saifuddin, 2006: 2). The nation state has administrative bureaucracy and laws written that covers all citizens, and have a uniform education system throughout the country, and the labor market are the same for all citizens. This process, if we follow the Victor Turner concept of communitas, will inevitably lead to structure and law, after which a new form of communitas may rise again (Turner 1974, 82).[29]

Almost all the nation-states in the world have a national language which is used for official communications. A distinctive feature of the nation state is the concentration of power that is extraordinary. Quite clear that Indonesia is one example of a nation-state. From our discussion of anthropological perspectives on nationalism and of the above, it can be argued that the Indonesian nation-state is now facing great challenges, which if we do not successfully confront and conquer these challenges, it can be predicted that the unitary Republic of Indonesia is about to expire. But if we have an agreement and commitment that this is the final state unity, then we need to consider carefully the challenges we face, and the tasks that we have implemented to deal with it. We argue that multiculturalism is the most appropriate alternative to rebuild the nation's integration, though not yet found a model of multiculturalism as what is

[29] See, Victor Turner, "Passages, Margins, and Poverty..."

most appropriate for Indonesia. Their opinions are correct, because in the process of multiculturalism approach more relevant to address the issue of nationality and national integration that is now required is able to respond to the challenges of change.

***

REFERENCES:

Anderson, Benedict R O'Gourman. 1991. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. 2nd edition. London: Verso.

Bateson, Gregory. 1935. "Culture contact and schismogenesis." *Man*, Vol.35.

Bateson, Gregory.1972. *Steps to an ecology of mind*. New York: Ballantine Books

Bujra, J. M. 1973. The Dynamics Of Political Action: A New Look At Factionalism. *American Anthropologist*, Vol.75, No.1.

Graeber, David. 2013. "Culture as Creative Refusal." *Cambridge Anthropology*, Vol. 31, No.2.

Louis, Dumont. 1986. *Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1986.

Louis, Dumont. 1994. *German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back. Chicago*: University of Chicago Press.

Lund Drolet, Patricia. 1984. *The Congo ritual of Northeastern Panama: an Afro-American Expressive Structure of Cultural Adaptation*. Dissertation,. 1984.

Nicholas, R. W. 1968. *A Reply to Beals and Siegel.* American Anthropologist.

Nordholt, N. S. 2002. "Violence and The Anarchy Of The Modern Indonesian State." *Nijmegen Studies In Development And Cultural Change,* Vol.37.

Said, Edward. 2001. "The Clash of Ignorance." *The Nation,* October 4, 2001

Saifuddin, Achmad Fedyani. 2007. "Kesukuan, Nasionalisme dan Multikulturalisme", at *http://interseksi.org/essays/kesukubangsaan-nasionalisme-dan-multikulturalisme*

Saifuddin, Achmad Fedyani. 2011. *Catatan Reflektif Antropologi Sosial Budaya*, Jakarta: Institute Antropologi Indonesia.

Saifuddin, Achmad Fedyani. 2013 . "Dengan Foucauldian, Menjadi Diri Sendiri", paper in discussion on Paradigma Institut Pertanian Bogor, May 24, 2013.

Samudra, Imam. 2004. *Aku Melawan Teroris*. Solo: Jazeera.

Samuel P. Huntington, 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Shay, Shaul. 2007. *Islamic Terror Abductions in the Middle East.* Sussex Academic Press.

Solahudin. 2015. *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah*, National University of Singapore.

Turner, Victor. 1969. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure.* Chicago: Aldine Publications.

Turner, Victor. 1974. "*Passages, margins, and poverty: religious symbols of communitas*." Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society.

Turner, Victor. 1974. "Passages, margins, and poverty: religious symbols of communitas." *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* (1974).

__________________, "Abdullah Azzam, Ulama Pencinta Syuhada, Syahid di Hari Jum'at." *http://www.eramuslim.com/profil/abdullah-azzam-ulama-pencinta-syahid-syahid-di-hari-jumat.htm*

THE SPLIT OF "DARUL ISLAM /NEGARA ISLAM INDONESIA (DI/NII)" INTO FACTIONAL RADICAL GROUPS IN INDONESIA

AFTER the martyrdom of SM Kartosoewirjo, The Darul Islam marked by idealism and aggressive crusading spirit supporting a social, political, economic or religious cause and then become a belief with great ensthusiasm and energy to stand against the secular state of Republic of Indonesia. After the collapse of the Soekarno administration indonesia, at the end of 1960s, priority of the New Order government was in controlling inflation and high economic growth. Foreign capital began to enter so that industrialization began working and Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita) first created in 1968. In the 1970s and early 1980s soaring oil prices on the world market that the New Order was able to build and control inflation and create high economic growth. To gain the foregn investment, the Soeharto government had to assure that there will be no sosial or political unrest and rebellion in Indonesia.

High economic growth does not make people free from poverty due to economic growth that is only enjoyed by a few people. The negative impact of economic conditions in Indonesia during the New Order, among others: (1) Dependence on oil and gas. Oil and gas is one of the main sources of income for the state budget. So the price of oil and gas devastating for the state revenue that falling oil prices led to declining state revenues. (2) Dependence on Foreign

Aid. Due to reduced revenue from oil and gas, the government rescheduling of the project - construction of existing projects, particularly those using foreign currencies. Ensuring an increase in non-oil commodity exports and final request an increase in foreign loans to countries - developed countries. In 1983, Indonesia is the seventh largest country in the amount of debt and in 1987 up to fourth.

The end of the 1970s, the development process in Indonesia suffered ″non market failure″ so a lot of hassles in the process of development, for example the outbreak of widespread radicalism desite the poverty and income disparity, mainly due to the ″market failure″.Approaching the mid-1980s, there is a failure of government (non market) in the adjusting mechanism of the performance of the market dynamics. Indonesian economy faces severe challenges due to the deterioration of the foreign exchange earnings from oil exports in the early 1980s. The New Order government has begun the policy of trapping[1] and destroying the Darul Islam in order not to harm the process of development.

However, despite the group being dismantled, underground networks have persisted. In the 1970s and 1980s, there were occurrences of ′Islamic′ terrorism attributed to a group known as Komando Jihad. The leaders arrested from this group were found to be Darul Islam veterans.

[1] See, Herdi Sahrasad & Al-Chaidar, *Islamism & Fundamentalism*...; Al Chaidar & Herdi Sahrasad, *Negara Madinah*...

Table4.1

No	Faction	Aproximate Members
1	Abdul Fatah Wirananggapati	5,000
2	Abdul Jabbar	2,000
3	Abdul Qadir Baraja	30,000
4	Abdullah Said	20,000
5	Abu Bakar Ba'asyir	10,000
6	Abu Fatihor Abu Hamzah	5,000
7	Abu Kholish	5,000
8	Abu Toto	50,000
9	Abu Wardan	3,000
10	Abubakar Misbah	10,000
11	Aceng Kurnia	10,000
12	Adi SMK	1,000
13	Aef Saifulloh	5,000
14	Ajengan Masduki	20,000
15	Ali AT	20,000
16	Bahrum	5,000
17	Banjarmasin	5,000
18	Broto	1,000
19	Budi Santoso	10,000
20	Emeng Abdurrahman	10,000
21	Fahru	10,000

22	Gaos Taufik	10,000
23	Helmi Danu Muhammad Hasan	20,000
24	Karsidi	1,500
25	Lukman	5,000
26	Mamin	10,000
27	Misi Islam	10,000
28	Munir Fatah	10,000
29	Mursalin Dahlan	10,000
30	Musodiq	10,000
31	Omo	5,000
32	Qaidatul Jihad	9,000
33	Tahmid Rahmat Basuki Kartosuwiryo	20,000
34	Tawaw	5,000
35	Ules Suja'i	5,000
36	Yasir	2,500
37	Yunus	1,000
38	Yusuf Kamil Alnafi	5,000
	Total	376,000

SM Kartosuwirjo as Imam addressed testament at a meeting with the commander/warrior (Mujahid) in 1959, "I (Imam) saw signs of wind disaster that will wipe out the entire mujahid except that stayed just handing over seed truely a

fighting mujahid to maintain a permanent establishment of the Islamic State Indonesia, as proclaimed on August 7, 1949. While the wind disaster, should you remember this all my testament: (1) friend will be the opponent, and the opponent will be friend; Commander will be a footsoldier, footsoldier will become Commander; Mujahid will be outdoors Mujahid, outside mujahid will be a mujahid; (2) If the Mujahidin have broken, remember! ″It was more evil than the devil″ because he knows secret strategy of our struggle, while the enemy does not know. For the sake of continuity remains the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia, then shoot him; (3) If the priest is absent, and you are disconnected with the Commander, and left only soldier petit alone, the soldier must be able to perform so petit Imam; (4) If the priest gave shoot only, because it means the devil if the priest instructed continue to fight, follow it as a servant of Allah; (5) If you lose the requisite struggle, continue the struggle for Pancasila is still there, even though the teeth stay one, and use that one to bite. (6) If you are still in a state of jihad, remember that security as a poison. (7) At the end of it, he will say ″If you want to have a prosperous prosperous Indonesia and blessing of Allah, then resist Soekarno. If you are intending to Indonesia prosperous prosperous but the curse of Allah, then shoot me and join the Soekarno state, which do you choose? When it all officers and soldiers were left wept with emotion and determined to stand behind Imam to defend NII from military attack of RIS.[2]

[2] See, Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam...*

Even SM Kartosoewirjo thus fostering painstaking apparatus and army to behave islamically. However, as a result of the revolution that truly urgent situation then in such a situation, at that time the Islamic State of Indonesia enforced with some limitations, especially regarding the quality of the fighters. Among them there are approximately five types NII guerrillas who fought in the middle of the turmoil of war [3]:

First, the special cadre has been prepared for the position and function of vital functions within the structure of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Long before the revolution proclamation echoed Imam SM Kartosoewirjo has galvanized them in Suffah Institute in Malangbong. They were not only brave and ready martyred for this sacred task, but they actually departed from the soul as pure as pure monotheism, high science and smart as high as clever stratagem. Ready to lead the battle, ready also to manage the state in time of victory has been achieved. Able to maintain themselves and become role models for other mujahidin-both in peacetime and in wartime. And they are always at the forefront of leading the struggle front, build awareness of the people in the fight against falsehood, the journey of jihad NII's cadre selection martyrdom gained much in advance. Due to the lack of cadres who understand exactly step strategy NII struggle, eventually traveling jihad NII can shift to the other direction depending on who joined him. Imam has continued to lead until 1962, but the management of a large number of cadres with little statesmen, make the running state is no longer as planned.

[3]See, Al Chaidar, *Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia...*

Second, fighters who joined because consciousness is driven by the knowledge that he has, although not specifically cadred Suffah Institute. So the flavor loyal to the NII limited view of himself alone, not necessarily in line with the mission and vision of NII as proclaimed before the proclamation. With awareness of their knowledge, he hastened to support and defend the Islamic State, with his consciousness he left "*Darul Kufur*" (infidel state) Republic of Indonesia, but due to limited awareness emerged of him, especially in the current turmoil of the war, the process of equalization vision mujahidin thought rather difficult. This is due to the demands of the state to prioritize defense, fighting back the onslaught of military forces that continually bombard the base region area. Time to sit together; discuss the course of the country, at the level of the area to the bottom commandment relative rather difficult. TII army troops finally slowly metamorphed in particularities of each depending on the background of the thinking of the struggle before the merge with the NII. Footsteps led force commander coming from Suffah, be different from the character of the army led by a *kiay* of a Pesantren which emphasizes values of mysticism for example. However, due to a genuine consciousness before, they become formidable fighters defending mujahid Islamic state. In Central Java of which is kiay Ghafur Ismail. He martyred when they were in West Java in 1962 has been dropped. Kiayi Ghafur do not want to give up, despite together his relatives were ambushed by the army of the Republic. He had been shot. Then after martyred, then she took the weapon from him directly hit the enemy, but ran out of bullets, then his wife is also a martyr. Then, as is the

case also in West Java, Kiayi Khoer Affandi of Manonjaya he joined the NII just because science, and after descending the mountain Kiayi Khoir Affandi did not design the subsequent guerrilla tactics to garner NII this greatest gift of Allah, but open Pesantren. Although it is the spirit of monotheism and jihad spirit so strong, her love was in the NII is not in doubt, but he is not a statesman who continues to defend the existence of the Islamic State as befits a country is maintained.

Third, guerrillas and the people who joined the fight when the revolution (physical war) begins. In an atmosphere like this, when the need is so urgent combat power, as well as the need for both the people who support, then the recruitment process becomes less attention to quality elements again. At those times, which were ready to help rebels, who support the mujahidin, then he can be fought with. No longer see the extent of the depth of knowledge, depth of consciousness and whether what they know about the vision of an Islamic state or not, because of the urgent need for such workers then accepted them as TII forces and citizens fighting NII. The problem that arises then is, difficulty maintaining hygiene image NII struggle itself, because morals when fighting, both patience and perseverance, or morals when they interact with the public is not the same. Unlike the first cadre of truly educated with the values of the struggle of the Prophet. Insurgents who joined in the middle of this road sometimes stepping on the basis of his own accord and ignoring morality Muslim army. In this case NII forced to bear the responsibility of the group, although it was carried out not by the cadres, then all their undisciplined actions reflect badly on the image of the

Islamic State.

Fourth, the guerrillas of defectors from the military to the TII, when troops returned from Yogyakarta to the Republic of West Java, they were intercepted by his comrades who did not participate retreat to Yogya, they were told that now in West Java has been proclaimed Islamic State, as container who enforce the laws of God perfectly. Hearing that armed with a sincere conscience impulse then immediately join the TII. For example Kadar Solihat a TNI officer who later joined the NII, and become Indonesian Islamic Army officers.

Fifth, the fighter who was born and grew out of the area that was overrun by TII, although they are not of local students or kiayi. They were never a period of cadre, even letters Al Fatihah, many who did not know what it means. However, because the area can be controlled by TII and then into the base, then over time know the purpose of Darul Islam. Even interested in such a TII character franchises, making them even forged into the cadre mujahid anyway can not even be considered trivial. Because in fact in 1962 the month of June alone from one of the areas in Brebes, there are many good men and women there are still left for the jungle guerrilla whereas previously it had been a lot pamphlet of the enemy whose contents that Darul Islam in West Java has been a cease fire, from the jihadists NII not all surrendered to the enemy, that this is Sunnattullah. The people of DI eschatologically considered this situation as what the words of Allah:"Among the believers there who fulfill what they have promised to God; then in between them there are (also) are waiting for (what God promised to him), and they are not in the least changed the (promise)."(QS33: 23).

In addition to the above five elements there are also those who deliberately infiltrated the enemy into the body TII, to manipulate people who have faded spirit of jihad and down to the town. Of those who have taken to the city where they gain entry into the government center NII, as is done by Sergeant Ukon Sukandi. More potential again to destroy the Muslim people's support for the struggle of Islam that jihadists do this is; the wild forces that deliberately uses the markTII identification, then perform actions on the brutal killing any scholars who support the struggle of NII, robbed and burned down the house of houses suspected of siding with the Darul Islam and damaging the honor of their ladies. Supported by mass media which is controlled by the government of the Republic of Indonesia, the rise of news bad news about the Darul Islam. The call gangs, robbers even identifiedDI with *duruk imah* (Sundanese: means 'burn the houses').

The next episode of the DI actions were a series of bloody fighting for an abode of Islam, an Islamic State in Indonesia with those high cost of humanity. The below table shows calamities affected by the messianic power in Indonesia:

Table 4.1

Terrorism Related Bombs in Indonesia (1957-1991)

No.	Time	Place	Event
1	30 November 19 57	Cikini, Central Jakarta	A bomb blast in college Cikini complex in an attempt to assassinate President Sukarno ("Events Cikini"). The perpetrator group Anti-Communist Movement (GAK) led by Colonel

			Zulkifli Lubis, Chairman of the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement (GPII) branch Gambir Saleh Ibrahim.
2	11 November 1976	Nurul Iman Mosque, Padang, West Sumatra (West Sumatra).	The government calls made by a figure Komando Jihad.
3	December 1976	Medan, North Sumatra (North Sumatra).	Hotel Apol, the Methodist Church, and the Cinema Riang.
4	March 20, 1978	Some places in Jakarta	A group of youths do blasting with Molotov cocktails, and burning cab to disturb the general session of the MPR.
5	14 April 1978	Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta	Blast of bomb with TNT.
6	March 11, 1981	Police Office (Kantor Kosekta) 65, Cicendo, Bandung, West Java	Offices attacked by Jemaah Imran, four policemen were killed. The attackers wanted to free members of Jemaah Imran detained by police. Two police weapons seized and used for air piracy Woyla
7	March 28, 1981	Piracy Garuda DC-9 or events Woyla	Perpetrators of 5 people, the leadership of Imran, Komando Jihad. Acts of terrorism motivated Jihad.
8	October 4, 1984	BCA office in Jalan Gajah Mada, Taft, and Shopping Complex Glodok, West Jakarta.	Protests against the 1983 Tanjung Priok incident. Kabah Youth Movement.

9	December 24, 1984	Southeast Asia Bible Seminary Building and Church Sasana Budaya, Malang, East Java (East Java).	-
10	January 20, 1985	Borobudur, Central Java (Central Java)	Protests against the 1983 Tanjung Priok incident
11	March 16, 1985	Bus explosion in Pemudi Express in Banyuwangi, East Java	The culprit is Abdulkadir Al Habsy, members of taklim. This case is also associated with blasting Borobudur which also protested the events Tanjung 1983. The explosives used were TNT bars PE 808 / type Dahana.
12	May 14, 1986	Bomb blasted in three places: Wisma Metropolitan at Jl.Sudirman, in the Fair JKT, and rocket attacks on the American Embassy, Japan and Canada were launched from room 827 President t Hotel, Jl. MH. Thamrin	An organization calling itself "Anti-Imperialist International Brigade" in Japan claimed responsibility for the terror bombing. According to the Japanese National Police culprit was Tsutomu Shirosaki of the Red Army, an extremist organization left Japan in retreat.
13	30 September 1991	Mini Hotel, Surabaya, East Java	- Perpetrators unknown. The explosives were used is potassium - Usual used to bomb fish.

Source: Sarie Febriane, Compiled from Kompas News Daily.

In Indonesia never was a movement of the nation who are trying to build the rule of Islam, namely the Islamic State of Indonesia who managed proclaimed, August 7, 1949, and managed to maintain its existence until 13 years (1949-1962). But the regime has manipulated history with at will, so that Muslims themselves do not recognize clearly its past history.

Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo is a name that is quite problematic and controversial in the country of Indonesia, from the past to the present. That he was known as a rebel, we must straighten. Not only for the sake of correcting erroneous historical facts or intentionally misrepresented, but also that historical injustice does not continue against a figure that should be respected.

During Soekarno's power (1947-1949) which is the peak of the struggle of the Islamic State of Indonesia, SM. Kartosuwirjo is known as a rebel. But the actual fact is, indeed Kartosuwirjo savior figures for Indonesia, more than what was done by the nationalist leaders Sukarno and other leaders. At the time Soekarno with the army of the Republic moved to Yogyakarta as a result of Renville Agreement, which states that the region Indonesia just stay Yogya and surrounding it, and the remaining area that was, disputed between the Netherlands and Indonesia, which at that time was almost the Unitary Republic of Indonesia is not there anymore. And that there is a simply state the union, both of which have been formed, and are still in the process of completing the requirements of state. Such as West Java, when it is recommended by the Dutch State in order to form a Sundanese, but has not yet formed at all, because of the lack of completeness of state.

When all the events mentioned above, the political atmosphere clung archipelago, at the time of Indonesia in the vacuum of state power. At that time, Sukarno ordered all troops to be moved to Yogyakarta by Renville Agreement. To give Islamic legitimacy, and to deceive the Muslims of Indonesia in moving troops to Yogya, Sukarno was manipulating terminology of the Qur'an by using the term "*hijrah*" to refer to the movement of troops of the Republic, so that seems islamic and was not impressed escape. But SM Kartosuwirjo with troops not easily fooled, and refused to move to Yogya. Even with his troops, he tried to maintain the region of West Java, and named Sukarno and his army as a wild force that ran away from the battlefield.

Long before independence, namely in the 1930s, the term "migration" has been introduced, and is used as a brilliant modern methods of struggle by BC Kartosuwirjo, based on its interpretation of the Sirah Nabawiyah. At that time, in 1934 has emerged two methods of struggle that cooperative and non cooperative. Non cooperative method, meaning does not want to get into the parliament and cooperate with the Dutch government, but is passive, not trying to deal with existing authorities. This method is actually influenced by politics of Swadeshi, political Mahatma Gandhi of India. Then came SM Kartosuwirjo Hijrah method, a method which seeks to form their own community, without the cooperation and active, trying to fight the colonial power.

However, at that time, this method was heavily criticized by Agus Salim; because it considers SM Kartosuwirjo apply the method to move this in a society that has not been politically literate. So he then tried to instill political and methods to

move it to the members of PSII in particular. With expectations after political understanding, they want to use this method, because of political ideology is very important. However, Agus Salim rejected it, because he did not agree with the politics. According to folk or just party members should know the problem without knowing the organizational mechanisms ongoing political constellation, and only the elite leaders who should know. While ″migrated″ is trying to withdraw from the political debate, and then trying to form its own ranks and tried to force himself to anticipate system that is not quite progressive struggle and not Islamic. It is this factor which initiated the split PSII, which gave birth to PSII Hijrah employing methods to move and PSII wake-led Agus Salim.

Although the method of *hijrah*, for some political leaders at the time, seems impossible to be used as a method of struggle, but it turns out to be effective in 1949 with the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia which was proclaimed under the banner Bismillahirrahmaniirrahim. So it is worth, if we do not pay attention to a series of previous history carefully, it was supposed that the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia means a state within a state, since the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 had previously done.

But actually if we understand history correctly and fairly, then the position of the Islamic State of Indonesia and Indonesia is the country with the state. Because only a RI state Yogyakarta region at that time, while the Islamic State of Indonesia is located in West Java and expanded (expansion) region. Central Java, South Kalimantan, South

Sulawesi and Aceh to support the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia. And that support is not just a statement or rhetorical, but joined in revolutionary. Probably it's true, that the Islamic State of Indonesia is the only movement of the people who greeted so lively in some regions in Indonesia.

Seeing such a warm welcome from other Muslim brothers, then the regime of Sukarno attempted to impede the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia together with AH Nasution, a Muslim military leaders are proud of until now, but it turns out to have a negative contribution in the development of the Islamic State of Indonesia. He along with Sukarno attempted to cover all ha l which allows SMKartosuwirjo and Indonesia Islamic State back up in the community, such as hiding place of execution and the tomb of the Islamic mujahid.

It appeared now that the actual ruler of Orla and Order, have committed crimes and political history as well, which is a very big sin that it is hard to forgive. Might be likened, almost the same as idolatry in the religious sense, which is the greatest sin in Islam. Because of their political behavior bluntly showed, have misled the public in understanding the history of Islam in Indonesia struggles with the truth. Various political engineering to manipulate history has done to the smallest of the struggles as well as personal SM Kartosuwirjo. Like the family of data conversion, date and year of birth. All that is intended to allow Islamic State of Indonesia away from public memory. Nevertheless, SM Kartosuwirjo not seeking to avenge government actions of RI. Never once Army Trial Court (Mahadper) offers to apply

for a pardon (forgiveness) to the president Sukarno, for the death penalty that had been inflicted upon him was canceled, but the chivalry he replied, "I will never ask forgiveness to the man who called Soekarno". Assertion and consistent as it is commonly found on every member of Darul Islam in Indonesia. They are also adept at playing equipment violence are like small arms and homemade bombs.

So it is not strange if during 1962-2003, Indonesia has recorded dozens of bomb explosions occurred in a small and large scale, half occurred in Jakarta. Note begins with a bomb blast that occurred in the complex in an assassination attempt College Cikini first president of Indonesia, Soekarno, in 1962. The following are a number of events related to the violence which werelinked to Darul Islam:

11 November 1976: At Masjid Nurul Iman, Padang. The culprit is TimsarZubin, figures the government called Komando Jihad. But, Timsar not been discovered until now; 20March , 1978: A group of young men doing blasting at several places in Jakarta with Molotov cocktails, burning cars and taxis to disrupt the president's general assembly MPR; 14 April 1978: Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta. Until now, the explosion of a bomb with the explosive TNT was still so mysterious; 4October, 1984: A bomb blast in the BCA bank, West Jakarta. The culprit is Muhammad Jayadi, members of the Ka'ba Youth Movement (child organization Development Party) because of protests against the Jayadi Tanjung Priok incident 1983which is not known as a member of the Ka'ba Youth Movement and then was sentenced to 15 years after claiming to be the perpetrator

blasting.At the same time, also there was an explosion in the BCA and Shopping Complex Glodok, Jakarta with actors Chairul Yunus alias Melta Halim, Tasrif Tuasikal, Hasnul Arifin who is also a member of the Youth Movement of the Kaaba. They were sentenced to prison and dismissed from the membership of the Ka'ba Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah).In addition, the explosion also occurred in the BCA Jalan Gajah Mada, Central Jakarta with actors Edi Ramli, also a member of the Youth Movement of the Kaaba. While the bombing mastermind, is still mysteriously at large, but Eddie was sentenced to prison.The series of cases of blasting the BCA office dragging some figures Petition 50, such as HM Sanusi, AM Fatwa (both jailed, witnesses say they were tortured), and HR Dharsono.

December 24, 1984: Southeast Asia Bible Seminary Building (TIME), Jalan Margono, Malang, East Java. Not known who was responsible.

January 20, 1985: Borobudur temple in Central Java, did not escape from the bomb blast targets. The culprit was a preacher, Husein Ali Al Habsy which also at the background motive of protests against the 1983 Tanjung Priok incident Hussein rejected accusations of involvement in the bombing of Borobudur and accused Mohammad Jawad, who was not caught, as the mastermind. At first, Hussein rewarded life imprisonment. But then obtain a pardon from the Habibie government on March 23, 1999.

March 16, 1985: the bombing of passanger of a bus, Pemudi Express, in Banyuwangi, East Java. The culprit is Abdulkadir Al Habsy, member of the taklim. This case is also associated with blasting Borobudur which also protested the events

Tanjung 1983. The explosives used were TNT bars.

Darul Islam suffered fragmentation and factionalization that quite thick and deep. Many epigones and radical Islamic organizations and terrorist movements originating from the Darul Islam. For example, AMDI (Young Generation of Darul Islam). Until now there has been structured as yet undeclared. According to a tentative schedule set, AMDI will be declared in December 2005 in Solo and is now the new emerging movement formation. Regional Coordinator AMDI that has been formed that is in Solo (leader: Saleh Ibrahim) and Yogyakarta (leader Abdurrahman). The extent of the activities carried out consolidation and new members gathered cadre of paramilitary Islamic hardliners.

After the martyrdom proclaimed Islamic State of Indonesia SM Kartosoewirjo, many important events in furtherance of political resistance struggle of Muslims and the Islamic State of Indonesia on future generations. After the end of a regime Old Order, New Order government and the Army from the beginning has been fully aware of the existence of the possibility of rising Muslim political prestige. Starting when the fall of the strength of PKI which has failed in his coup action then formally reinforced by political decisions issued by the government about the dissolution of the party PKI, has indirectly raised the political image of Islam in the stage of the national struggle. Which it of any Islamic political parties denounced and condemned many of the PKI treatment and they demanded the government to immediately resolve the PKI this case, and thus in the structure of political power maps Indonesia at that time there was an imbalance (imbalance). Symptoms that arise

from their political defeat PKI makes Muslims were any wind, and the symptoms were arrested by the government with a political prediction that Muslims have a tendency to want to strengthen his position. Where the force that will destroy the secular nationalist ideals that have made Pancasila as the state of the Republic of Indonesia. And it is well recognized by the Army, that in the Muslim community there are the seeds of extremism that very potential could one day rise to the surface.

Then on December 21, 1966 announcement of a political statement by the officers of the Army soldiers that they "will take firm action against anyone, of any party, and any group that would deviate from the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as it has been done by Rebellion The Communist Party in Madiun, Gestapu, Darul Islam ... and Masjoemi-Indonesian Socialist Party .... "

For the above a lot of political engineering conducted by the New Order government through the intelligence agency's operations against Muslims in all segments of life. While still growing political power of Muslims, during which the movement can interfere with the wheels of the New Order government that is looking for its identity, so it is desirable damping even destruction. It is exactly as has been hinted at by Allah in the

Where and until whenever, as long as Islam is believed by his people as Minhajul life, the only way of life that should be enforced, during which the forces of the infidels and polytheists will establish cooperation to work together in reducing the rate of Islam. And the possibility that the worst that would be obtained by the Muslims of such cooperation

is how they eradicate the terrorists by force of arms is supported by military forces.

To anticipate any current strength of political Islam, the New Order government and the missionaries run some patterns of action through the secret agency. The first target they shake with the political engineering is Parmusi party (Indonesian Muslim Party); the Government did its engineering to Parmusi seeing that in Masjoemi still many entrenched Islamic politicians who have Islamic militancy that has the potential to revive the mission of Islam in the event of elections by making Muslims as a base of supporters. Therefore, the New Order government took a policy against this party. On 5 February 1968, General Suharto announced that the Government approved the establishment Parmusi Party, but the Government does not allow anyone to former party leader Masjoemi play a role in the management of the party, and to them are encouraged to wait until after the elections. Likewise about Marriage Bill, on 31July 1973, when the government proposedmarriage Bill to Parliament. Then Bill got a strong reaction from Muslims. Peak, more than 300 Muslim students stormed into Parliament and make damage when the Minister of Religious Mufti Ali was reading the government's response in the House of Representatives plenary session.

Besides, the government of New Order political maneuver against traditional Islam as NU—postscript has many followers, intelligence agencies were represented by Opsus (special squad) do political intrigue by creating mass organizations GUPPI (Joint Enterprise Renewal of Islamic Education)— with leaders who called Ramadi, in raising the

people to be Golkar voters. They hope with through the organization formed, strength of Muslims can be suppressed. Furthermore, after joining the Muslims in this GUPPI milling machine, with systematic intelligence agencies working on the traditional Islamic masses for withdrawal as an advocate and defender of Golkar. Thus the New Order government implements its policy strategy, which in essence is how to control the Muslims.

Likewise with the intelligence agency Special Operation (Opsus) program to do the same against the former Darul Islam fighters, they make sophisticated engineering-engineering of the Darul Islam fighters with a pattern of "fishing and nets", the fighters gathered in a container and then sacrificed to via bloody events. As if those Islamist fighters have always wanted to have a confrontation with the armed forces and the ruling party, the action rioting, rebellion and so forth. With the creation of the atmosphere of the intersection of what the wishes of the tyrannical rulers granted, which make Muslims feel allergic to the Islamic State and always shut down when she told. It's a very cruel act, like the abominations that the king Pharaoh when at the time of the Prophet Moses.

Genesis engineering a bright picture of the New Order government, that they do not want at all Islamic political resistance fought by the Muslims in general and the Darul Islam fighters in particular to develop Islamic ideology in the political arena. What they want is that Islam was limited to a mere spirituality without interfering in the affairs of state. Thus the plot plan which is being championed by taghut, to empower Muslims as a political commodity for

human beings ignorant (ignorant).

The most viable and prominent in its efforts to implement Ali Murtopo's divide et impera towards people Islam` in Darul Islam is a holy struggle. According saving him, who and where people do not become a problem, if not invited to cooperate it will be embraced to jointly implement the program Opsus devil. One mode of operation Murtopo is to collect the greedy generals to be involved in every action Opsus. With expertise in mass embrace, he aplenty harness Islamic forces not only against fighters Darul Islam but also against the forces of former Permesta, Masjoemi. Various approaches her journey including material to be intensified later after they were persuaded and put them into a "cage" they had prepared. With the theory of 'rising' —which in theory was outlined that the absence of friends and enemies.Ali Murtopo run tactics and strategy in fostering these forces for the sake of political interests.

Already since the early 1970s, Murtopo entered alliances with a number of fighters DI. When it Murtopo actively go to West Java to pull them to Jakarta, previously fighters --- which is still below the target Siliwangi Military Command Bandung --- among others, Dodo Kartosuwirjo, some of them are like Adah Jailani, Danu Muhammad Hasan. But the policy line that was created by Murtopo to approach fighters DIthat cause problems in the body Bakin (Indonesian Intelligence Agency). Indeed, after all the name of the struggle of Islam that should not require alliances with tyrannical rulers. In fact there should be appearing on the brave speak the truth in front of a tyrant ruler. By convening Special Operation (Opsus) by the government, among

military officials themselves much surprised and shocked, why Ali Murtopodare embrace the Darul Islam fighters. According to the Chairman of Bakin Sutopo Juwono, he had several times warned Ali Moertopo so do not mess with Darul Islam fighters. Because he said, could be the Darul Islam fighters will love all sorts, because the feeling has come destroying PKI services of all kinds, they can claim the promise later. Then it is better not to. The warning essentially signaled to Ali that one of the two possibilities must happen on Darul Islam fighters: the possibility that fighters Darul Islam will manipulate Opsus; or conversely, Opsus manipulate them.

With the event of disputes within the military body of the Republic of Indonesia seems that the New Order power to unite, as outside looks compact with its cooperation to suppress Islamic political resistance, but actually in their own bodies are hostility and internal conflict is very great. Their hearts are divided not in unity and unity; they empty the soul of the military of the Islamic aqidah, even nearly as illustrated by Kartosoewirjo first. God has said:"They will not be fought simultaneously, but only in villages that have been fortified, or from behind a protective wall only. The hostility among them has peaked. You think they are compact, but in fact their hearts are divided. The divisions that arise, because they do not understand the meaning of unity. "(Qur'an 59: 14)

As spoken by Ramadi, that many Darul Islam fighters roaming in her home, among Danu, Dodo Muhammad Darda Kartosoewirjo. There are also names with distinctive call, like Ki Ki Acun or Mansour. According to the narrative

of one of the men Murtopo in Opsus, support shown by the Darul Islam fighters against Opsus very strong. So strong they forgot their duties and functions that are mandated by their predecessors.

Special Operation (Opsus) presence with all its programs apparently has been and always traps the Darul Islam fighters, with the lure that they would be ready to assist in the re-establishment of the Islamic State. Darul Islam fighters believe right above the ″greeting″ Murtopo it. In their eyes, if Murtopo win then he would establish an Islamic state. It's a lie has been done by the disbelievers to cover up his goal, let him or her if you keep the wheels of government ignorance, the Islamic laws will never be enforced. Deceit pagans have entered into the spirit of the fighters, so they are entrusted pagans as a loyal friend to get together a coalition to re-established back the Islamic State. Yet God has asserted against the believers in the Qur'an.

In 1978, based on the story of a warrior Darul Islam, that Murtopo very ambitious to become vice president. If only Ali Murtopo managed to become vice-president so that the next target is President Soeharto, he added, Ali Murtopo will further neutralize the situation in any way that could sit in a chair Murtopo presidency. Opsus program chaired by Murtopo this, at the beginning of the New Order is highly functional in political reforms (political reform), in order to strengthen the axis of Pancasila and the Constitution 45, also neutralize the political power of Muslims through engineering efforts against all civil society organizations or any political and social organizations and professions which became a political target of Murtopo with creating the idea is

how to master the state intelligence agency to run the New Order government that is in development. However, due to constraints in the body Opsus caused many gathered all flow there, so in the end Ali has concluded that Opsus not effective. Indeed, on the one hand can be a gathering of all streams in Opsus signifies Murtopo capacity. But in terms of organization, where Opsus (Special Operation) very vulnerable to the emergence of disputes brought by any existing flow. Each interest were then faced each other in the body Opsus own.

To show the weakness of the strategy Murtopo need cited a proverb, as clever-clever squirrel jumps eventually fall as well. He made a mistake when it did not base its intelligence operations on organic members, but often even more trust member webs like Aulia Rahman, Leo Tomasoa, and Bambang Trisulo. Or more trust in Liem Bian Koen, as well as Darul Islam fighters.In the world of intelligence, to develop a network is one of the important things, so that in addition to having an official member of the organization, intelligence also developed a network of members (unofficial) everywhere. Depending on what targets to be achieved. However, the secrets Ali operation seems more widely known by members of the net rather than an organic member. As a result the game Ali dismantled by members of his own net. In this case Murtopo criticized less obey the laws that mention intelligence management: should not be too much trust in members of the net! Maybe he wanted to improvise, or intends eccentric.

In addition, Member netting is also known to have poor discipline so that they are usually easy to open card, open

striped intelligence that should be kept secret. So it is not surprising that Ali's secret involvement itself dismantled by traces of subordinate net in custody. Ramadi and his entourage, perhaps because not stand the pressure of life in custody, then they reveal all games Murtopo. They are busy to "sing". Instead, members of the organization are generally more educated, more disciplined and steadfast in holding a secret. Organic Members also can hide behind a rule that does not allow them to unlock the secrets. Another difference between the organic members with members of nets is an organic member knows his job thoroughly, while members of nets are usually just out per sector. For example, one member of the nets assigned to foster scholars, and then he knows only a matter of scholars. The other was not.

Towards the end of the 1970s many fighters were rounded up from a number of DI built Ali Murtopo like, Adah Djaelani Tirtapradja, Danu Mohammad Hassan, as well as two sons Muhammad Dodo Kartosoewirjo Darda and Tahmid Rahmat Basuki. When the trial of the formerDI leaders was held in 1980, it reveals what is actually the target of the convening of the court action. And with it suspected as an attempt to discredit the position of Muslims. As one proof is in the court case Danu Mohammad Hassan. By the time he was in court he claimed as the Bakin. Perhaps this is due to be experienced by Darul Islam fighters after holding Opsus cooperation with organizations that have been created by Soeharto regime.

Bitter events experienced by the mujahid NII since 1970, the main cause that has lost its reference, so it has deviated from the legislation, so that the leadership also raised the outside

lane NII Constitution. Therefore, if the appointment of Imam NII not based laws, it can be brought under control by the intelligence of disbelievers, and certainly chaos therein. In circumstances where the War Emergency NII territory controlled by the enemy, then the enemy can create fake NII leaders. Because no legislation that legally there is no difference regarding the person with the other figures, so there is no difference between the values of which does not also give up the already surrendered to the enemy? Without a law that people can not tell which is the real leader and where NII NII leaders splinter.

NII of the real struggle began proclaimed 1949 to 1962 there was no groups in the struggle to raise the State's Gift of God. But what then is born afterward is the disagreement and understand about who has the right and proper to continue the sacred duty as a leader. Seedling emergence of a dispute about the year 1974 -1979, whereby when the mujahidin NII broke into three groups. It thus recognized by Adah Djaelani in his testimony in court. "According to witnesses, NII organization in Indonesia there are three groups, namely; Imam its group Daud Beureu'eh, deputy witnesses, a group of his Imam Djadja Sudjadi (EastGarut) and his group Hadji Sobari Imam of Rajapolah, Tasik Malaya (West Java). The cause of the grouping because each wants to secede with the reasons as stated by the witness: Haji Sobari assume we are given up in 1962 as a traitor so he formed his own NII, while the Djadja Sudjadi we deplore the Imam lifted so he formed NII Sumatra itself. DjadjaSudjadi group known in the Fillah faction. While others are known in the Sabilillah faction.

At about the 90's, re-emerged misunderstandings in the

Darul Islam movement, after Adah Jailani delegate powers to Abu Toto (Toto As-Salam) as Warasatul Mafasid (heir to the people who make mischief). Actually, As-Salam Toto was never registered as a member of DI, but using the name of the NII. With all its capabilities "notorious intellectual" has, he continues the legacy of leadership on behalf of NII and oversees the congregation of about 50,000 people to squander treasure the people for the sake of himself and those who participated disagree with him. Vigorously devotion squanders treasure the people for the sake of himself and the people who helped disagree with him.

So what is known and believed by some people today about the Islamic State of Indonesia which produced by accomplice New Order government is just a misguided and misleading engineering of the doings elements fasikun are not responsible for the sacred values contained in the Quran, Hadith and the Qanun Azasi (constitution) Islamic State of Indonesia. Sharia procedures and methodology of any harakah outlined many are violated and ignored, so that arose tajassus (mutual find fault) between the successor to struggle Darul Islam to assume that the most correct according to the size of each leader and his followers, and not according to the Koran and the Sunnah of the Prophet nor under the Actsof NII.

As the laws in force in the history of human life on earth, a treasure hunt and power, today coloring also in the continuing struggle of the fasikun estafeta sacred task that God has to a legacy for Indonesian Muslims. In fact, already happened engineering with the 'infidels' to obscure harakah Darul Islam who later of these efforts, would defame the

struggle NII until Muslims "back into pagan" by following the steps that have been designed by Satan. Most of Darul Islam fighters had fled from the bottom lines of the struggle that has been set by the Imam of the Islamic State Kartosoewirjo namely: "the establishment of *li'ilai kalimatillah fil ardhi*" (the strive to erect the words of Allah) though Imam Assyahid Kartosoewirjo have advised fighters Darul Islam through the words of God.

The solution back to the law makes cadre mujahid be so strict in maintaining the value of the law. When Abdul Fattah Wirananggapati captivity in 1991-1996, and at that time the leadership on the orders of Abdul Fattah Wirananggapati switch on free mujahid outside. The top leadership of the Imamate Council agreement is returned to him after Abdul Fattah free. But when later proved that he who has been appointed as Imam was giving statements negative tone statements when interviewed by reporters from the magazine People. Council Imamate heard the case, and then let him go at the beginning of 1997. There is a business entity that supports the struggle, then raising NII growing more rapidly covering many provinces.

Islam never force someone and not too sharp spread by the sword, as claimed by the enemies of Islam. Islam has legalized war, to get rid of the Evil-Evil stood in the way of propaganda to the people and residents. After-Evil Evil is removed and the propagation of Islam echoed, the matter is up to the people, whether they want to accept Islam, or remain in their own religion, but he had to bow as *ahlu dzimmah* (the protected citizen).Islamic missionary tendency of this kind strengthened by the words of Rabi bin 'Amir in

the presence of Rustum, the leader of the Persians, "We are sent by God to remove the man from the worship of creatures to worship God, from the narrow world into the world of the field and of the abuse of religion to justice Islam."

Regarding the *jizya* to be deposited by the hall dhimma, not intended to provide specific emphases so that they would convert to Islam, never, jizyah was in lieu of responsibility and efforts of the Muslims to protect them.The freedom given to people, who subjugated the Muslims to choose to convert to Islam or pay jizya, is a testament to the strong, clear and explicit that Islam forbids compulsion to force others to adapt the culture.People who pay the *jizya* to the Islamic government called *ahlu dzimmah*. They are entitled to the rights and guarantees as received by the people of Islam. One of the governors at the time of Caliph Umar bin Abdul Aziz wrote to him that it explained that the experts dhimma to Islam is even more dangerous if if they are not burdened jizyah. So the basic idea of this kind, it remains attractive jizya although there are experts dhimma who had converted to Islam.After reading the letter, the Caliph Umar bin Abdul Aziz immediately sent a letter saying: "God demonizing think it. Because Allah has not sent Muhammad *sallallaahu alaihi wa Salam* as a tax collector. But he was sent to give guidance. If you've read this letter then immediately cancel the jizyah for ahlu dzimmah who had converted to Islam. " Umar bin Khattab met an old man ahlu dzimmah beggars at the door of the mosque to pay *jizya*, for his needs, Umar said to the old man, "We will do justice to you, we freed after you old." Then, Umar brought the person to the treasury, and given the need for moderation and he was exempted from

the payment of *jizyah*. Furthermore, it strengthened again with the confessions some people who've studied Islam correctly. Arnold Toynbee(1972:76)[4]a great historian said," After the Islamic army led by Abu Ubaidah up in the valley Urdun, the Christian population that settled there wrote a letter addressed to the Arabs who are Muslim it, which reads: 'O all Muslims, we love you more than the Romans, although their co-religionists with us. You better keep promises, be gentle with us, to prevent abuses that happened to us and we want to keep ourselves. But the Romans were oppressing us and our earth. '

The residents of each city in order to close the entrance of the army of Heraclius did not loot. They broke the news to the Muslims that they are more pleased with the Muslims and their justice rather than arbitrariness of the Greek people. All thoughts and accusations that the role of the sword that has turned humans convert to Islam, is definitely the accusation that is far from true. Dakwah and gratification are the two essential factors the spread of Islamic proselytizing, and not because of the strength and violence (Arnold Toynbe, 1979: 87).[5]Human history knows no conqueror fair and gentler than on the people of Islam. That's a fraction the rights that have been given to the scribes Jews and Christians living under Islamic State protection. A right which would not be found in other divine religions, or law and order were made by humans throughout the ages.

In the subsequent development of Darul Islam movement

---

[4] See, A.J., Toynbee, *A Study of History Illustrated* (Cambridge: Oxford University Press,1972).

[5]See, A.J. Toynbee, *An Historian's Approach to Religion* (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1979).

(1962 to 1998), the word jihad and ijtihad used to a different field, in which jihad means earnest work hard, maximizing power, funds and how to uphold the teachings of Islam. Medium ijtihad earnest meaningful work smarter, maximizing power, and how to mengilmui Islamic teachings. Jihad is applied in the field of charity, while ijtihad is applied in the field of science, both claimed by the Darul Islam community be a prerequisite for the glory of Islam, but subconsciously they had left. Factors and situations functional-structural whether that has affected this devaluation process?

At the end of the 20th century, fundamentalism has emerged as a very powerful force in the world that is trying to rival the dominance of modern secular values and its presence is considered to have threatened the peace and harmony of the universe this earth. Instead, the fundamentalist militants are always applying a firm stance against the elements that are considered to deviate from the values of religion is felt that only their religion can restore balance to this world to its original state. Manifestations difference this perspective in politics often surprising especially with terrorism attack that takes a lot of innocent victims. Fundamentalists have a framework of values and governance own rules and their own often perceive it as something that is incompatible with modernity. For them, civilian casualties and more victims are often referred to lay as 'innocent', it is seen as an unjust society that should receive the impact and effect, either directly or indirectly, of all of the actions that surprising that they make. In the next development, the development of Darul Islam movement further away from the political discourse of nationality and Indonesia.

Since 1998 to the tragedy of the September 11 terrorist attacks, 2001 has destroyed the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon building owned by the Department of Defense United States (US) who allegedly claimed more than three thousand people have led to the stigmatization of jihad negative bercitra and horrible, something more parochial where communities Darul Islam practiced religion as an embattled forms of spirituality rather than a commitment to sivilisasional movement. If at first the Darul Islam community moves dyadic: intellectually, then the military, so now they leave intellectualism and into the jungle military force, propaganda and terror at the expense of many innocent civilians.

Worse yet, when the term jihad is arbitrarily used by fundamentalists today, the Darul Islam community, as an enemy of the US, exposed to the influences of Islamic fundamentalist movements that have sprung up in Indonesia.

According to Amos Perlmutter, the fundamentalist movement is an aggressive revolutionary movement as militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist, and Nazi movements of the past. Furthermore, Perlmutter mentioned that fundamentalists generally very 'authoritarian, anti-democratic, anti-secular, "and can not be friends with' Christian-secular universe 'and its aim is to establish an Islamic state which is authoritarian'.

What is happening now has been far from idealizing the beginning of political Islam. The first period of Islam, is the period in which the jihad and ijtihad go hand in hand, under the guidance of revelation and the example of the Prophet

Muhammad. Seriousness of the Companions demanding and appreciate science, in line with the seriousness of their practice and fight for Islam. The result in 23 years just perfect revelation to the implementation of the whole of worship, achieve the goal of the creation of man: to be a caliph in the earth. The Darul Islam feel they have passed the 'deadline' is perceived by the early Islamic history, so it appears the symptoms of disorientation, dislocation and disposition in the midst of the development of secular Indonesia.

Then came a period of decline Darul Islam movement, both in idea and economically, in which the *'ijtihad'* is no longer accompanied by *jihad*. According to the Darul Islam and this is because the 'ijtihad' is not a mujahid, the struggle in the field of science, often become the reason for not appearing in the field of jihad, just turn the concentration of the real problem. Assemblies science squeeze discussions with people who discuss many issues, being beyond the tyranny --sebegaimana has never happened in the days of the kings Islam-- began to tarnish the history of people's lives. The split between generations in the body Darul Islam has also resulted in the emergence of factionalism and the influence of fundamentalism in the political structure of the Darul Islam movement. Will Darul Islam coopted by sectarian mindset or will be able to resist the elements narrow fundamentalism that surrounds them during this time?

Whether the Darul Islam feel the need for mandatory effort to restore potential and creativity of the Islamic ummah that country back to stand upright on the principles of law and politics that shaped not only democracy but more than that,

should form a nomocracy ummah (community based legal system) , They are still very confident that in the future the Islamic countries will stand triumphant in Indonesia, a fate that will not be rejected, something that by Isaiah Berlin conceptualizes it as a historical inevitability.

Nationalism is a new topic in anthropology. The study of nationalism - the ideology of the modern nation-state is the topic of conversation for a long time political science, sociology and history macro. (Nation) and the national ideology is a large-scale modern phenomenon. Even though the study of nationalism raises issues of new methodologies relating to the scale and difficulty of isolating units of study, these problems precisely mengkait with other topics (Saifuddin, 2007: 2). Social change has occurred in the central region of anthropological studies, which integrate millions of people into the market and the state. Anthropological attention towards nationalism instead take a different path of political science since the beginning of putting the country as a study center.

Anthropology, in line with the tradition that puts the theory of evolution as the basic premise of positioning the country as part of the public discussion about the evolution from simple to complex (Saifuddin, 2011: 3). In this case the state becomes part of the conversation about the public process mengkota (urbanizing) as a result of the process of evolution of simple people (formerly referred to as colonial as primitive societies). In other words, the state is an institution that is a consequence of the evolution of society, an organization which overlaps with kinship institutions in the

simple community in the past. (Cohen, 1985).[6] In the methodology, as we are living in today, and here, informants anthropological research is a citizen. Further-more, isolated primitive societies may not like in the past, so it is no longer "more genuine" or "purer" than our society today.

Anthropologists have long been sought lifting cases at the micro level, as reflected in a simple society (d / h primitive) is small, a small population, live in an environment that is relatively isolated, and have a relatively homogeneous culture, to a level of abstraction that macro, so as to explain the same phenomenon in various places in the world. Nevertheless, this effort is not easy to be realized especially when anthropologists today increasingly tend to favor diversity in thinking paradigm constructivism is now growing, as the paradigm of cultural relativism rooted in the traditions of the past anthropology acquire new premises today (Achmad Fedyani Saifuddin 2005: 5).[7] refers to the views Ernest Gellner [8](1983: 1) about nationalism:

> *"Nationalism is a political principle, which means that the unit of the nation should be in line with the political unit. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, most precisely defined within the context of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is anger arising from the violation of this principle, or a sense of satisfaction because this principle is run by baik.Gerakan nationalist sentiment actualized by this kind "*(p. 1).

Gellner view of nationalism is more fitting to the context of the nation-state (nation state). This is reflected in the concept

[6] See, Abner Cohen, *Two-dimensional Man* (London: Tavistock, 1974).

[7] See, Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

[8]See, Achmad Fedyani Saifuddin, *Antropologi Kontemporer: Suatu Pengantar Kritis Mengenai Paradigma* (Jakarta: Prenada Media. 2005).

of "nation unit" contained in the above quote. Gellner seems still looked "unit of the nation" the same ethnic group - or at least an ethnic group that claimed its existence by the nationalists: "In short, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, namely that ethnic boundaries should not intersect with limits political boundaries "(Gellner, 1983: 2). In other words, nationalism, in the view of Gellner, referring to the relationship between ethnicity and country. Nationalism, in this view, is the ideology of ethnic maintained so that this ethnic group dominates a country. The nation-state itself is a country dominated by an ethnic group, which is a marker of identity-such as language or religion-often contained in an official symbolism laws and institutions.

***

REFERENCES:

Fealy, Greg, and Greg Barton, eds. 2013. *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jem'ah Islamiyah*. Cornell University Press.

Swartz, M. J., Turner, V. W., & Tuden, A. 1966. *Political Anthropology*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.

Symonds, Peter. 2003. "The Political Origins and Outlook of Jemaah Islamiyah." *World Socialist Website*, Part 2.

Syofiardi, Bachyul. 2005. "Moderates, Conservatives Dispute Freedom of Thought." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. September 14, 2005.

Syukur, A. 2008. "Jaringan Lokal Abdullah Sungkar dalam Peristiwa Lampung 1989." in Henk Schulte Nordholt, Bambang Purwanto, and Ratna. *Perspektif Baru Penulisan Sejarah Indonesia*. Jakarta: KITLV.

Tan, Andrew TH. 2005. "Singapore: Recent developments in

terrorism and Japan's role." *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 12, No. 2.

Taufiqurrahman, M. 2006. "Legislators Take Stand Against Sharia Laws." *The Jakarta Post:* Jakarta. June 14, 2006.

Temby, Quinton. 2010. "Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah." *Indonesia*: 1-36.

Thompson, Paul. 1994. "Believe It or Not: Rethinking the Historical Interpretation of Memory". in Jeffrey Jaclyn and Glenace Edwall, (eds.). *Memory and history: Essays in recalling and interpreting experiences*. Lanham, London: University Press of America.

Tilly, Charles. 2004. "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists." *Sociological Theory,* Vol. 22.

Tony Rudyansjah. 2012. "Going Native sebagai Tabu dan Identitas Tempatan sebagai Titik Pijakan Etnografis." in Tony Rudyansjah (ed.), *Antropology Agama: Wacana-Wacana Mutakhir dalam Kajian Religi dan Budaya*, Jakarta: UI Press.

Tony Rudyansjah. 2009. *Kekuasaan, Sejarah dan Tindakan.* Jakarta: Rajawali Pers.

Toynbee, A. J. 1972. *A Study of History Illustrated*. Cambridge: Oxford University Press.

Toynbee, A. J. 1979. *An historian's approach to religion*. Cambridge: Oxford University Press.

Toynbee, A. J. Turk, Austin T. 1982. "Social Dynamics of Terrorism." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 436.

Turner, Victor. 1969. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure.* Chicago: Aldine Publications.

Turner, Victor. 1974. "Passages, margins, and poverty: religious symbols of communitas." *Dramas, Fields and*

Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (1974).

Uhlin, Anders. 1997. *Indonesia and the "Third Wave" of Democratization"*. New York: St. Martins's Press.

Upton, J. 2004. *In the streets of Londonistan*. London Review of Books.

Van Bruinessen, Martin. 2002. "Genealogies of Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia." *South East Asia Research,* Vol. 10, No. 2.

Van Bruinessen, Martin. 2002. "The Violent Fringes of Indonesia's Islam." *ISIM Newsletter*, Vol. 11.

ISIS, INDONESIAN MUSLIMS AND GLOBAL TERRORISM[1]

A STRIKING phenomenon of hundreds people of Indonesia who were actively involved in the political dynamics of the Islamic world, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which declared itself as an Islamic Caliphate in June 28, 2014, shocks the public and government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in Indonesia. Since early 2013, ISIS has successfully consolidated various radical groups in conflict with one another to divert the target: control region of eastern Syria and western Iraq that cannot be controlled effectively by the government of Damascus and Baghdad.

The fall of Mosul, which has a population of about 2 million people into the hands of ISIS, has been so severely blow to Baghdad. Thousands of resident—especially the minorities and Shia communities—out of Mosul, the provincial capital of Nineveh, look for survival.

ISIS army takes-over government buildings, oil wells, military bases, arsenals, and banks. ISIS, which claims to be the *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq wa ash-Sham*, has three main principles of the struggle, among others: First, establish monotheism, destroy polytheism and idolatrousness, and enforce the law of God by force of arms. With these three principles, ISIS joins forces to exploit sentiments of Sunni

---

[1] This articles is a working paper at Freedom Foundation (NGO) in cooperation with Paramadina University, Jakarta.The writers would like to thank Dhuha Hadiyansyah (lecturer at School of Adab and Humanities, UIN Jakarta) for his critical comment and correction for this paper.

versus Shi'ite sectarianism and caliphate as a political entity unifying Muslims worldwide. They also called on the Muslim world, including Indonesia, to support and join it. With the three principles of struggle above, ISIS destroyed many mosques and holy places that are considered as a place of worship which could lead to polytheism and contrary to the creed of monotheism.

In this case, the involvement of some Indonesians in the ISIS in the Middle East region is not new because previously, there is precedent that some Indonesian citizens in the past had involvement in conflicts abroad when President Jimmy Carter used the CIA to weaken the power of the Soviets in Afghanistan, with fighters from all over the world mobilized, including not less 350 people from Indonesia, and Osama bin Laden himself from Saudi Arabia to destroy the Russian communists.[2]

Indeed, we have had precedent on Indonesian involvement in armed actions since 1985, in which it can be found early in the war of Afghanistan and the conflict in Pakistan. In the past, a number of Indonesian citizens were also reported military training in Libya. Back to the country, among them become the actors of violence and terror that has been rife since the early 2000s.

Although ISIS has a variety of social networks in Indonesia, it failed to recruit Indonesian Muslims in large numbers to support their actions and goals. ISIS failed to persuade these groups to encourage intolerance and radicalization that can quickly be terrorism in the country.

---

[2] See, John Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (Pluto Press, 2002).

Our deeper question is: Is this because ISIS supports the sentiments which tend to be universal *ummah* or domestic situation in Indonesia that is still conducive to the flowering of radical Muslim, understood as a form of state failure and civil society that provide an alternative discourse to the narrative of their violence? Or, are local and international factors equally dominant?[3]

Genealogy of ISIS

The fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq's Shiite regime spawned to not give place to the Sunnis. The failure of Iraqi leaders, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in building an inclusive political system, has given ways to grow militants across Iraq, including the Sunnis, in turn, gave birth to ISIS. Sunni militants protested the economic and political marginalization by the ruling Shia. Supports of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to the hardline oppositions in Syria also contributed to the birth of ISIS.[4]

Of course, the presence of ISIS created by the Sunni has shocked the Muslim World, including Indonesia. ISIS is a translation of the Arabic language *Al-Ad-Daulah Islamiyah fi al-Iraq wa Ash-Sham*. Some call it as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).[5] There is also a call Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which specifically has different area coverage. The term includes the Sham or the Levant region

---

[3]Noor Huda Ismail, "NIIS Indonesia dan Evolusi Teror Mondial," *Kompas Daily*, (07/08/2014). Noor Huda is a founder Foundation of Prasasti Perdamaian; he hold PhD in Politics and International Relations, Monash University, Australia. See also, Oliver Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

[4]Hillary Clinton, *Hard Choice* (Simon & Schuster, 2014)

[5]*Elmihwar, newspaper,* Egypt (6/8/2014)

between the Mediterranean Sea and the Euphrates River that the country coverage includes Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. The term *Syria* is confined to the state of modern Syria that is currently in conflict.

Genealogy of the organization can be traced to the Salafi Jihadist movement being fought in Iraq and Syria that are on a mission to the formation of *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic State).

ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), according to Zana Khasraw Gulmohamad from the University of Sheffield, stems from the birth of *Al Qaeda in Iraq* (AQI) in 2003 The initial declaration of the *Daulah Islamiyah* organization that conducted the insurgents in Iraq group is established by az-Zarqawi in 2004 who eventually reveals himself as part of al Qaeda.

After Az-Zarqawi was killed in battle against the army of the United States in mid-2006, AQI was established by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi from Jordan, who in 2006 was murdered by the United States. He was replaced by Abu Ayyoub al-Masri, Egyptian origin, which supports the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) or *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq*.

Helm of *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq* switched to Abu Hamza al-Mohajir until April 19, 2010. He was killed in an attack by American troops. That helm was transferred to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. After standing ISI, Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi known as Abu Hamed Dawood Mohammed II or Khalil al-Zawri (Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai and Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi) makes Baquba as his headquarters. Al-Baghdadi, the Iraqi people, replaced al-Masri, killed by American troops and Iraqis.

Under the control of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, *Iraq fil Daulah Islamiyah* organization increasingly expanded its influence until April 9, 2013 when appearing a voice recording associated with the voice of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The tape was stated, *Jabhah Nushra* (Victory Front) in Syria is a continuation of *Iraq Daulah Islamiyah* organization. The tape also described that the name *Jabhah Nushrah* and *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq* be removed, and later proclaimed *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq wa ash-Sham*, that is written by media as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as his successor, while Raqqah city located in Syria, which borders with Turkey, as its capital.[6]

In 2012, al-Baghdadi sent his men to form a branch of al Qaeda Syria, named Jabhat al-Nusra. The group aims to get rid of President Bashar al-Assad and establish a Sunni Islamic state led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, a Salafist-oriented leader. According to the Australian National Security, they received funding and support from AQI and ISI. However, they subject to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al Qaeda.[7]

Al-Baghdadi who wants to be a single leader, in 8 April 2003 through a decree stating that AQI and Jabhat al-Nusra turned into ISIS/ISIL. However, Jabhah al-Nusra rejected it. Dispute between the ISIS and Jabhah al-Nusra prolonged and failed to be mediated by Ayman al-Zawahiri that ultimately claimed that Al-Qaeda cut off ties with ISIS because ISIS has its own conception and position; not subject

[6]M Hasan Mutawakkil Alallah, "ISIS dan Perlunya Pergub; Ketua Tanfidziyah PW NU Jawa Timur," *Jawa Pos* (09/08/2014)

[7] Trias Kuncahyono, "Radikalisme: Genesis ISIS," *Kompas Daily* (02/08/2014).

to the Al Qaeda and Ayman Center.

According to German radio, Deutsche Welle (DW), ISIS takes money at the Central Bank of Mosul, some 500 billion Iraqi dinars, or about 429 million dollars plus a certain amount of gold. "With that much money, they used to pay 60,000 fighters," said Eliot Higgins, a resident scholar of the UK. Currently, ISIS has estimated about 10,000 armed members from different parts of the world: Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Australia, and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.

According to the Director of the Center for Research on the Arab World at the University of Mainz, Germany, Gunter Meyer, "The most important financial source of ISIS is the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates," especially from the rich people in the country. The motivation of initial assistance they provide, according to Meyer, is to support the ISIS to face the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. This support is encouraged "hatred" sectarian: three-quarters of the Syrian population is Sunni Muslim, but most of the ruling elite are the Alawite minority, which is often called the part of the Shia Muslims.

BBC stated that ISIS received financial support from donors in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. It happened when they were still called Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). However, after the breakup of AQI with its central leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, and proclaimed ISIS, according to CNN and The New York Times, they rely on the financial resources of criminal acts, such as kidnapping, extortion, and robbery.

Syrian conflict is initially localized, such as demonstrations to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad, then evolved into an international conflict, involving thousands of combatants from dozens of countries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Chechnya, Turkey, America, England, France, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.[8]

Majority of Afghan alumni in Indonesia are *tawaquf* (silent) or be very careful in giving support to the ISIS openly because of their loyalty to al Qaeda today led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 2013, al-Zawahiri issued a *fatwa* that ISIS is not part of Al Qaeda because ISIS has acted very brutally; thus, it damaged non only the image of Al Qaeda in Syria but also the Islam as strategic religion. Al Qaeda has had its own army, Jabhah al-Nusra, which has been first to come and help the people of Syria long before the ISIS did.

Breaking up the partnership between the ISIS and Jabhah al-Nusra is also carried over to Indonesia. In fact, in some areas, including in the prison that housed inmate terrorists, occur fierce hostility between ISIS supporters and Jabhah al-Nusra.

In Indonesia, said Noorhuda Ismail, one of the local factors that cause people interested in joining the ISIS and even willing to die for this choice is the weak system of law enforcement, especially in prison. Massive Distribution of ISIS message in Arabic translated by Aman Abdurrahman, terrorism inmates, is done from inside the prison in reclaiming. This translation is then disseminated via the internet by its visitors.

[8] Noor Huda Ismail, "NIIS Indonesia ..."

Aman Abdurrahman has the track record as terrorist that jailed twice since 2004. He was involved in Cimanggis bombing and military training in Aceh in 2010. He refused to cooperate with prison officials, as well as consistent with the *takfiri* ideology (infidelized people outside the group), and he turns out to be the main attraction among Islamic activists who thirst the figure of the leadership.

Although there is no evidence that there is an official order from Aman Abdurrahman for his proteges to flee to Syria and join the ISIS, but through translation, writings, and sermons, it is then recycled by his followers and the media, through open discussion, marches, demonstrations, and social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Youtubegiving 'jihad' imagination beyond the nation-state concept for the readers, and then moves them to act.

What is interesting is the majority of the Afghan alumni in Indonesia has responded *tawaquf* (silent, quiet) or be very careful in giving support to the ISIS openly because their loyalty to al Qaeda, led by Aiman al-Zawahiri, is stronger.

In this case, on the recommendation of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), the Ministry of Communication in 2015 blocked 19 websites it claimed to be spreading violent messages and recruiting Indonesians to join ISIS. Then the move was reversed, however, after a major public outcry, including from civil society groups often attacked by these very websites.

For the radical Muslims, this type of knee-jerk reaction and flip-flopping exposes a hasty and imprudent decision-making process that could undermine authority in the future, meanwhile the initial move to ban the websites sent

the wrong message to civil society and mass media that saw it as a precedent of a repressive measure that could threaten freedom of speech.

Instead of arbitrarily blocking websites used as platforms to spread hateful religious sentiment, the government has to monitor them tightly to gather evidence to prosecute them for the content that really violates the ITE Law, the way it prosecuted other ITE cases. This is important as it sends a message that it does not tolerate the spread of terrorist ideology in Indonesia, while not being seen as indiscriminately targeting websites with merely hardline perspectives.[9]

The authorities and the security forces aware that the Internet has been used by ISIS and other radical movements effectively to spread their ideology and lure new recruits a and they know too, Pew Research Survey found that an astounding 72% of Indonesian Muslims would prefer to live under Sharia law, meanwhile The State Department details other Indonesian extremist groups in their most recent country report on terrorism from 2013. There were 40 separate raids that led to the arrests of more than 75 suspects. One of the biggest incidents saw a planned attack on the Embassy of Burma in Jakarta thwarted. Many of the terrorist attacks were targeted at police.

Hundreds Indonesians Joined ISIS

On July 2015, a video showing Indonesian pro-Islamic State

[9] Devi Asmarani, "Indonesia Struggles to Keep Citizens from Joining ISIS", article, at*: http ://www.themalaymailonline.com/opinion/devi-asmarani/article/indonesia-struggles-to-keep-citizens-from-joining-isis#sthash.3j0sOUJd.dpuf*

in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters, over 70 Indonesian-speaking men in military fatigues and armed with rifles are making preparations for a field assignment. These men seem in good spirits as they smile and joke for the videographer, referring to themselves as the Ikhwan Nusantara, or the brothers of the archipelago - a reference to Indonesia as the world's largest archipelagic nation.

The videographer also introduced some of the men as he walked around, giving their names as Abu Salma, Abu Urwah, Aman Abdurrahman. The video is strategic propaganda. It shows the Indonesians having a place, a force there. This would invite other pro-ISIS people in Indonesia to join.

The clip is the latest to show the existence of the Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyah, or Malay Archipelago unit for ISIS, and analysts say it is proof there is a significant number of members who have joined as fighters. The emergence of the new clip comes as officials in Indonesia are getting tough on ISIS supporters, readying charges against as many as 14 men accused of either creating a website to promote ISIS, or funding and helping ISIS supporters to travel to the Middle East to link up with the militant group Syria and the number has increased each month. Many of those who have slipped into Syria pretended to be tourists or students. Aman Abdurrahman is one of the radical Muslim figures who help the ISIS to get supports from the young Muslims in Indonesia.

In this case, Aman Abdurrahman had use his influence to Sam, a Terrorist Ring Banten member who served a nine-year sentence for robbing a goldsmith to finance the first Bali

bombing, visited his friend Rois Abu Syaukat in Kembang Kuning prison within the Nusakambangan prison complex. Aman Abdurr**ah****m**an is a key figure in the Indonesia-Syria pipeline and he is the *takfiri* ideologue, who began translating ISIS tracts following its formal split from the Nusra Front in April 2013. He has been one of the most vocal advocates of ISIS from his cell at Nusakambangan prison. Aman Abdurrahman is Rois's cellmate. Shortly after the visit, Sam left for Syria.[10]

Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail noted that Sam professed in January 2012 that he had no intention of participating in any future "actions" in Indonesia. However, he would do what he could to "help oppressed Muslims anywhere." And when Taufik Andrie, the director of the Institute for International Peace Building, met with Sam in late 2012, he found that Sam was distressed that no one was mobilizing either relief aid or jihad on behalf of the Rohingya minority in Burma. There was no mention of Syria. After meeting with Rois and Aman at Kembang Kuning in 2013, he decided to join the fight in Syria. Given that Aman is a key ISIS supporter, it is likely that he prevailed upon Sam to join ISIS. On arrival in Syria, Sam "remained in ready contact via Facebook and shared information on developments in Syria," especially as they pertained to ISIS. Sam became a cheerleader for ISIS with Facebook postings on Syria's "5-star jihad." Then he was

---

[10] Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, "There and Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria," The *Middle East Journal*, January 27, 2015, *http://www.mei.edu/content/map/there-and-back-again-indonesian-fighters-syria.*

killed in Ramadi in April 2014.[11]

The authorities in Indonesia see all of them as one group who has divided tasks among themselves. They are in one group with a wanted terrorist, Abu Jandal, who threatened to attack the government, especially the prisons that house terrorists in Indonesia.[12]

We noted that of the more than 500 Indonesians that are believed to have joined ISIS, about half have gone on to fight in Syria or Iraq. Contrast this with the fact less than 200 Indonesians was estimated to have fought in Afghanistan for al-Qaeda, and since 1999, the police has arrested more than 450 terror suspects. Some of them were released after serving their sentences. These people, he said, could easily go back to their old activities unless they shifted paradigm.

In this case, radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir -- viewed as the spiritual leader of the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah -- is currently in an Indonesian prison in Java, but has declared support for ISIS. Ba'asyir has pledged allegiance to ISIS from his jail cell and is encouraging radicals to join the group. Actually, like other radicals, Indonesian extremists have even brought their families to Syria and Iraq so they could live under full Islamic law, and

[11]Hwang and Ismail explain that, still others are leaving directly from Indonesia, using channels similar to those operationalized during the Soviet-Afghan war. Indonesians are traveling to Malaysia and from there departing for Syria. Much like the Afghan veterans who identified themselves as Filipinos on forged passports to head to the Afghan front, Indonesians are identifying themselves as Malaysians. Interestingly, Malaysians are also departing from Indonesia to avoid attracting the attention of their own security services. Moreover, there is now a sufficient enough number of Malaysian and Indonesian fighters on the ground in Syria that, as of July 2014, there was discussion of forming a *katibah nusantara,* or a special Malay-speaking unit, of ISIS.

[12]*The Straits Times* (July 17,2015)

reported, they receive stipends for housing, food, and education and radical schools.

Our field research found that the number of Islamic State (ISIS) recruits from Indonesia tripled to over 500 by the end of last year. Home to the world's largest Muslim population, Indonesia's more than 200 million Muslims make up 13% of the world's total Muslims. The nation's history of extremist movements makes it a ripe location for ISIS recruits.

Wildan Mukholland, for instance, was one of those recruits. He came from the same village in Indonesia as two militants convicted and executed for their role in the 2002 Bali terrorist bombings, which killed over 200 people and were carried out by Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda affiliate.[13]

Mukholland grew up admiring the two terrorists and eventually went on to join ISIS and move to the Middle East. Last year, he blew himself up in a terrorist attack in a restaurant in Baghdad. In that similar case, Afief Abdul Madjid, 63, had travelled to Syria to allegedly attend military training. He was accused of spreading violent ideology when he returned home.

He was sentenced by the court on other charges, receiving four years' jail for funding a terrorist paramilitary training camp in Aceh in 2010, less than the eight years demanded by prosecutors.

The prosecutor handling the Afief case focused on events that occurred in Syria, which were more challenging to prove, meanwhile one of the men, Muhammad Amin Mude,

---

[13]About Wildan Mukholland, see, "ISIS in Indonesia: 500 Recruits and Counting," at *http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6002/isis-indonesia*. See also, *http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/jakarta-grapples-with-indonesian-pro-isis-fighters*

41, was arrested after police said they foiled his attempt to arrange for six people with fake passports to go to Syria.

Amin is alleged to have arranged the trips of three batches of travelers to Syria prior to his arrest.

Another of those arrested, Muhammad Fachry (M.Fachry), is accused of setting up and running a radical website that promotes ISIS and invites people to go to Syria.

ISIS is not the only terrorist group looking for a base in Indonesia. Hamas also tried to open an office there to help manage its fundraising operations in the region, but was denied by Jakarta government.

Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-majority country with 250 million people, practices a tolerant brand of Islam and has long eradicated terrorist networks such as the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah, but it is now grappling with a small radical fringe that includes pro-ISIS sympathizers.

Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail said that, of the approximately 8,000 foreign fighters from 74 countries believed to have joined the Syrian conflict, it is unclear how many of them are Indonesian. Official government estimates vary from a low of 24, cited by General Ansyaad Mbai, the director of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency, to a high of 56, as stated by General Sutarman, the National Police commander.One Jemaah Islamiyah member stated that by his own count, some 150 fighters were in Syria with either ISIS or the Nusra Front.[14] Aspiring jihadist are traveling to Syria by way of four main channels. Some join with Jemaah Islamiyah as part of its humanitarian arm, Hilal Ahmar

[14] Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, "There and Back Again..."

Society Indonesia (HASI), for a month-long tour providing relief and medical assistance. While on the tour, these individuals slip away. Most have joined the Nusra Front. However, when ISIS split from the Front, a portion of those fighters left for ISIS. Others have made it to Syria after performing the *'umrah*, the little hajj, taking a boat from Yemen through the Suez Canal to Latakia in Syria.[15]

For the Indonesian Jihadist in Syria, their experiences as volunteerfighters would enrich their struggle as the real Muslims in the arena of global conflict in which they can meet, communicate and exchange of ideas each other with the volunteer Jihadist from European Union, Africa, the US and so forth. This historical experience has been their pride as the global Muslim Jihadist in the context of the struggle for the real in the battle for God, to borrow 'Karen Armstrong's political metaphor'.

According to Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, others, most notably alumni of the Al Mukmim Islamic boarding school in Ngruki near Solo, have used Facebook to connect with fellow alums studying in the Middle East. Nine alumni of Al Mukmim, also known as Ngruki, have been documented as having joined the fight, leaving from boarding schools in Yemen and Pakistan, where they had been doing follow-up study.[16] Several were attending Al Iman, a boarding school in Sana, Yemen. Al Iman has been

[15]Australian media estimates put the number of Indonesian fighters on the ground in Syria at closer to 300. Security analysts believe that official government estimates are understating the number of Indonesian fighters, while Australian estimates are overstating the number

[16]See, Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Report 6 "Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict," January 30, 2014, at *http: //file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/01/IPAC_Indonesians_the_Syrian_Conflict.pdf.*

especially vocal in its support for Sunni fighters in Syria and thus provided the necessary conduits to travel there. These fighters connected other Al Mukmim alumni to contacts in Syrian militant groups. By way of the connection and networking the militant groups, there open the door to go Syria/Iraq.

Based on our interview with one of the returnees from Syria, the Indonesian Jihadist are very confident that by joining ISIS in Syria or Iraq, they will get blessing by Allah and, even, they will be paid with high salary more than enough compared with their monthly salary in Indonesia as the cheap laborers as far as they get here. At least, they will get what the so-called ''a shortcutto heaven'' as the Jihadist if they killed or die in the battle ground.

As far as we know, the Indonesian Jihadist go to Syria through Turkey because Indonesian citizens are eligible for a visa-on-arrival in the country, meanwhile the other country like Iraq or Jordan is more strict and difficult to give a visa.

Hwang and Ismail found that, there are two major routes that Indonesians tend to take when traveling to Syria to join ISIS or Jabhah al-Nusra. Most typically, they cross through Turkey since Indonesian citizens are eligible for a visa-on-arrival. One common route is to fly from Jakarta to Istanbul and then travel over land to Reyhanli, a town near Turkey's border with Syria. From there, arrangements are made to cross the Syrian border. Others have taken a more indirect route, traveling from Indonesia to Malaysia and then departing from Kuala Lumpur, often with Malaysian identity papers, to Doha, Qatar. They then travel to Istanbul and finally go by land to Reyhanli. In December 2014,

Malaysian authorities caught some two dozen Indonesians attempting to go to Syria via this latter route. In the press/media, this story spread out among the radical Muslims in Indonesia who are interested to join ISIS, and this stimulate them to make the contacts with their networking and radicalists cell in the spirit of Jihadist for ISIS.

In this case, as many as 16 Indonesian citizens are reported to have gone missing in Turkey while they were vacationing. The 16 missing individuals left Indonesia using a travel agency and their whereabouts remain unknown. They are suspected to have fled outside of Turkey to join the notoriously known radical group, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A number of rumors led to the speculation that these individuals have deliberately gone missing as they travelled across the border to join the notoriously known radical group ISIS. Reports said, it is a very likely possibility knowing that Turkey is located next to Iraq and Syria, the two countries where most of the radical group is resides.[17]

Many of the Indonesian workers who went to do 'umrah' to Saudi Arabia never came back and so they furthered their journey somewhere else, most likely to join ISIS. Because if they are not doing anything wrong, why are they hiding or running away from their own government who are suppose

---

[17]In March 2015, The Chairman of Indonesian Intelligence Agency (BIN) Marciano Norman revealed the Indonesian government endeavour to gather more information regarding the 16 missing Indonesians who were last seen in Turkey. BIN thinks that the strategy of using a travel agent to travel somewhere first just to transit is not a new one but often used, especially by those who went to do 'umrah' and never returned since. The Indonesian Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey have released the names of the 16 missing Indonesians in Istanbul. Among 16, 10 originating from Surabaya, East Java, whereas the other 6 came from Surakarta, Central Java.

to protect them. It is possible, there is the travelling agency that is suspected to have been helping these 16 people who are now on the run to somewhere unknown.

Some Muslims in Middle East supposed to finance Indonesians wanting to join ISIS to launch what the so-called the holy jihad, even though they don't understand the real situation in Syria and Iraq.

Based on Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail's study, the Indonesian diaspora in the Middle East has been critical in assisting Indonesians seeking to fight with ISIS and the Nusra Front by providing them with logistical support and local contacts. There will be some and the concern is that these people will now have combat experience, tactical skills, weapons knowledge, deeper ideological commitment and international connections. Even if it's just a handful of people, they could provide leadership for the tiny extremist movement here

Once the jihadist arrive at the border, someone from ISIS or Jabhah al-Nusra picks them up and transports them to safe houses on the other side. Total travel costs, including the flight to Istanbul, local transport to the border, and two days accommodation along the way, are estimated at between $1000 and $1500.[18]

Some Indonesians joining ISIS and the Nusra Front hail from radical groups, while others are independent operators, radicalized through the Internet. Jemaah Islamiyah members typically affiliate with Jabhah al-Nusra. Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and Mujahidin Indonesia Timor, whose

[18] Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, "There and Back Again..."

leaders have sworn *bai'at* (an oath of allegiance) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, send their members to ISIS.

In this case, Aman Abdurrahman supporters have been setting themselves up as ISIS recruiters and organizing mass pledge sessions in radical mosques. In connection with this action, a few armchair jihadists like M. Fachry have latched onto ISIS propaganda to widen their networks through social media and through organizing public demonstrations of support for the Islamic State. But unlike others, M. Fachry, who leads the Forum Aktifis Syariat Islam (FAKSI, Forum of Islamic Law Activists), has, and wisely perhaps, played no direct role in sending Indonesian fighters to Syria. However, the publicity machinery he has created, especially his jihadi website Al Mustaqbal, has allowed Aman Abdurrahman to become, as Indonesia watcher Sidney Jones puts it, ″the most important ideological promoter of ISIS″ in Indonesia despite being physically confined to prison.[19]

ISIS, Notion of Takfiri and Islamic Extremism

Analysts and the authorities have warned that a lack of concerted efforts in fighting the proliferation of the radical ideology propagated by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has resulted in an unprecedented rise in the number of Indonesians leaving for the Middle East to fight for the group. In total, an estimated 514 Indonesians have gone to Syria and Iraq to fight with the ISIS, around half of whom had been living in nearby countries as students or migrant workers prior to the rise of the ISIS. Indonesia is probably the region's biggest supplier of ISIS fighters. In comparison,

[19] Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, "There and Back Again..."

around 40 Malaysians, 200 Filipinos and 60 Australians have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, according to several media reports.

One should remember that, because Indonesia has the world's largest Muslim population, the country will always be at the center of recruitment, although only hundred Muslims would join ISIS. Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) director Sidney Jones noted that the number of Indonesians who went to fight in Afghanistan from 1985 to 1994 did not exceed 300.

Since the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the government has declared ISIS an illegal organization and ideology as they are opposed to Pancasila (Indonesia's philosophical foundation). But unlike in Malaysia and Singapore where ISIS supporters can be charged and detained upon their departure to the combat zone, Indonesia authorities still have no legal basis to do the same. While the government has repeatedly emphasized the danger of ISIS ideology, maybe only the Indonesia's National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and the National Police have been actively involved in prevention measures.

Prof. Mohamad Bazzi of New York University emphasize that, one of the pillars of ISIS' ideology is that it is the true - and only - defender of Sunni Muslims, who are being persecuted in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt and everywhere else where ISIS has carried out attacks, either directly or through its affiliates. In its slick propaganda, ISIS emphasizes two major themes: a righteous and idyllic life for "true" Muslims in its self-declared Islamic state in parts of Syria and Iraq, and an ideology that sanctifies violence as the only

means for Sunnis to achieve power. The extremist group is highly sophisticated in its use of social media to sow fear among its enemies, and to entice alienated Muslims living in the West to ″immigrate″ to ISIS-controlled territory.[20]

ISIS is the global ultra-Revivalists for global terrorism and never mind that ISIS selectively uses a group of clerics and scholars from across Islam's history that advocated declaring other Muslims as infidels or apostates, and justified their killing. The majority of the world's 1.6 billion Muslims reject this notion of takfiri. But it is central to the ideology of most of today's militant groups, who have killed far more Muslims than non-Muslims. That fact becomes obscured as long as ISIS has new opportunities to portray itself as the defender of Muslims. [21]

In Indonesian Muslims perception, genealogy of the ISIS emergence, as a political movement, wrapped inclothes of Jihad by religious doctrines, in which the Islamic thinkers categorized them as the global ultra-Revivalists for global terrorism. Their deployment and activities in Indonesia would be to watch out from day to day because they danger the cohesiveness of its people. Their doctrine and religious understanding are certainly very dangerous forthe continuity of tradition and culture of Indonesian Muslims, especially among the *nahdliyin* (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU) and Muhammadiyah moderate Muslims.

When the ISIS and radical Muslims movement is not forbidden, of course, there will be potential course for

---

[20]Mohamad Bazzi, "Trumpeting Islamophobia Helps ISIS", *The Straits Times,* December 12, 2015.

[21]Mohamad Bazzi, "Trumpeting Islamophobia..."

political upheaval that led to the horizontal conflicts among communities of Indonesia. As world leaders call for Muslims to take the lead in the ideological battle against a growing and increasingly violent off shoot of their own religion, analysts say NU/Muhammadiyah's campaign is a welcome antidote to Islamic extremism.

The campaign by NU and Muhammadiyah for an open-minded, pluralistic Islam also comes at a time when Islam is at war with itself over central theological questions about how the faith is defined in the modern era. In a way, it should not be surprising that this message comes from Indonesia, the home of Islam Nusantara, widely seen as one of the most progressive Islamic movements in the world. The movement - its name is Indonesian for East Indies Islam - dates back more than 500 years, and promotes a spiritual interpretation of Islam that stresses non-violence, inclusive-ness and acceptance of other religions.Such liberal-ism poses strongly a counter-argument to ISIS.

Regarding to prevent ISIS so it can not expand the reach beyond the digital realm, what the government should have been doing since two decades ago is to come up with a massive and effective campaign against radical Islamic teaching, intensively involving the country's two largest Muslim organizations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muham-madiyah, as well as the conservative Indonesian Council of Ulama and many popular Muslim clerics.

ISIS ideas and activities can pose a serious problem in the political, religious, and social activities in the country. Almost certainly, the main supporter of the idea of ISIS caliphate state is a radical resident or a small group who has

been troubling the people of Indonesia.

More than that, it is very important to accept Pancasila as the state ideology, while Islam remains guarded as a creed. We do not need to bang the state basic and religion creed. Because, the precept of Pancasila which contains the deity is a form of the practice of Islamic law.

Caliphate is clearly irrelevant to the Muslims of Indonesia. Indonesian Islamic organizations have formed the Comite Califat following elimination of "caliphate" in Turkey in 1924 by the secular Turks; they intend to defend and demand that the "caliphate" in Turkey revived.

To respond this phenomenon, in the past, it was "the grand old man" Haji Agus Salim, a well-known Muslim intelligentsia, who once stated that the committee along with Indonesian caliphate is irrelevant. According to him, what is called a "caliphate" in Turkey is a despotic and corrupt empire that need not be defended, especially by Indonesian Muslims. After Califat Committee, the issue of caliphate was almost entirely absent in the discourse of Indonesian Islam, except articulated by Darul Islam movement led by SM Kartosuwirjo, a leader of DI (Daulah Islamiyah) who initiated Indonesian Islamic State (NII) in 1940's. Kartosuwirjo was sentenced to death under Soekarno administration in 1063.

In addition, Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah almost never talk about the caliphate. Instead, they receive and develop concepts and praxis Indonesian nation-state. The NU and Muhammadiyah realize that the caliphate utopianism lies in the fact that Muslims in the region have adopted various nation-states

based on the reality of a nation with a tradition of distinctive society, culture and religion, geographical area, and different historical experiences.

Therefore, the ″unification″ in all regions of the Muslim world under a single political authority of Islamic Caliphate style is clearly and merely empty slogan.[22] The vast majority of mainstream Muslims in Indonesia is generally incorporated in NU, Muhammadiyah and so forth in across the country and nation clearly rejected ISIS, which is considered as a global terrorist organization by the claim ″caliphatism″ which proved to be full of violence and brutality.[23]

***

REFERENCES:

Sahrasad, Herdi & Chaidar, Al. 2012. *Islamism & Fundamentalism*. Loksumawe, Aceh: University of Malikussaleh Press.

Sahrasad, Herdi & Chaidar, Al. 2000. *Negara Madinah: Refleksi tentang Agama dan Pluralisme*. Jakarta: Madani Press.

Chaidar, Al. 1999, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia SM Kartosoewirjo:Fakta dan Sejarah Darul Islam*. Jakarta: Darul Falah.

Chaidar, Al. 2002. "Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Darul Islam's Response Towards Indonesian Democracy, 1949–1982." Paper in a conference on regional workshop on ''Contemporary Islamic Movements in Southeast Asia: Militancy, Separatism,

[22] Dhuha Hadiyansyah & Herdi Sahrasad, "ISIS: Terorisme dan Islamisme," *paper*, School of Adab and Humanities, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, 2014.

Terrorism and Democratisation Process,''organized by The RIDEP Institute/FES, Bogor, 2002.

Chaidar, Al. 2015. "Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: An Anthropological Analysis of Darul Islam,

Jamaah Islamiyyah, and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid." *Paper*, Post graduate, University of Indonesia, Depok.

Toynbee, A.J. 1972. *A Study of History Illustrated*. Cambridge: Oxford University Press.

Toynbee, A.J. 1979. *An historian's approach to religion*. Cambridge: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, Abner. 1974. *Two-dimensional Man*. London: Tavistock.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Saifuddin, Achmad Fedyani. 2005. *Antropologi Kontemporer: Suatu Pengantar Kritis Mengenai Paradigma*. Jakarta: Prenada Media.

SANTOSO, ISIS AND GLOBALIZATION OF TERRORISM[1]

AFTER being chased, attacked and surrounded by about 3.000 police and military forces in the forest area of Poso, Central Sulawesi, finally Santoso (Abu Wardah), as a fugitive terrorist be terminated. In our opinion, this is *"the struggle for the real"* (to borrow a Clifford Geertz's metaphor) by the Police/Army to address challenges Santoso group who feel mightyand powerful in the Poso jungle. Santoso group has joined ISIS (Islamic State of Syria and Iraq) and build a power base in Poso to struggle against what the so-called "thaghut regime" in their perception and opinion.

In this regard, actors and designers of the Bali bombings, *Ustadz* Ali Imron, told the authors that after the murder of Santoso, the future of terrorism could be more desperate and awful, will not easily be killed, let alone embryos of ISIS (Islamic State of Syria and Iraq) in Indonesia has been growing with its global network, where the paradigm of ISIS is that the Muslims who disagree with them as the unbelievers, deserve to be killed, while they are ready to attack the government of a state at any time.

Mujahidin of East Indonesia (MIT) led Santoso (Abu Wardah); he believes has been affiliated with ISIS. Remember that an Indonesian citizen named Abu Muhammad al Indonesi are also the Santoso's network, has appeared in a video to invite hundreds other citizens to join

[1] Revision of paper presented to "Sempimti POLRI" , in Jakarta, July 18, 2016, with the topics "Gerakan Terorisme Transnasional" (The Movement of Transnational Terrorism)

ISIS and has recently happened repeatedly departure to Syrian citizen allegedly linked to ISIS.

Ali Imron is the designer and maker of bombs in cafes of Paddy`s Pub and the Sari Club in Kuta, Legian, Bali on October 22, 2002. The first Bali bombing has been into mourning for the whole world because about 202 people, including 164 foreign tourists were killed pathetically in the incident

Yesterday, Ali Imron from behind prison reminded us, only 10 of the 400 alumni of Afghanistan who commit acts of terrorism involving Santoso in their action and it's been shocking the world. What if hundreds of others doing the same abominations? It was horrible.

Terrorism in Indonesia: the Tip of the Iceberg?

In today's era of globalization of terrorism, Santoso Group is just the tip of the iceberg of the real-actual and potential strength of terrorism in Indonesia, that interlaced and connected with global networking, which they have imagined solidarity among globalized Islam radicalists, - to borrow Asef Bayat's perspective, a Middle East expert and Islam Politics from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA.

Every terrorist attack anywhere and wherever, in Belgium, France, the US, Turkey, Middle East and so on, tend to trigger resonance, stimulate appetite and motivate terrorist groups in Indonesia to act, in response amid the globalization of terrorism itself.

The spread of the ideology of radical Islamism, according to Oliver Roy-, continued to seep due to injustice, corruption, oppression and socio-economic disparities are increasing sharply tapered. The situation is compounded by, consciously or unconsciously by leaders, elites and the state apparatus, the intrusion of friction or even ideological-religious-political conflicts from the level of middle class to the lower class. All too often we see on the television screen how terrorist groups shoot out with the police, or the FPI (Front of Islam Defender) and other paramilitary Muslims who clashed with officers, and many more such cases.

We have to admit, after the passage of the New Order era, Indonesian reformation era past dozen years, entered a phase of friction and clash of ideology that is relatively sharp. Religious ideology, often accompanied by violence and other forms of emotional expression, change into an ideology of radical opposition that is strong enough, even with a relatively small number of supporters. In many cases, they are sporadic, brutal and frightening. The ideology of Islam in Indonesia at this period appears in its hardest and roughest form: terrorism.

From the confessions of terrorism suspects of the October 12, 2002 Bali bombings, Imam Samudra, for example, states "... *Fighting the US and its allies is the command of Allah and His Messenger, either directly or indirectly"* and that, clearly an expression of religious emotion. Imam even expressed his attitude to the firm and simple: "... *avenge injustice and tyranny of the US and its allies against Muslims with the intention to stop his injustice."*

There is a value that works and dictates their minds. Ali Ghufron for example, stated that the bombing was "*act of devotion to God*." Thus, it is possible Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, Amrozi and his group felt a *delusion of grandeur*, and a feeling that they hold or represent or get edicts and become part of the elements of greatness believes him to carry out a special mission from the God.[2]

The terrorists always felt themselves to be "God's warriors" fighting to Allah (battle for God, to borrow the poetic language of Karen Armstrong) who are called to act in the name of God and religion, to "hand of God" on earth to "realize" wrath in the form of resistance: the bombings and other terrorist acts.

In fact, the Imam Samudra, bombing was carried out the orders of God in the *Quran surah An-Nisaa* verse 74-76. This is clearly erroneous interpretation, even misguided. As a result of the interpretation and expression of religious emotion that delusive, then tragedy ensued and a large amount of speculation arose in the midst of the public.

Attacks of Terror and Speculation

The attacks of Santoso Group and tragedy of terrorist bomb attacks in Bali, Makassar, Jakarta, Ambon, Poso and other places in Indonesia, have led to a series of speculations of the apologists to the *a priori*.

The first speculation is about who the perpetrators of terror attacks were very well planned and carried out by people who have advanced the technical knowledge. The culprit is

[2] Nova Riyanti Yusuf, "Delusion of Grandeur", *Gatra*, October 18, 2003.

arbitrarily identified as anti-US / Western, anti-Israel, anti-democratic, anti-capitalist economic strength, and global anti-military.

The second is speculation about the motives of the terrorists in carrying out acts of excessive destruction of places where the strength of the economic, political, and military of the West is located.

The third speculation is about what the goals that will be aimed towards the US/West and Israel. The culprit is allegedly identified as Islamic fundamentalists who today became the mortal enemy of the US/West, group of Osama bin Laden who used to hide in Afghanistan.

Osama bin Laden in February 1998 had issued a fatwa against the Jews and the Christians and became a role model for almost all suspected terrorists

In addition to bin Laden, the world community assumes that the culprit is a radical Salafi or the scripturalists/Islamic fundamentalists who have doctrinal relationship with ISIS or Al Qaeda network or its ramifications/fractions thereof.

Because the United States is present everywhere, anywhere in the world, including in Indonesia, as it is known, the terrorists and the Islam scripturalists/fundamentalist in Indonesia was very characteristic anti-US, anti-Israel, anti-democratic, anti-capitalist, and anti-global military.

Their motive, as far as can be analyzed from the character of US foreign policy over the years, is the attitude of hatred toward the US/West - according to them - perception secular, anti-Islamic and too possessive and over-protective of Israel. While speculation about his next target, is the usual

response of the loss of a sense of security and fear of the US/Western people requiring an immediate answer to what might happen.

This speculation is reasonable once formed because of this incident was so sudden, massive enough and synchronously with tremendous power destroyed. Speculation is also reasonable because it has caused enormous anger of the people and leaders of the US/West who is comfortable living in modernity, secularism and economic prosperity suddenly have to face an embarrassing nightmare. The US/West People are not the first time the face of the terrorist attacks. For the Islam fundamentalists and radicalists-which lay better known by the term 'the terrorist'- against the US/ West is to carrying out personal liability, a global jihad against the Jews and the Christians.

Thus, the US/West also has put Muslim terrorists as enemies since 1979 (which led to the name "Ayatollah Khomeini" as the name for the enemy perceived it) at the time of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and culminated in the events of the gulf crisis of the 1990s (which appears the name "Saddam Hussein" as an enemy).

With the killing or the arrest of the suspects of terrorism in Indonesia and in some Southeast Asian countries and even in America and Europe, increasingly shows us that the terrorist organization's network is very extensive, aligning globally and mondially. [3]

Although morally and international diplomacy terrorists attacked the "war discourse" are pushing them as "the

[3] Seth Mydans, "Militant Islam Unsettles Indonesia And Its Region," *New York Times*, September 21, 2001.

coward", ''extremists, the savages '', "the inhuman", "people are happy at the expense of others", and " the mental illness", but the terrorists are constantly emerging in the political map of Indonesia and the world until now to deliver messages that are very difficult to interpret.

Because the so hidden enemy of this one, it has given to the rising impression of mystery and the psychological fear. For the people of the US/West, terrorism is a ghost (Specter) others who have faced the US/West after phantom of communism gone, a form of ideological enemy, as well as the new spiritual enemy ever remind magnified by Samuel Huntington in *the Clash of Civilization*. Douglas E. Streusand even dared to mention "that Specter is Islam", which was later identified by the public in layman AS/West as "green peril", the dangers Green.[4]

And, with the events of the attack on the WTC and Pentagon 11.09.2001, the name of Osama bin Laden emerged as an "enemy" to restore the trust of the public AS/West against his government in dealing with terrorism from Muslims.'[5]

For us, in the context of Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world, the problem of terrorism raises many dilemmas: between keeping the feelings of Muslims and law enforcement, the rule of law, which must be enforced.

Moreover, there is a fact that the attack of Santoso group and other brutal terrorist attacks has taken place, so the state enemy must be defined to then take the next steps before

[4] Leon T. Hadar, "The Green Peril: Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat", *Policy Analysis,* No. 77 August 27, 1992.

[5] Eric Pianin and Bob Woodward, "Terror Concerns of U.S. Extend to Asia: Arrests in Singapore and Malaysia Cited", *Washington Post*, January 18, 2002.

executing the terrorists as "criminals", although they continue to hide behind the religious symbols and reasons . Terrorism is a crime against humanity, which is an extraordinary crime

Again, back to Santoso as the subject matter, in which he has been terminated with all of his radical adventures, then the society and state must remain vigilant and anticipatory. Santoso is one of the terrorist'skingpins that had been targeted in the de-radicalization program, but it is proved that he is even more rampant and with a global network of owned, it appears that he was increasingly confident until his death

Santoso group along with his tissues and cells are already affiliated with ISIS, and that means terrorism in Indonesia has integrated itself with the world-class, global terrorism. Therefore, surveillance in the area where there is a terrorist should be tightened to restrict their movements.

The image of Santoso as ex the government guided de-radicalization which proved even became an important figure in the national and global terror networks should be an important lesson for the country.

Deradicalisation should not just be a "project", because the impact can be fatal and become a boomerang for the government and society.

Vigilance, introspective and alertness of the state (and society) will be needed to scrape and tackle terrorism after the killing of Santoso. Counterattack from the Group of Santoso should be anticipated, and very likely "the new Santoso, the other Santoso" would be popping back here and there. That is the challenge for our society and state in the

road ahead, related to transnationalization of terrorism and globalization of terror complicating the matters in the political-economic sector, security and law under reform era.

ISIS, Indonesia and the New Revival of Islamism Ideology

Up to now about 518 Indonesian citizens suspected of joining with ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). According to Sidney Jones of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), already more than 200 Indonesian citizens who had left and joined the movement of "terrorist" in Syria two years ago. While, according to *The Intercept* (July 8, 2015), two pilots Indonesia (Ridwan Agustin or Ridwan Ahmad al-Indunesiy and captain Tommy Hendratno or Tommy Abu Al Fatih Hendratno) that was once the state security apparatus and then to pilot an airline multinational, joined by ISIS last year.

This essay attempts to answer a puzzle that arose over what the underlying motives seediness affluent professionals, such as Ridwan Agustin and Tommy Hendratno, who are tempted to become soldiers of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or better known as ISIS?

Many then worried about the choice of life lived in the age of two professionals who are still very productive. Not a few others who were questioned about the motives both joined the army ISIS, defending something that might be considered ideal somewhere faraway land outside Indonesia. Even among politicians in the Western world concerned with the track record of those who previously joined the state security forces are highly respected in the

region.

Earlier, a police officer active in Jambi, Syahputra (Abu Azzayn al Indunesiy) left his wife and children and depart via Medan to Syria for jihad against what they perceived as "anti-Islamic" (enemy), the regime of Bashir al-Assad. His status as a member of the state police's paying-off would invite a big question mark: what's behind all this? His actions leave his wife and kids for jihad there; throw themselves into the arena of war, certainly not an ordinary rational decision. There is something unidentifiable from the social reality of this problematic issue.

All the worries and anxieties of various circles are very rational. The professionals on the basis of socio-economic status of the middle class and against the background of relatively moderate and pious Muslim family is certainly expecting a real answer to a question that is puzzling. Syahputra actions divorced his wife and went to a foreign land to fight certainly can not be explained from the perspective of psycho-social generic. Sure there are theological reasons or even eschatological of this unusual action.

Money and Sexual Motives?

From a modern and academic perspective, a lot of analysis of financial attractiveness ISIS offered to anyone who is pleased to join a multi-national army. This opportunity was welcomed by many people who, according to the calculations of various experts, coming from the marginali-zed who seek a more viable economic livelihood. In fact, there is also mention of sexual motives underlying the desire

of a small part of Indonesian citizens to participate in a war or conflict in Syria and the Iraq.

When widespread ban against people who allegedly about to depart for Syria in various airports in Indonesia and Malaysia since 2013 and 2014, the analysis of economic interest as a motive is dominating explanation of the background of these marginal groups. Almost no one else analysis linking him to the ideological consciousness of the ISIS supporting actor.

Even, to borrow Daniel Bell's thesis (1960) and Francis Fukuyama's perspective (1996) that the ideology is dead and can not affect the rise of the East . However, analysis of economic interests, or any material motive, be able to explain why the professionals involved in a conflict that was terrible for many people.

It takes one other explanation academically accountable to provide answers to the phenomenon that is shocking the world. Anthropologically, D'Andrade and Strauss (1992) has filed a cultural motif ideological nature of the phenomenon of the rise of armed resistance and communal conflicts in various parts of the world. Gupta and Ferguson (1992) tried to explain the motives of cultural models such as "a sense of loss of territorial root" in which the values of nationalism and patriotism has begun to fade or is the occurrence of "an erosion of the cultural distinctiveness of place" which then produces a byproduct of globalization which is referred to as "deterritorialization of identity" where identity is no longer attached to the place where one was born or brought up in a period crucial formative age.

Identity-based locality replaced by what has since long been

known as an ideology. The Islamic ideology has become an option for two pilots and one policeman from Indonesia which must have the state doctrine under the ideology of Pancasila and the results of the tax paid by the citizens who live in a democracy.

Ridwan Agustin and Tommy Hendratno and Syahputra who have experienced this secular ideological indoctrination and then replace it with a new ideology embraced. Where nationalism and patriotism that was taught by the country?

Nationalism and patriotism are place based-ideology and will be easily lost when memories of the place was fading amid cosmopolitanism of secular and materialistic world.

Edward Said (1979) describes the situation of the ideology that permeates the boundaries of nationality and other localities as ″a generalized condition of Homelessness″. This is what we may call a transnational religious ideology that has been spreading since the end of cold war between the Capitalist Bloc and the Bloc Communist / Socialist. Both of these ideological blocs, by the transnational Islamic movement, including ISIS, is considered to have spread mental pollution and threatens the sanctity of religion. The concept of ″pollution (contamination) and purity″ (Louis Dumont, 1970) is then developed academically to explain why ideological choice be rational in the choices of materials and more economical.

Ideological analysis becomes important when the explanations of economic motives, socio-psychological and politics became paralyzed in the face of this problematic social reality (Talal Asad, 1979; Louis Althusser, 1977; George Marcus, 1986; Maurice Bloch, 1983 and 1986). Renato

Rosaldo (1988) shows how ideology no longer know where the boundaries and permeates into various groups that he describes as "people without culture" is.

The ideology of jihadism that is considered responsibly, or at least are behind all bloody insurgency with all its sociological messiness, could at least provide an explanation of the phenomenon of the return of ideology in the analysis of the social sciences and humanities.

Social Awareness of Radicalists

The tendency of the more material and social analysis on the various symptoms of the emergence of resistance movements and religious conflicts must be balanced with adequate cultural analysis. The return of radical Islam ideology (radical Islamism) for many people from different socioeconomic backgrounds showed that the non-material factors far more powerful in influencing motives of a person or group of people to commit acts of resistance.

Geertz (1973) states that ideology is part of a cultural system that maps the problematic social realities and becomes a matrix for the creation of social awareness. Ideology is the underlying force and spirit for Ridwan Agustin, Tommy Hendratno, Syahputra and also Heri Kustiyanto to renounce all of worldly adequacy and dispose of the material world they profess ever before. They head to new hopes which still unclear materially, but its is yet very clear ideological: the promise of heaven for the martyrs and intercession for the nuclear family and relatives.

The matrix of social awareness is built by people who feel

the moral injury (moral torment) caused by the attack of other ideologies (Joel Robbins, 2004). Social awareness of the feeling of oppression is then moved them to avenge the wounds are still gaping moral them. Social awareness is not built on the basis of nationalism or ethnicity, but stood as transnational as a new consciousness called by Michael Francis Laffan (2003) as the Islamic nationhood. This is where the concept of ummah built as a social consciousness that affects a wide range of people to participate in the establishment of an Islamic state in Syria and Iraq.[6]

The Laffan's concept (2003) on the spirit of defending the country in the Islamic community is so booming and at least be a political interest for other movements. Islamic ideology of nationhood is affecting many radical movements and terrorism in various parts of the world. The radical Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (East Indonesia Mujahidin-MIT) led Santoso in Poso immediately declared the oath of allegiance (allegiance) to the caliph Al Baghdadi, who led ISIS (2013), as well as Boko Haram in Negeria drained with a demonstration of force shown by ISIS (2014). Some of the Mujahidin factions in Syria, Afghanistan, Palestine, Lebanon, and other regions expressed solidarity to support and join the movement which is considered as a representation of their subconscious to deter the enemies of religion that have carved moral torment against Muslims during centuries.

Even recently Fakhruddin bin Kasem Din alias Robot, former commander of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in

[6] See, Michael Francis Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

Julok, East Aceh (09.07.2015) expressed his desire to join ISIS. Despite the stalled political passion is regarded by many as a step sensational, at least problematic social reality is influenced by widespread nationalistic ideology of Islam that is exhaled by ISIS. The image of an Islamic state de facto became the main attraction for many of the resistance movement. Al Qaeda was overwhelmed by the attacks ISIS in the bases they had seized earlier in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda lost quickly in realizing the ideals of the archaic highly desirable among many radical and fundamentalist Islam, namely the desire to have a tamkin (state) is definitive. Tanzhim position (movement) Al Qaeda is slowly began shifting by ISIS diligent exposing the savagery and violence as glad tidings and warnings to satisfy the old grudges over oppression and colonialism under the system of capitalism and neo-liberalism of the West.

Cultural or ideological motive is what might be being sown by the professionals who have been feeling the affluent life still is not enough theological and eschatological. There is a spiritual drought acute there. There hereafter objectives underlying their actions in joining ISIS far in Syria there. The Syria, far country for Indonesian Muslims, is not considered much and is not seen as providing material wealth for the satisfaction of carnal lust, but the war was a chance for them to reach their theological and eschatological desire to go to heaven and mingle with the angels- that according to their own view- are always virgin.

Among the terrorists and radical Islamists, there is a belief of Islamic State, an ideology that can not be exchanged for any

material reward, and this kind of millenarian ideology that had been sought by the radical Muslims, including the ISIS followers and sympathizers in Indonesia, and when they found it, then any earthly delights will be left with immediately.

***

REFERENCES:

Asmarani, Devi. "Indonesia struggles to keep citizens from joining ISIS." at: *http ://www.themalaymailonline.com/ opinion/devi-asmarani/article/indonesia-struggles-to-keep-citizens-from-joining-isis#sthash.3j0sOUJd.dpuf*

Bazzi, Mohamad. 2015. "Trumpeting Islamophobia helps ISIS." *The Straits Times,* December 12, 2015.

Clinton, Hillary. 2014. *Hard Choice.* New York: Simon & Schuster

Cooley, John. 2002. *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism,* Pluto Press

Huda Ismail, Noor . 2004. "NIIS Indonesia dan Evolusi Teror Mondial."' *Kompas daily*, 07 Agustus 2014.

Elmihwar, newspaper, Egypt (6/8/2014)

Hadiyansyah, Dhuha & Sahrasad, Herdi. 2014. "ISIS: Terorisme dan Islamisme." *Paper.* School of Adab and Humanities . UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta,2014.

Hwang, Julie Chernov and Huda Ismail, Noor. 2015. ''There and Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria." *The Middle East Journal*, January 27, 2015.

Kuncahyono, Trias. 2014. "Radikalisme: Genesis ISIS." *Kompas daily*, August 2, 2014.

Mutawakkil Alallah, M. Hasan. 2014. "ISIS dan Perlunya Pergub; Ketua Tanfidziyah PW NU Jawa Timur." *Jawa Pos*, August 9, 2014.

Roy, Oliver. 2004. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah,* New York: Columbia University Press.

__________ "Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict." Report 6 of Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC). January 30, 2014.

WAHHABISM, TERRORISM AND THE PARADIGM OF TAKFIRI

RECENTLY, in Madura there is a song called "Wahhabi" that very straight forward describe what the flow is considered as the Islam scripturalist/radicalists/ fundamentalist by many. The song describes the Wahhabi does not like birthday of the prophet, does not want *tahlilan*, disagree grave pilgrimage, does not recognize *qunut*, and assume all Muslims outside the group as heretical, heretic and infidel. Stigma often attributed to the extreme Wahhabi and labels are often directed to this group. In many ways this song is true, but not all Wahhabi behave that way.

In the midst of accusations against the Wahhabi thought has humiliated Islam, it must be recognized that there are many services of Wahhabi groups in defense of the oppressed, especially the followers of Islam. Almost certainly mostly defended by Wahhabi are Muslims regardless of their sects and schools of thought. The humanitarian aid was given the Wahhabis spread throughout the world in the form of philanthropy charity, alms, sacrifices and the construction of mosques and educational institutions.

Admittedly, a lot of Wahhabi services in defense of the oppressed of the earth. Aid to Rohingya refugees came from Saudi Arabia, which is considered as a Wahhabi state. We must assess these Wahhabi more fairly before dropping stigma or label radicals, extremists and terrorists to everything that comes out of mainstream Wahhabism. Though there are Wahhabis anti-jihad, anti-uprising, and

also can accept the Wahhabi grave pilgrimage, *tahlil, maulidan* and are still willing to come to the feast-feast to eat the meal.

Today, the phenomenon of widespread clash between the Wahhabi sect and the traditional Islam has made many people wonder about what the Wahhabis, how its history and the danger of the outbreak of flow or sect considered this radicalism?

In the view of Anthropology, religion is a cultural element hardest to change (Achmad Fedyani Saifuddin, 2012) and the influence of the most difficult to control (Houston Smith, 1976). Clash of civilizations or clashes of civilization (Samuel Huntington, 1978) occur because of the religious factor. Clash within civilizations or clashes within civilization also occur because of the religious factor (Hans Dieter Senghaas, 2002). One of the most religious understanding accused contributed much conflict, war, terrorism and communal violence is, understands Wahhabism. So we need to understand Wahhabi sociological, theological, historical, political and anthropological.

This article is an executive summary for the layman or some sort of policy briefs for the super busy, the ingredients are collected from the "Wahhabi" itself became the subject of research by the writers over the years.

About Wahhabi Movement

The Movement of Wahhabi initiated by Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-1792), a reformer (mujaddid) of Islam of Najd, Saudi Arabia, which comes amid a long upset

Muslims under static four schools (Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali and Hanafi).

Abdul Wahab was a *mufti* from Suudiyah Daulah, the forerunner to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that we know today. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab called on his people to monotheism, just pray to God without intermediaries, not glorify the saints and learned men or scholars or people who are more pious as special and refusing to worship graves.

Wahhabi embrace egalitarian principles in worship. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab sect is regarded as the fifth after Shafi, Hanbali, Hanafi and Maliki. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, many wrote that it is in line with the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al-Qayyim, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Because influenced by the ideas of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Wahhabi-ism is somewhat similar to the Hanbali sect. Wahhabi thoughts are then developed by Bin Baz, Utsaymin, Syeikh Ahmad Khan, Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, Rashid Ridha, Muhammad Abduh, HOS Tjokroaminoto, and SM Kartosoewirjo.

Later in the period of post-colonialism, the ideology of Wahhabi developed more systematically again by Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Qutb, Hassan al-Banna, Abul A'la Al-Mawdudi, Yusuf Qardawi, and Nasir Al Albani. Then during the revolution in Afghanistan this ideology is neatly packaged in books by Abdullah Azzam, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al Zawahiri, up to the period of the conflict Iraq and Syria by Abu Mus'ab As Shuri.

Typology of Wahhabism

Wahhabism are not monolithic, meaning that this group is also split into several variants of each other unfriendly or even hostile sometimes can also lead to bloody conflicts. Wahhabism is actually a generic term to describe or refer to the Salafi groups. However, due to the traditional Islam also claims itself as Salafism (who carry out the tradition *Salafussholeh*), then the label Wahhabi been so easily distinguish theologically with groups that are not Wahhabi. The Wahhabi terminology was used as a euphemism because there are certain groups who are very sensitive to the Salafi name.

Anthropologically, there are at least three types of Wahhabism in Indonesia that the writers can observe.

First, The *Wahhabi Shururi* considered anti birthday, anti adzan twice, anti tahlil, anti pilgrimage grave and anti jihad and often assumes the public against the government as *bughot* (rebels).

Second, The *Jihadi Wahhabi*, namely Wahhabis groups that focus on jihad and tried to resist any government policy, also has a similar rejection in the first group. Wahhabi Jihadists in Indonesia has appeared with the name of Darul Islam (DI) in West Java in 1949 [with the character Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo], Central Java in 1950 [Amir Fatah Widjaja Kusuma], South Sulawesi in 1951 [Kahar Muzakkar], South Kalimantan 1952 [Ibn Hajar] and Aceh in 1953 [Daud Beureu'eh], then *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) 1992 through 2010, which accused Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar and Abubakar Ba'asyir, Dr Azahari, Noordin Mat Top, Amrozi, Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron and Ali Imron.

Lastly, the groups that appears in the Jihadi Wahhabi 'Al Qaeda' that formed Tanzhim Veranda of Mecca (TQSM) and many of its activists were arrested after the discovery of *i'dad* activities (war preparation/war games) in Bukit Jalin, Aceh Besar in 2010. The *Jihadi Wahhabi* group is now more calm and choose the path of missionary endeavor with wisdom, peace and sage (*dakwah bil hikmah*) in their daily activities.

Third, the *Takfiri Wahhabi* that so often accuses others outside the group as heretics or even pagan. This group is in Aceh, Java, Sulawesi, and other region today, and still faithful to his pledge of allegiance to support the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or better known as ISIS. This group is radical in word and deed, This *Takfiri Wahhabi* group appear more frightening, could be more desperate and awful, will not easily be killed, let alone embryos of ISIS (Islamic State of Syria and Iraq) in Indonesia has been growing with its global network, where the paradigm of ISIS is that the Muslims who disagree with them as the unbelievers, deserve to be killed, while they are ready to attack the government of a state at any time.

Because of the conflict of interest, in their own internal Wahhabi circles also occur mutual accusations and recriminations, in which many groups of Wahhabi involved in action such as blasphemous and heretical among them.

Shururi Wahhabi circles have often accused the Wahhabi Jihadists as the rebels, betrayers (*bughot*). *Jihadi Wahhabi* more passive and did not react socially and politically. The *Jihadi Wahhabi* prefer the worship *mahdhoh* (ritual) and avoid friction with any party, is active in various community events monotheism awareness.

While the *Takfiri Wahhabi* very hyperactive in his message and accused many Jihadi Wahhabi circles as heretical , heretic or infidel to many groups because they do not want to accept the caliphate of Al-Baghdadi in Syria and Iraq. Through social media *Takfiri Wahhabi* groups is indulgence call-call noisy and full of threats and accusations while showing its intolerant attitude assertively.

In the middle of Wahhabi gait in communal conflict in events Cumbok in Aceh (1946), Ambon (1999) Poso (2001) and other places, there is also a gait and movement of Wahhabi groups in political violence in South Sulawesi and gait of Wahhabi terrorism, played by Jemaah Islamiyah, Darul Islam, and so forth from 2000 to 2014.

In public perception, this then makes Wahhabi became the paragon of ugly irrefutable. Here, Wahhabi supposed to be performed as a paragon of beauty and scent of Islam in the eyes of the world. Incidents of violence in Iraq and Syria where ISIS shows the terrible cruelty has made Wahhabi as the party deemed theologically responsible for violence and barbarity.

***

INDONESIAN ISLAMISM: FROM MESSAGE OF BOMBING TO KHILAFAH, A PERSPECTIVE

ACTION of terrorist suicide bombing in Solo-Indonesia in July 2016 and terrorist attack in Thamrin, Jakarta in January 2016, were successful in media publicity. In the case of Solo suicide bomb, President Joko Widodo has encouraged to launch deradicalization program in Solo with the fund US$ 12 millions to eliminate terrorism and seeds of terrorist in Solo (Surakarta) as soon as possible.

David L and C Paletz Danielle Vinson (1992) revealed that to achieve the objectives, terrorist's action always published their action. Publications have been done in a way that is a typical terrorist Al Qaeda, Jamaah Islamiyah, ISIS and their network that successfully increase the value of the activities, owing to election time and place to attract the target, although not issued a statement. Also do not claim to be responsible.

In the last ten years, based on experience in Indonesia, nearly no terrorist group that was responsible. So practical, suicide bombing in Solo July 2016, Bali bombing 2002, and in Jakarta July 17, 2009 that shocked the JW Marriot Hotel and the Ritz Carlton Hotel, in the heart of the security of Mega Kuningan, Jakarta, there is no surety answered. It is rather clear to us that the bombing bring this dangerous message that seems to be related to the victory Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Boediono presidential election in the new few days just passed. These bombs have strong

relationship with the reaction among the radicals and fundamentalists against democracy.

In connection with terrorism, in the year 2007, in Islamabad, Pakistan bomb exploded in a presidential election campaign in that country on July 17. Target JW Marriot is a very soft target, the hotel is attacked twice before, but the explosion on Saturday night is the most formidable in the capital of Pakistan since the country joined the war against terror with the leaders of the United States at the end of 2001.

Terrorism in Indonesia is very strong relationship with the United States, anything that related to the capitalist countries will be targeted. Democracy ideology, for example, is a program the United States and allies anywhere, including in Indonesia. Of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the terrorists actually have a high resistance, not only because the issue of neo-liberalism, but this victory is seen as SBY victory of the United States in Indonesia where the institutions of democracy from the U.S. participated and intervened to the presidential election in Indonesia, such as IFES (International Foundation for Electoral System) and others. Bomb explosion at hotel JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton as well as political explosion because the issue of security and peace not finished in this republic. The terrorists take advantage of easily from the elite political conflicts in presidential elections, movement between the two versus one lap lap, between the strength of nationalist versus IFES (UnitedStates)intervened the presidential election.

Many people ask whether you want a message delivered with the Bali Bomb 2002, Jakarta bomb 2009, Solo 2016

suicide bomb July 17 bombing and so forth. This bomb is a clear reaction to the victory of SBY pro-US/West as President of Indonesia and he will rule this country until 2014. But, however, the terrorists do not desire to disrupt the vote counting results of presidential election by KPU (General Elections Commission). Evidence, no one poll is bombed by terrorists. For them, timing is important, but it is just simply because of the ease of access to reach the target.

This bomb is also a reaction to the plan of the coming football team Manchester United to Indonesia, not because of their choice to dislike a particular sport, but because the target is used as a foreigner (England), which is considered U.S. ally. This will also make a terrorist attack is not interested in the building if the Jakarta-Senayan sports rivalry football progress. Even the terrorist leader Osama bin Laden is like the Arsenal football club from the UK.

An implication of the Marriot bomb is a terrorist nation that makes this hotel as a permanent target. JW Marriot Islamabad has also twice bombed, so also in Jakarta. This means, the hotel will continue to be the terrorist attacks remain. This hotel may need to change the name to the names of other, more local or names of the other level of small resistance. If it does not change the name, the hotel will continue to be a terror bomb target. This hotel is the symbol of the presence of capitalism and liberalism in the United States anywhere in Pakistan and in Indonesia. Want to terrorist attacked the symbols is capitalism, democracy, neo-liberalism and the United States wherever it is located.

Indonesia is a soft target for the terrorists and their presence in Indonesia to be very comfortable because this country is a

fertile ground for radical movements and fundamentalists. Recognition of the crime of terrorism suspects Bomb Bali 12 October 2002, a clearly visible expression of religious emotions.

Ali Ghufron, one of the Bomb Bali terror suspects, even states with simple and emphatic gesture: *"... reply to tyranny and arbitrary rule of the US and allies against the Muslims with the intention that they will stop the oppression."*

There is a value that work and dictate the way they thought. Ali Ghufron, for example, states that the bombardment was the "action devoted to God." Then Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and the group felt a *delusion of grandeur*, represent or have any feelings or decree and be part of the elements of greatness that assure themselves have special mission from God. The terrorist always feel themselves as a "warrior of God" is one with a call to act in the name of God and religion, to "hand of God" on earth to realize "his wrath" of the same shape in the resistance on, bombardment.

In fact, the terrorist group is not new in the world of movement and the radical fundamentalists of Indonesia. The terrorist is the combination of the core teachings of radical fundamentalists and that meet in one point of planning the war against tyranny. In Indonesia, this terrorist group was small: (1) Jamaah Islamiyah, (2) Mujahidin Indonesia Timur led Santoso (East Indonesia Mujahidin) and (3) Darul Islam (limited to follow a course faction a hard line). However, as some found enclave terrorists in cities such as Palembang, and Cilacap, Semarang Central Java, shows that the proliferation of this group with a wide and fast. With

anxious hope, we feel that under SBY and even Jokowi presidency, it is very probably the state and society would continue to face this terror situation in Indonesia led to the terrorist front. For civil society, the business community and the state, the shadow of terrorism will still be a source of fear in the middle of vigilance.

About *Khilafah* (Islamic state)

In search of a solution to many complex problems in the archipelago, many Indonesians are in the peak of getting tired with the government's less effort towards combating poverty. Not to mention other issues like injustice, tyranny, corruption, lack of education and significant number of human rights violations. It is quite understood that the prolonged transition in Indonesia has not only given birth but also led to more loud voices of Islamic parties, calling for establishing *Khilafah* (Islamic state) as a way of building a better moral and prosperous nation.

Sounds like a promise, but for the pluralistic country like Indonesia this is not at all a good idea. *Khilafah* means combining Islam and politics in governance, and applying it in the archipelago having high diversities in religions, ethnics, cultures and economic disparity; *Khilafah* can be very dangerous.

Nonetheless, some Islamic parties and organizations have been inspired by transnational Middle East version of Islam. Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). This party is a real example of an Islamic political party that follows, to some extent, the teaching of *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (Muslim brotherhood)of Egypt.

Having motivated by the al-Qaeda, a notorious terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden, Jemaah Islamiyah has been modeled by the style of al-Qaeda's Islamic Arabism. In addition, both Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia also take that Islamic Arabism as their teaching direction. The Islamic Arabism also seems to have been the cloak of Islamic teaching in many *pesantren* (Islamic boarding), though not all, students at the *pesantren* are potential to breeding radicals.

And with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's having International *Khilafah* Conference in Jakarta this month, it is no more than an evidence that the teaching of religions in developing countries like Indonesia can be potential tool to reach a political gain by building practical relationship between individuals and groups. It is a transformation of religious political system, also known as *religio-political system.*

This is also what Clifford Geertz claimed to be "religions mindedness," a process of how the religion ideology comes into existence.

In this context, the religion ideology has potential power to ignite fanaticism and radicalization that unquestionably can erupt violence and destruction. Any religion in this position will have two functions; building better integrity among its followers while creating conflict and violation.

The tragedy of Bali bombs, Australian Embassy bomb in Jakarta, suicide bomb in Solo and other brutal acts done by anarchists like those from Islamic Defender Front (FPI) — where they use violence and destructive acts to close down businesses that they think is not in accordance of *sharia* like bar and café since they sell alcoholic beverages — are

examples where fundamentalists have shown intolerant exclusiveness and belligerent sense of supremacy in facing minority communities.

While such brutality to some people is no less than a destruction by anarchists, many perceives that the stark terror attitude is a pure motivation by a number of Islamic extremist groups having their hidden agenda.

Facing this worrisome development in a pluralistic country, which the country itself indeed still struggle with many internal affairs, we really think that all Islamic groups should stop using violence in dealing with any contention or disagreement. They should not monopolize the truth of what they believe to indoctrinate others.

The debate over *khilafah* is of a great relevance today, particularly with Hizbut Tahir is preparing an international conference to be held on August 12. The conference will definitely focus on building an Islamic state. However, whether an Islamic state is relevant to the Indonesia's pluralistic communities should be taken in wise consensus.

Therefore, an open dialog or interfaith discussion between Islam and other religions, whether they are from upper class or middle class of society, or even among grass roots should be what Indonesian government look for and we believe that promoting pluralism will guarantee better harmonious living, togetherness in addition to maintaining the nation sovereignty in the country where pluralistic melting pot has prevailed

Toward Cultural and Civilizational Dialogues?

The terrorist attacks of Solo last July 2016, in WTC, New York September 11, 2001, Bali Bombing 2002, JW Marriot bombing 2004 and so on, has encouraged the need for the significance of cultural and civilizational dialogues between Islam and the West. The cultural-civilizational dialogues between the West and Islamic societies has gained growing importance after the tragedy of Black September.

In this regard, development cooperation is imperative for the West and Islamic World. It is largely equal to politics beyond cultural borders and depends upon building bridges between cultures-civilizations of the West and Islamic world, and finding ways of cultural and civilizational understanding in order to enter into a dialogue about ethical, religious, and political differences and similarites with others cultures-civilizations and in respone to the criticism which since then has been expressed in islamic societies about Western politics towards developing countries.

The relationship between the West and Islam has been suffering from mutual wrong perception of each other which support anti western and anti Islamic feelings and attitudes. Each others cultures are predominantly interpreted as a monolitihic enemy and not, as it should be, an area of cultural deversity. For a long time, said Norbert Eschborn, the neighbor like relationship between Western and Islamic countries has not been maintained resulting in increasing tension on religious and cultural issues, such as the discussion about the ability of Islam to adjust its value system to the modern world. On the other hand, Islamic

extremist could be observed for more than a decade doing everything to pursue a course of action of politicizing culture and religion in accordance with their belief that *Islam is the solution to everything*, therefore, this long running process support the creation of an unreflected paradigm of Islam versus the West.

Given this background the approach of cultural differance must be supplemented with the perspective of cooperative coexistence. Mutual interest in and understanding of each otherâ€™s culture, history, and social relations are a necessary condition for the dialogue of the West with Islamic states and societies. Such a dialogue should not only underline similiarities between both cultures but also identify possible areas of conflict in order to mark the positive potential of religious, cultural and political exchange between both regions which are very heteregoneous within them and, at the same time, share a common history. (Norbert Eschborn, 2004).

As tension in the relationship between Western and Islamic cultures-civilizations have been growing, any kind of dialogue, therefore, has not only to be intensified but must take into consideration the changing situation of world politics.

Indonesia Islam and Challenges

Indonesia, as a muslim country, therefore, after the fall of President Soeharto, can be regarged as a champion of democracy or at least democratic transition for Muslim nation, although this must still be tested by the passage of time. It is natural that the West has viewed Indonesian

Islam, at least before the Bali bombing, as being Islam with a new face. In 1996, international media called Islam in Indonesia modernist, progressive, and a friend of the West and other cultures-civilizations and perceived it as an example of succesful harmony between muslim and modernity.

But, to borrow Anthony Reid's perspective, that Indonesian Islam still remains a *grossly understudied world* appears to be true today ever more than before. So, it is very timely to the West societies for research and study on Indonesian Islam that actually is very pluralistic and complicated, so often misunderstood by the Westerners. Of course, issue of terrorism is a real matter, especially after Bali bombing that has schocked Indonesian state and society.

Facing terrorism and Islam fundamentalism, no way out to solve the issues, except with cultural and civilizational dialogues and economic development cooperation between the West and Indonesia. These dialogues and cooperation are very contextual and pivotal to eradicate poverty, social unjust, backwardness, and multidimentional crises in Indonesian society, beside to improve mutual understanding.

So far, Indonesian society has fallen into *debt trap* amounted to about US$310 billions (state and private loans, according to Bank Indonesia data). That foreign debt, mostly the *odious debt*, has depleted economic resources of the people. Meanwhile imposition of *Washington Consensus* to Indonesia in conformity with IMF, World bank and WTO guidelines, has burdened the people economy in which most of them are the poor muslim. From this sensitive point, Islam has

been *rallying point* to youth, students, ulamas and scholars as a basic ideology *vis-a-vis* the West hegemony that they blame as the new imperialists in Indonesia under global capitalism.

But, is it Islam the only solution for everything, included as problem solver for poverty, social unjust and multi-dimentional crisis? Is it Islam the solution to everything?

The answer has not clear, even in fact it can be confusing. In reality, Islam has only provided values, ethics, norms and religious guides, not an instant panacea to the real problems that grasped the Indonesian Muslims. So it is imperative for ulamas (Islamic scholars), leaders and muslim inteligensia to make their *ummah* be aware and conscious that radicalism and violence is wrong answer in the wrong time to crackdown poverty, social unjust and multidimenstonal crises in Indonesia recent years.

Islam wolud be useful, beneficial and meaningful if it can provide real contribution such as ideas, thinking, solution and practical means in dealing with the real issues, so that the Indonesian Islam is more realistic and pragmatic than radicalistic, *catastrophic* and pessimistic in responding the nowadays and future challenges. Whether or not Indonesian Islam capable and credible in dealing with these worldly challenges, all of that depend upon their leaders, inteligentia and ulamas in reponse directively, quickly and effectively. But certainly, the caliphate is not the answer and radical Islamism will only provide further situation that plunged the ummah (Muslims) into disappointment, frustration and violence.

***

INDEX

N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

Y

ABOUT AUTHORS

***Al Chaidar**, a researcher of terrorism, a graduate with MA degree from University of Indonesia, and now PhD student at Department of Anthropology, Post Graduate Program, University of Indonesia, and he is a Lecturer at Faculty of Social-Political Sciences, University of Malikussaleh, Aceh, Indonesia. He was formerly a visiting fellow at ISEAS, and NTU Singapore, Kobe University, Frankfurt and Leiden University.*

***Prof. Blake Respini**, a graduate of Stanford University and San Francisco State University, the U.S., and he teaches courses in Comparative Politics and International Relations at the Department of Political Science, San Francisco State University, USA. Blake Respini is also a Professor of Political Science at Berkeley City College, and De Anza College. He was formerly a visiting Fellow at Pusat Studi Islam dan Kenegaraan (PSIK) University of Paramadina*

***Herdi Sahrasad** is Associate Director the Media Institute and Pusat Studi Islam dan Kenegaraan (Centre for Islam and State Studies), Paramadina University and he is a senior Lecturer at Paramadina Graduate School, Jakarta.He is a graduate from University of Padjadjaran, and hold PhD from the State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta. He was formerly visiting fellow at CSEAS Monash University Australia, LEAD Institute New York, Indiana University, Universiy of Washington Seattle and UC Berkeley, USA.*

Indonesians similarly may share Islam with others across the globe, but Islam can fulfill only part of the nationalist vision. Of course this is especially true in light of the tens of millions of Indonesians who are not Muslims.

The challenge for Indonesia is to find a place for sharia that neither subverts the uniqueness of Indonesia from rest of the Islam nor undermines non-Muslim Indonesians.

Indonesian Islamic scholarship has long and deep ties to the Middle East that form a strong bond with the rest of the Muslim world and recent decades have seen what is often called the Islamization or sometimes even the Arabization of Indonesia.

It would thus be a mistake to dismiss Indonesia as a worthy example of what the type of democratic society that Islam has produced even if it would be a mistake to assume that what can work in Indonesia could be exported to rest of the Islamic world.

ISBN 153-9-137-83X
9781539137832